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Introduction
The subject of this thesis is a analysis of the relationship between population
and economic growth. Everybody knows that population growth is jointly
determined by births, deaths and, in an opened economy, by migration flows.
Actually, this work focuses on fertility, whereas mortality and migration are
not taken into consideration. As far as economic growth is concerned, we
measure it as the rate of growth of per capita output. Within this work,
the level of output is determined by physical and human capital accumula-
tion. Our main interest is to study how economic growth and demographic
behavior interact. On the one hand, the level and evolution of macroeco-
nomic variables, such as the growth rate of output or technological progress,
affect individual and demographic behavior. On the other hand, individ-
ual decisions concerning saving and the allocation between the quantity of
children and their quality affect the evolution of the economy through the
channels of physical and human capital accumulation. Individual and demo-
graphic behavior are analyzed in two main cases: the case where parents are
self-interested and the case where parents care about the wellbeing of their
children. Within each case, we examine different social and economic con-
texts (we consider undeveloped markets, where it is not possible to save, the
case where individuals have access to the capital market, the case where it is
possible to invest in education, the role of State, different types of parental
altruism, etc.).
The first chapter of this work is a survey on different theories on popula-
tion growth developed in literature. According to the principal subject of the
thesis, the survey presents theories on fertility, omitting any consideration on
economic literature on mortality. In addition, we have to stress that the focus
of the survey is on economic theories on fertility, i.e. theories that explain
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demographic behavior through economic factors and economic mechanisms.
However, at the end of the chapter we briefly present alternative approaches
(anthropology and demography) to economics, comparing the pros and cons.
In the survey, we follow two criteria: first of all, we present different economic
theories following a chronological order, then we focus on the more recent
theories on demographic transition following “a theme criterion” (we pool
theories that give the same explanation to the demographic transition).
Considering different theories in chronological order, we briefly present
ancient and not strictly economic theories, such as the pre-Malthusian doc-
trines. The first ones to discuss and be interested in population were philoso-
phers, emperors and their advisors. Their main interest was, in modern
words, the “optimal population size” that guarantees the perfect running of
political, social and military organizations. In order to reach the optimal
population size, the attention shifted on the relation between the sustainable
population size and available resources. The inquiry involved the relation
between two variables: population and income. The first systematic analysis
on the relationship between income and fertility was developed by Thomas
Malthus at the end of the eighteenth century. We can say that, starting
from Malthus, a general anti-populationist attitude dominated the economic
thought until the second half of the twentieth century. On the contrary, from
the 1960’s we notice that population growth has been positively related to
income growth rate. Initially, population was treated as an exogenous vari-
able. Only after Becker (1960) we can identify a new phase characterized by
two important elements: a) population becomes an endogenous variable and
its microfoundations are taken into consideration, b) the interest shifts into
the attempt to explain the non-monotonic relation between the two variables
(income and fertility), that is the Demographic Transition.
The second part of the survey focuses on modern theories that investigate
the non-monotonic relation between income and population growth. We
briefly present the main strands of the economic literature and the different
explanations to the Demographic Transition: the role of income effect on the
trade-off between quantity and quality of children, the importance of gender
gap, the decline in infant and child mortality, the old age security hypothesis,
technological progress and return on human capital and income distribution.
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The second chapter is a microeconomic model based on the work devel-
oped by Cigno starting from Economics of the Family (1991). This chapter
analyses the individual behavior in a non-altruistic framework, where parents
are self-interested and have children only to guarantee an economic support
for themselves in the last period of their life, according to the old age security
hypothesis. In this analysis we adopt a Family Economics overlapping gener-
ations model where we focus on individual decisions concerning the quantity
of children and the amount of monetary transfers between generations. Any
couple of transfers toward the previous generation (the old parents) and the
next one (the children) is called “family constitution”.
Our aim is to find both the optimal number of children (that is, the equi-
librium fertility rate) and the family constitutions which is i) self-enforcing
and ii) negotiation-proof. For self-enforcing we mean that intergenerational
transfers support a sub-game-perfect Nash equilibrium. For negotiation-
proof we mean that no adult generation decides to change the current system
of intergenerational transfers, even if they have the opportunity to do so. We
study this issue in different social and economic environment and we analyze
how individuals change their optimal decisions depending on social and insti-
tutional framework (for example, when they have access to capital markets
or not, when they receive transfers from State or not, when they have the
possibility of investing in the education of their children or not, etc.).
Even if we adopt the same hypotheses and the same framework set by
Cigno, we come to different conclusions. According to Cigno, individuals de-
cide to introduce and keep a family constitution that guarantees an efficient
allocation of consumption across generations and an above-subsistence trans-
fer from adults to young children. We agree that the constitution suggested
by Cigno is negotiation-proof and, once introduced, it will never be changed.
However, we show that such constitution is never introduced because indi-
viduals prefer to adopt and to keep another family constitution that, for this
reason, is negotiation-proof too.
Unlike the second chapter, that is a purely microeconomic analysis, the
third chapter studies the interaction between the micro- and macroeconomic
framework in the evolution of economy. On the one hand macro economic
variables (such as technological progress) affect individual decisions concern-
viii Introduction
ing the quantity and the quality of children. On the other hand, these deci-
sions affect the level and the growth of per capita output. In particular, we
are interested in studying how income inequality affects that mechanism. In
addition, unlike the second chapter, this one deals with altruistic behavior.
We focus on two different types of parental altruism: the case where parents
care about the future possibility of expenditure of their children and the case
where parents directly get utility from transferring a monetary amount to
their offspring.
Income distribution affects the evolution of economy through three chan-
nels: fertility, saving and educational differentials. We show that the quali-
tative effects of income inequality change in the different stages of the devel-
opment process.
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my gratitude to all those who help me to complete
this thesis.
I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Prof. D. Fiaschi from the Depart-
ment of Economics of Pisa University whose help, stimulating suggestions
and encouragement helped me in all the time of research for and writing of
this thesis.
I have furthermore to thank the Director of the Ph.D. Program in Eco-
nomics, Prof. C. Bianchi.
My colleagues from the Department of Economics supported me in my
work. I want to thank them for all their stimulating support, help, interest
and valuable hints. Especially I am obliged to Tamara Fioroni, Lorenzo
Corsini, Simone D’Alessandro and Marco Guerrazzi.
I want to thank Prof. O. Galor and the Department of Economics of
Brown University for giving me the opportunity to deepen my studies and
my research work.
I would like to give my special thanks to my family and my friends that
enabled me to complete this work and encouraged me to go ahead with my
thesis.
 
Chapter 1
A Survey on Population
Theories
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this survey is to give an overview of the different theories on
population developed in the history of human thought. The interest in pop-
ulation issue is very ancient and goes back to several centuries B.C. The
first scholars to discuss and be interested in that subject were philosophers,
emperors and their advisors. They were mainly interested in the optimal
size of population in order to guarantee the perfect running of the political,
social and military organizations. However, the focus of this survey is on
the economic theories on population, i.e. theories that explain demographic
behavior through economic factors and economic mechanisms.
We will present the different theories on population following, at first,
a chronological order (Sections 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). In this case we will also
deal with the ancient and not properly economic theories, such as the pre
Malthusian doctrines.
Considering the chronological and sequential link between different schools
of thought and theories, we will show how the interest in population has been
changing over time. Initially, the focus was on the concept of optimal size
of population and on the means through which it could be achieved. When
population was decimated by wars, famines and epidemics, a new supply of
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men was pursued by laws and regulations that provided incentives for mar-
riage and new births and that punished celibacy. On the contrary, in case of
overpopulation, celibacy, colonization, exposure and abortion were proposed
as solutions.
After that, and strictly correlated with this aspect, the attention shifted
on the relation between the sustainable population size and available re-
sources. The inquiry started to focus on the relation between two variables:
population and income. The first to deal with this issue was Thomas Malthus
at the end of the eighteenth century. Starting from Malthus, a general anti-
populationist attitude dominated the economic thought until the second half
of the twentieth century.
From the 1960’s, we notice a significant change of attitude towards popu-
lation growth, which starts to be considered, in equilibrium, positively related
to the income growth rate. Anyway, at the beginning population is treated
as an exogenous variable. Only after Becker (1960) we can identify a new
phase characterized by two important elements:
• population is considered as an endogenous variable and its microfoun-
dations are taken into consideration;
• the focus continues to be on the relation between income and fertility,
but the interest shifts into the attempt to explain the non-monotonic
relation between the two variables, i.e., the Demographic Transition
(that has not shown up yet, before the end of the nineteenth century).
After this chronological presentation of economic theories on population,
the second part of the survey focuses on the modern theories that investigate
the non-monotonic relation between income and population growth. Section
1.5 shows the main fields in the economic literature and propose different
types of explanations to the Demographic Transition. Section 1.6 briefly
deals with a particular group of these theories, i.e. the microeconomic models
that constitute Family Economics.
Finally, Section 1.7 refers to alternative approaches to the economic one
and points out the main differences between the different approaches. Sec-
tion 1.8 draws the main conclusions about the different effort to explain
population dynamics we can find in the course of economic literature.
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1.2 Ancient Writings and Pre-Malthusian The-
ories
Philosophers and scientists have always debated the issue regarding popula-
tion, natural resources and the relation between the former and the latter.
In the history of economic thought, the first systematic theory dealing with
this issue was the one developed by Malthus at the end of the eighteenth
century. However, we can find several contributions about this theme also
in the previous centuries. Obviously, these vestiges of ancient civilizations
cannot be considered proper theories on the subject, but they prove that
population issue has always been felt very important.
The first traces of discussion about population growth are very ancient
and they go back to the works of Confucius and of other Chinese philoso-
phers. These writers, thousands of years ago, had a clear idea of the optimal
size of population. They theorized the ideal proportion between population
and land and pointed out the importance to reach and maintain that pro-
portion. Thousands of years before Malthus, Chinese philosophers detected
the positive and negative checks to population growth, such as premature
marriages and pregnancies, wars, costly marriage ceremonies, lack of food
and land.
In ancient Greece, populations were frequently decimated by wars. As a
consequence, for the State it was very important to obtain a new supply of
men. This aim, especially in Sparta and Crete, was pursued through regu-
lations and laws. Every Spartan was compelled to marry and celibacy was
punished, not only by public sentiment, but also by written laws. The ex-
plicit purpose of marriage was to conceive children of sound mind and body.
According to Plutarch, this aim had to be pursued even at the expense of
legitimacy of offspring. In the vestiges of the Spartan civilization we do not
find any trace of fear for overpopulation, except for the increase of the slaves
or when population, in the absence of wars, increased substantially. In these
cases, infanticide and abortion were accepted. In addition, in Sparta, the
exposure of deformed newborn was allowed and widely practised. In Athens
the situation was quite different. There was no rigid regulation about mar-
riage and its purpose. Anyway, also in Athens there existed laws discouraging
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celibacy and promoting the fruitfulness of marriage. On the other hand, when
population increased too rapidly, the ordinary solution was colonization, but
also exposure and abortion.
Plato and Aristotle postulated the concept of the optimal size of popula-
tion in order to reach the ideal conditions for the polis. According to Plato,
marriage was the most important means of propagating the race. In order
to achieve this goal, abundance (i.e. the quantity) of women and children
was considered desirable in itself. On the other hand, Plato stressed also
the importance of the selection (i.e. the quality) to improve the human race
and believed that the government should decide what person might pair with
another. In addition, all children should have to be examined for physical
defects. In case of overpopulation, he advised colonization and immigration
as solutions. Aristotle believed that property and population had to be dis-
tributed in such a way that each citizen could support himself and his family.
Since the amount of property is limited, Aristotle believed that the number
of children should have been regulated with greater strictness compared to
what Plato suggested.
From the Romans to the eighteenth century, the dominant thought had
considered population as a cause of wealth and strength. Of course, there
were scholars that stressed the negative effects of overpopulation, but most
of the ancient writers pointed out the advantages of population growth. Pop-
ulation growth meant significant military advantages to the Roman Empire,
hence several practical measures were taken in order to stimulate births. It
was always the aim of the Roman legislator to stimulate increase of popu-
lation, never to limit it. In the Roman writings we find several examples
of disapproval of celibacy and defence of marriage and procreation, even if
Cicero severely criticized the communism of wives and children that Plato
advised in order to stimulate births.
In the Middle Age, differently from Greeks and Romans, writers and
philosophers did not give great importance to population as a source of
strength for the State. The medieval approach to this issue was quite ambigu-
ous. The Christian message to procreate and to multiply people was strong,
but not as in the Judaism and other religions. Medieval writers exalted vir-
ginity and continence and, following Saint Paul’s message, they considered
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celibacy superior to marriage. In order to defend ecclesiastical celibacy, sev-
eral writers preceded Malthus arguing that overpopulation would have led
to famine and pestilence. In spite of everything, the dominant tendency was
in favour of population growth. The blame of abortion, infanticide, child
exposure, divorce and polygamy was stronger than the invitation to celibate.
The positive attitude towards population growth lasted over time and it
was still present in the first theories based on a more proper economic and
analytic approach, as the Mercantilist and Physiocratic thought.
Attitudes in favour of population increase were due to different circum-
stances. Until that epoch, there have never been any evidence of the dra-
matic consequences of a high increase of population and the discovery of the
New World kept them off. Secondly, until that moment, empirical evidence
showed that good standards of life only existed in areas relatively highly
and densely populated. The third and most important element that fostered
a positive attitude towards population growth is related to the concept of
wealth. Wealth was considered a stock and it was identifiable as the amount
of land, gold and other precious metals. Since the amount of land was con-
sidered fixed over time, Mercantilist writers (sixteenth-eighteenth century)
believed that the only way to increase the wealth of a nation was to plunder
other states. Initially, this idea justified wars and military occupations and
only in a second moment it led to the attempt to increase exportations in or-
der to stock gold and precious metals. Foreign trade started to be considered
necessary also to provide for the material needs of population (see Cantillon
and Steuart).
Mercantilists stressed the economic, political and military advantages of
population growth and suggested several policies in order to stimulate pop-
ulation increase, such as the imposition of disabilities on celibates, the em-
ployment of penalties, favours, and monetary rewards to encourage marriage
and production of large families, the removal of disabilities on illegitimate
children, checks to emigration and incentives to immigration. The target of
the State was not to increase the income per capita, but to increase the aggre-
gate national income and the excess of national income over the wage-cost of
production. Population growth fostered the achievement of both these goals.
The first scientific analyses and measures of population trend go back
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to the end of the seventeenth century, when John Graunt (1620-1674) and
William Petty (1623-1687) collected and analyzed data concerning popula-
tion. In the history of economic thought, Petty is considered the founding
father of Population Economics and we can say that the real scholarship on
this subject began with Petty’s work. In “Another Essay in Political Arith-
metick” (written in 1682 and printed in 1683) and “Political Arithmetick”
(written in 1672-76 and printed in 1690), Petty lays the basis of Population
Economics:
The scope of this Essay, is concerning people and colonies, and to
make way for another Essay concerning the growth and the city
of London. I desire in this first Essay to give the world some light
concerning the numbers of people in England, with Wales, and in
Ireland; as also, of the number of houses, and families, wherein
they live, and of acres they occupy. (1683/Simon (1998), p. 29)
William Petty investigates the causes and the consequences of population
growth and wonders which the ideal size of population for the defence of
the kingdom, for peace and uniformity in religion, for the administration
of justice and for the proportionably taxing of the people is. Furthermore,
Petty uses and gives credit to statistical demography, that is the basis of all
empirical Population Economics.
Many writers believe that Petty is responsible for the work of John Graunt
entitled “Natural and Political Observations Made Upon the Bills of Mortal-
ity”, even though it was written in 1662, some years before Petty’s works.
Graunt’s work is the first systematic study of mortality and life expectancy.
He observed the numerical regularity of deaths and births and, in general, the
numerical regularity of many important biological phenomena in the mass.
In particular, table 1 of his work reports the number of burials and christen-
ings in London from 1604 to 1661, whereas table 2 reports the causes of the
deaths from 1647 to 1659. At the end of his work, Graunt writes that the
final aim of that “laborious buzzling and groping” is to know the number of
people (total, males and females), how many of them are married, how many
fertile women exist, the causes of deaths and so on.
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We can say that Population Economics and the classical period began
with London mortality data and its study by John Graunt and with the
theory of William Petty.
1.3 Malthus and Reactions to his Theory
Until the end of the eighteenth century, the dominant thought have been
continuing to point out the advantages of population growth, even if several
authors stressed how population tends to press on the means of subsistence.
With the first edition of Malthus’s Essay on Population (1798), a radical turn
took place and the opposite attitude started to spread. From that moment,
economic thought on population was dominated by an anti-populationist or
Malthusian attitude, which was completely opposite to the general view of
the previous centuries.
Actually, it is quite difficult to explain why such a radical change occurred.
We do not notice any significant change in the socioeconomic context of the
eighteenth century or of the first decades of the nineteenth century that can
justify such a swing. This change of mood is justified in France since, at the
end of the lost war against England, the ancient idea of national expansion
fell. On the contrary, we do not find any justification in England, where the
state of things was exactly the opposite. The anti-populationst sentiment
spread also there, maybe because of the strong economic growth of Industrial
Revolution, which shocked most of economists.
In spite of the importance of the writings above mentioned, such as the
ones of Plato and Aristotle, we can say that Malthus was the first in history
of economic thought to study population in a rigorous way and to develop
the first proper theory on the subject.
In Malthus’s theory, the main idea is that growth in food production is
exogenous and it increases in an arithmetical ratio. On the contrary, without
restraints, population would increase geometrically, so “the power of popula-
tion is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence
for man”. Since the food is necessary to the existence of man, population
growth is checked by the growth in food production. When shocks occur
on food production (very poor crops, for instance) or on population (epi-
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demics, earthquakes and so on), in the short run there are some deviations
from the equilibrium: population growth increases (decreases) if the shock
caused a surplus (deficit) of food. Anyway, in the long run the rate of popula-
tion growth must simply adjust to the exogenous growth of food production.
Malthus singles out two types of checks which can act on population in the
short run: negative or preventive checks and positive checks. The negative
checks act on population growth in advance, for instance by the postpone-
ment of marriage or the reduction of conceptions due to the fear of hunger.
Whereas, the positive checks act on population by “misery and vice”, reduc-
ing the size of population by wars, pestilences, diseases, epidemics, etc. The
point is that the positive and negative checks are effective only in the short
run, because people cannot live either below or above subsistence for too
long. Ultimately, the system converges to the steady state where population
growth is determined by the arithmetical increase of food production and
where people live at the subsistence level. Such equilibrium is well known as
“Malthusian trap”.
We remind two important points of the Malthusian theory:
1. in this theory food production is exogenous. Population dynamics is
assumed to increase geometrically. In this sense, population dynam-
ics is exogenous, too. On the other hand, population is ultimately
endogenous to the economy, because it is determined by economic con-
ditions. Anyway, the role of the incentives and disincentives on popu-
lation growth is very limited in the Malthusian theory and checks on
population are effective only in the short run. In the long run, popu-
lation is determined by the exogenous food supply, and it marks the
failure to really treat population as an endogenous variable;
2. the Malthusian theory anticipates some important elements of the con-
temporary theory, such as the presence of multiple equilibria, including
a poverty trap.
Regarding the Malthusian anti-populationst attitude, we have to stress
that there is a quite significant difference between the first (1798) and the
following (1803, 1806, 1807, 1817, and 1826) editions of Malthus’s essay.
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Of course, among the different editions, we can identify important common
elements. They can be summarized in five points:
1. population tends to grow and humankind to multiply. This natural
trend is influenced by food supply;
2. the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale for its in-
puts, which are land and labour;
3. population consumes food and resources, but it has no effect on their
production, which is exogenous;
4. mortality inversely varies with welfare, while fertility is directly pro-
portional to it;
5. people have the possibility to arrest population growth by preventive
checks and moral restraints in order to avoid overpopulation which ulti-
mately brings about a lack or resources and hence a mortality increase.
Even if Malthus takes into consideration the preventive checks (point 5)
also in the first edition of the 1798, in the first edition he is very sceptical
about the capability of the man to carry out virtuous behavior, such as
the postponement or the reduction of marriages. He believes more in the
efficacy of the positive checks, which act on population by misery and vice.
He writes that a man cannot, “by any efforts of reason”, escape from the
laws of Nature. In the second edition we see a quite appreciable difference
in Malthus’s attitude. He thinks that people might to really limit families
voluntary. In the preface of the second edition (1803), he writes:
Throughout the whole of the present work I have so far differed in principle
from the former, as to suppose the action of another check to the population which
does not come under the head either of vice or misery; and, in the latter part I
have endeavoured to soften some of the harshest conclusions of the first Essay.
(1803/Simon (1998), p. 52)
In the same edition, Malthus goes on writing:
It cannot be doubted that throughout Europe in general, and
most particularly in the northern states, a decided change has
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taken place in the operation of prudential restraint. [...]The pru-
dential check to marriage has increased in Europe; and it cannot
be unreasonable to conclude that it will still make further ad-
vances. [...]From a review of the state of society in former peri-
ods, compared with the present, I should certainly say that the
evils resulting from the principle of population have rather dimin-
ished than increased, even under the disadvantages of an almost
total ignorance of the real cause. And if we can indulge the hope
that this ignorance will be gradually dissipated, it does not seem
unreasonable to expect that they will be still further diminished.
(1803/Simon (1998), p. 55, 56)
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that Malthus totally abandons his pes-
simism. He concludes the preface to the second edition writing:
To whose who still think that any check to population whatever
would be worse than the evils which it would relieve, the con-
clusions of the former Essay will remain in full force: and if we
adopt this opinion we shall be compelled to acknowledge, that
the poverty and misery which prevail among the lower classes of
society are absolutely irremediable. (1803/Simon (1998), p. 52)
Using Petersen’s words1, we can say that from the first to the last edition
of his Essay, Malthus moved from an unrelenting pessimism to a cautious
optimism. Indeed, in the same edition Malthus writes:
And although we cannot expect that the virtue and happiness of
mankind will keep pace with the brilliant career of physical dis-
cover; yet, if we are not wanting to ourselves, we may confidently
indulge the hope that mankind will be influenced by its progress
and will partake in its success. (1803/Simon (1998), p. 57)
Apart from this weak hope, Malthus’s attitude is still very pessimistic
and it is not very far from his view in the first edition. In conclusion, we do
1See Petersen (1979), p. 373.
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not find any evidence in Malthus’s work to claim that his prediction in the
first Essay completely reversed. On the contrary, we can say that the first
edition’s conclusions reflect the essential Malthus.
Malthus’s work provoked many reactions that can be divided into two
main streams: on the one hand, a limited group of authors severely criticized
Malthus, on the other hand many authors supported Malthusian theory and
confirmed it by their works and their writings. In general, we can say that
the dominant economic thought accepted Malthusian theory and his anti-
populationism until most of the nineteenth century. Thus, starting with the
Classical Period, a new current of thought spread. It was completely oppo-
site to the pre-Malthusian theories, which looked with favour on population
increase.
Among the most important economists who accepted Malthusian ap-
proach, we find John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). In “Principles of Political
Economy” (1848), he writes:
Even in a progressive state of capital, in old countries, a consci-
entious or prudential restraint on population is indispensable...
[...]Indeed, even now, the countries in which the greatest prudence
is manifested in the regulating of population, are often those in
which capital increases least rapidly. [...]There is room in the
world, no doubt, and even in old countries, for a great increase
of population, supposing the arts of life to go on improving, and
the capital to increase. But even if innocuous, I confess I see very
little reason for desiring it. The density of population necessary
to enable mankind to obtain, in the greatest degree, all the ad-
vantages both of co-operation and of social intercourse, has, in all
the most populous countries, been attained. (1848/Simon (1998),
p. 97, 98)
Also Ricardo (1772-1823) accepted and adopted Malthus’s theory. He
provided a reason to the unexplained Malthusian assumption according to
which food supply increases in an arithmetical progression. Ricardo based
that explanation on the hypothesis of the sacristy of land and the diminishing
returns to labor farming fixed land.
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Although the dominant thought accepted and developed Malthus’s ideas,
we find more interesting to focus on the authors that rejected the Malthusian
approach. Indeed, since this point of view does not belong to the dominant
thought, it runs the risk of being neglected. Among this group of authors,
we remind William Godwin, Alexander H. Everett, Simon Gray, Henry C.
Carey, Friedrich Engels and Henry George.
Godwin (1756-1836) does not agree with Malthus about the fact that hu-
man fate is fixed by immutable laws, such as the geometrical trend of the
reproductive behavior and the arithmetical trend of the food production.
Godwin, together with the Marxists, believes in the power of social institu-
tions and he is certain that, if mankind organizes itself properly, there would
be no natural constraints to population growth in the long run. In the same
way, Marxists believe that constraints to population exist only in a capitalist
economy, but that a socialist economy would provide for all human beings
born without limitation.
William Godwin refutes Malthus’s arguments and in “Of Population”
(1820) he writes:
I have abundantly shewn, if population is kept down by the nar-
row limits within the means of subsistence are at present confined,
that this restraint arises out of civil institutions, the inequality
of mankind, and the accumulation of property, landed property
especially, in few hands. But this system of policy had a begin-
ning. It is the offsprings of refinement. The soil of the earth was
once as free, once probably a great deal freer, than it is now in
the territory of the United States of North America. Every man
might have land at a very cheap rate. Every man might have land
perhaps for nothing. And then, by the principle I have already ex-
plained, that each man in civilized society is born with the power
of producing a much greater quantity of food than is necessary
for his own subsistence, I see nothing that upon the principle
of the Essay on Population should have arrested the progress of
population, till the earth, the known world, was “cultivated like
a garden”. I call on Mr. Malthus to explain this phenomenon. I
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call on Mr. Malthus to account for what we see, an unpeopled
world. (1820/Simon (1998), p. 61)
At the time of the first edition of his Essay, Malthus already knew God-
win’s point of view. In the first edition, Malthus replies to Godwin with
these words:
The system of equality which Mr. Godwin propose is, without
doubt, by far the most beautiful and engaging of any that has
yet appeared. [...]But, alas! that moment can never arrive. The
whole is little better than a dream, a beautiful phantom of the
imagination. These “gorgeous palaces” of truth and virtue will
dissolve, “like the baseless fabric of vision”, when we awaken to
real life and contemplate the true and genuine situation of man
on earth. (1798/Simon (1998), p. 48)
Regarding Godwin’s idea about the need to abolish property rights, Malthus
replies:
Were there no established administration of property, every man
would be obliged to guard with force his little store. Selfishness
would be triumphant. The subjects of contention would be per-
petual. Every individual mind would be under a constant anxiety
about corporal support, and not a single intellect would be left
free to expatiate in the field of thought... And thus it appears,
that a society constituted according to the most beautiful form
that imagination can conceive, with benevolence for its moving
principle, instead of self-love, and with every evil disposition in all
its members corrected by reason and not force, would, from the
inevitable laws of nature, and not from any original depravity of
man, in a very short period, degenerate into a society, constructed
upon a plan not essentially different form that which prevails in
every known State at present; I mean, a society divided into a
class of proprietors, and a class of labourers, and with self-love
the main-spring of the great machine. (1798/Simon (1998), p.
50)
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Among the authors that objected to Malthusian theory we also find
Alexander H. Everett (1790-1847). In “New Ideas on Population on the The-
ories of Malthus and Godwin” (1823), Everett looks as one of the precursors
of the theory of the “demographic pressure”. According to him, increase of
population immediately brings about a division of labor and, in its turn, the
division of labor brings about inventions of new machines, improvements of
methods in all the department of industry and, ultimately, a rapid progress
in the various branches of art and sciences. The effect of the final increase
in the productivity of labor and the following improvements is higher than
the effect of the initial increase in population so that the ultimate effect of
an increase of population is, in the long run, the transition to an easier and
more civilized society. In addition, the increase in population and labor pro-
ductivity, the development of new skills and machines, create abundance of
manufactures and, hence, they promote commerce and welfare also for other
populations.
In his work, Everett writes:
Thus the rapid growth of these young scions, instead of exhaust-
ing the parent stock, gives it new health and vigor; and a dense
and increasing population on a limited territory, instead of bring-
ing with it any danger of scarcity, is not only an immediate cause
of greater abundance to the nation where it exists, but a principle
of prosperity and civilization to every part of the word. (1823/Si-
mon (1998), p. 72)
As example, Everett reminds Great Britain and the United States of
America and he adds that:
[They] prove conclusively that the theory of Mr. Malthus is not
only erroneous, but directly the reverse of the truth; and that an
increase of population, instead of being, as he maintains, the chief
cause of all the physical and moral evil to which we are exposed,
is, on the contrary, the real and only active principle of national
wealth and happiness. (1823/Simon (1998), p. 73)
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Also Simon Gray, in “The Happiness of States, or an Inquiry Concerning
Population” (written in 1804 and published in 1815) distances himself from
Malthus’s view. The work of Gray is very schematic and it develops through
two main propositions:
1. population has no natural tendency to over-increase with respect to
subsistence, employment or wealth, as it was supposed by Malthus and
others;
2. the increase in population augments the average quantum of employ-
ment.
Therefore, Gray’s assumptions are very different from the natural laws
that, according to Malthus, would rule human behavior. In Gray’s theory,
population has the tendency to increase but not to over-increase, and for any
increase it carries in itself the power and capability of supplying its needs.
In Malthusian theory, the amount of subsistence regulates the amount of
population, whereas, according to Gray, population regulates the amount of
subsistence, as completely as that of clothing, housing, and any other goods.
As a consequence, the effects of an increase of population are not negative
at all. Not at all, population growth brings about positive consequences. On
this point, in the section “A view of the effects of the increase of population”,
Gray writes:
The increase of population gives rise not only to the fond affec-
tions between the sexes, which produce so much happiness, but
to many of the social connections, from which so great a share of
human enjoyment is derived. [...]The increase of population op-
erates towards correcting the bad effects of the progress of wealth
and luxury. [...]The increase of population tends to regulate more
completely the supply of food, and to render men less depen-
dent on the natural fertility of the soil, and even on the climate.
[...]The increase of population necessarily adds to the wealth of
a country. [...]The increase of population is, in truth, the great
predisposing cause of wealth. [...]The increase of population is
also the grand cause of civilization of society. [...]The increase of
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population is thus the source of the wealth and civilization of soci-
ety, and all the advantages arising from these. [...]The increase of
population produces its effects not chiefly by the harsh influence
of increasing poverty and famine, as the abettors of that melan-
choly system, which throws a hateful gloom over the whole mass
of nature’s arrangements and results, the antipopulation theory,
would insinuate; nor at all. [...] Populousness and the increase
of population tend to enable a greater proportion of a nation to
reach comforts, and to make them more cleanly, as well as in-
dustrious. [...]Populousness and a rapidly increasing population,
by the variety of mental employments, which they give rise to,
prove the source of greater happiness to those minds formed by
nature for such exercises, as well as exalt the national intellect.
(1815/Simon (1998), p. 81-85)
Henry C. Carey (1793-1879), like Everett, focuses on the positive effect
of the demographic pressure and of a high population density. According to
Carey, when population is scarce and widely scattered over the land, people
is unable to unite and work together, so it is very difficult to achieve sub-
sistence, security and capital accumulation. With the increase of population
and capital, which are linked by a consequent cumulative spiral, communities
can guarantee peace, order and social security and people can devote more
time to the productive activities.
We report there a passage from the first volume of “The Principles of
Political Economy” (1837-1840) which summarizes Carey’s thought very well:
As capital increases, population becomes more dense, and the in-
ferior soils are brought into action with a constantly increasing
return to labour, men are enable to benefit by the co-operation
of their neighbours, and habits of kindness and good feeling take
place of the savage and predatory habits of the early period.
Poverty and misery gradually disappear, and are replaced by
ease and comfort. Labour becomes gradually less severe, and the
quantity required to secure the means of subsistence is diminished
by which he is enable to devote more time to the cultivation of
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the mind. His moral improvement keeps pace with that which
takes place in his physical condition, and thus the virtues of civ-
ilization replace the vices of savage life. (1840/Simon (1998), p.
93)
Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) is very critical towards Malthus and the
myth of overpopulation. In “On Malthus” (1843) Engels focuses on the
importance and the power of science and technology in order to release the
constraints given by the Malthusian laws of Nature and he mentions an early
theory of the growth of technology:
The area of land is limited-that is perfectly true. But the labour
power to the employed on this area increases together with the
population; and even if we assume that the increase labour is
not always proportionate to the latter, there still remains a third
element-which the economist, however, never consider as important-
namely, science, the progress of which is just limitless and at least
as rapid as that of population. [...]Science increases at least as
fast as population; the latter increases in proportion to the body
of knowledge passed down to it by the previous generation, that
is, in the most normal conditions it also grows in geometrical
progression. (1843/Simon (1998), p. 106)
Some decades later, in “Progress and Poverty” (1877), Henry George
(1839-1897) underlines again the positive effects of an increase in population.
His starting point is the reaction to the Malthusian assumption according to
which food supply increases slower than the natural tendency in population:
The great cause of the triumph of the Malthusian theory is, that,
instead of menacing any vested right or antagonizing any power-
ful interest, it is eminently soothing and reassuring to the classes
who, wielding the power of wealth, largely dominate thought.
[...]I go to the heart of the matter in saying that there is no war-
rant, either in experience or analogy, for the assumption that
there is any tendency in population to increase faster then sub-
sistence. (1877/Simon (1998), p. 115)
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George, as Godwin, thinks that an increase in population is always capa-
ble to trigger an increase in food production in order to sustain all individuals:
Of all living things, man is the only one who can give play to the
reproductive forces, more powerful than his own, which supply
him with food. (1877/Simon (1998), p. 110)
George completely reverses the cause-effect relations given by the Malthu-
sian theory:
It is not the increase of food that has caused this increase of
men; but the increase of men that brought about the increase of
food. There is more food, simply because there are more men.
[...]In short, while all through the vegetable and animal kingdoms
the limit of subsistence is independent of the thing subsisted, with
man the limit of subsistence is within the final limits of earth, air,
water, and sunshine dependent upon man himself. (1877/Simon
(1998), p. 110)
As Everett and Carey, Henry George believes that a more populated land
can guarantee a higher standard of welfare and civilization:
I assert that in any given state of civilization a greater number of
people can collectively be better provided for than a smaller. [...]I
assert that in a state of equality the natural increase of population
would constantly tend to make every individual richer instead of
poorer. [...]Is it not true that under similar conditions-that is
to say, among communities of similar people in a similar stage
of civilization-the most densely populated community is also the
richest? [...]These things conclusively show that wealth is greatest
where population is densest; that production of wealth to a given
amount of labor increases as population increases. [...]The richest
countries are not those where nature is most prolific; but those
where labor is most efficient-not Mexico, but Massachusetts; not
Brazil, but England. The countries where population is densest
and presses hardest upon the capabilities of nature, are, other
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things begin equal, the countries where the largest proportion
of the produce can be devoted to luxury and to support of the
nonproducers, the countries where capital overflows, the countries
that upon exigency, such as war, can stand the greatest drain.
(1877/Simon (1998), p. 112-113)
Henry George’s work is worth being mentioned for the great intuition
of his author concerning the non-monotonic relation between income and
population. Indeed, George gets the tendency to have fewer children when
wealth increases:
Besides the positive and prudential checks of Malthus, there is a
third check which comes into play with the elevation of the stan-
dard of comfort and the development of the intellect, is pointed to
by many well-known facts. The proportion of births is notoriously
greater in new settlements, where the struggle with nature leaves
little opportunities for intellectual life, and among the poverty-
bound classes of older countries, who in the mist of wealth are
deprived of all its advantages and reduced to all but an animal
existence, than it is among the classes to whom the increase of
wealth has brought independence, leisure, comfort, and a fuller
and more varied life. (1877/Simon (1998), p. 111)
1.4 The Modern Thought
After the development of the Malthusian theory at the end of the eighteenth
century, few important studies were made on that subject and we can claim
that no news was said after Malthus for more than a century. Like in the
Malthusian theory, population was considered, in the long run, to be deter-
mined by the exogenous food supply and so it was itself considered as an
exogenous variable.
We report there a simple specification of a model where population is
exogenous and land is the main element of the production process. We will
show that we get the same conclusions of the Malthusian theory.
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The output at period t is given by:
Yt = (AX)
αL1−αt . (1.1)
The input X is the amount of land, and it is fixed over time. How much it is
possible to cultivate the land depends on the level of technology, A, and AX
is the amount of effective resources. In the Malthusian epoch, technology
evolves by shocks and not continuously in the time. For this reason, A does
not have the subscript t. The input Lt is the labour force at period t. The
output per worker is
yt ≡
Yt
Lt
=
(
AX
Lt
)α
, (1.2)
that is, the effective resources per worker. There is no property right on
land, so the wage is equal to the output per worker, yt. The absolute size of
population at period t+ 1 is described by the following simple equation:
Lt+1 = ntLt, (1.3)
where nt is the number of children per adult, and not the rate of population
growth. Individuals take care about their consumption (according to the
weight (1 − γ)) and about the number of children (according to the weight
γ):
Ut = γ lnnt + (1− γ) ln ct, (1.4)
and they allocate their income between children and consumption:
yt ≥ ct + ntz,
where z is the cost per child. It is not a time cost, but measured in units of
output. Maximizing the utility function, we obtain:
nt =
γ
z
yt. (1.5)
Hence, the number of children is proportional to the level of income per
capita. The dynamics of population is given by:
Lt+1 = ntLt =
γ
z
ytLt =
γ
z
(
AX
Lt
)α
Lt =
γ
z
(AX)α L1−αt ≡ φ(Lt), (1.6)
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where φ′ > 0 and φ′′ < 0. The steady state is given by
L¯ =
γ
z
(AX)α L¯1−α,
that is
L¯ =
(γ
z
) 1
α
AX. (1.7)
Hence, changes in the amount of effective resources affects L¯. The level of
equilibrium of the income is equal to:
y¯ =
(
AX
L¯
)α
=
z
γ
. (1.8)
The per capita income y¯ does not depend on technology: if technology raises
for a shock, the population size L¯ increases, but the level of the income per
capita y¯ does not change: positive shocks on the level of technology make
the population larger, but not richer. According to this theory:
• technological progress or resources expansion lead to a larger but not
richer population, without changing the level of income per capita in
the long run;
• during the Malthusian epoch, income per capita fluctuates around a
constant level y¯;
• countries with superior technology have a larger population density
but their standard of living in the long run does not reflect their higher
degree of technological advancement. Within a country, an increase in
A raises the population size, but not its level of income per capita in
the long run.
Empirical evidence confirms these predictions in several cases before In-
dustrial Revolution. We remind, for instance, the effect on population of the
Black Death. Population was decimated during the 13th century, resources
per capita raised and population increased significantly during the 14th and
15th century. Ultimately, population growth brought about a decline in in-
come per capita in the 16th century back to its level in the first half of the
14th century. The point is that this theory is no longer valid and cannot
explain what happened after the Industrial Revolution.
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We meet the seeds of the modern thought starting from the 1920s, but
we have to wait until the 1960s to see the spread of a new current of thought.
The interest in Population Economics flourished again in the 1920s with the
studies by Cannan, Dalton and Robbins. Since the birthrates were declining
significantly, the studies of that period focused on stationary and declining
population, rather than population growth.
In the premodern period (1920s-1960s), the general attitude towards pop-
ulation growth was quite ambiguous and it is difficult to describe the domi-
nant thought among economists.
Immediately after the World War II, there was a general consensus on the
idea that population growth was bad for the less developed countries. Physi-
cal capital was considered the first engine of economic growth and economists
believed that population growth, declining machineries and infrastructures
per person, had a negative effect on output per capita. Many authors (James
Meade, Partha Dasgupta, Leontief, Coale, Hoover) took a clear Malthusian
position and many economists of the time can be considered fiery Malthusian.
Keynes himself, in “The economic Consequences of the Peace” (1920)
writes about “the disruptive powers of excessive national fecundity”. He
recognizes that after 1870 “the pressure of population on food became for the
first time in recorded history definitely reversed”, thanks to the accessibility
of supplies from America and larger proportional returns from an increasing
scale of production of agriculture as well as industry: “as numbers increased,
food was actually easier to secure”. However, about the 1900 this process
began to be reversed again and “a diminishing yield of Nature to man’s effort
was beginning to reassert itself ”. On the other hand, the resources of tropical
Africa came into large employ and other improvements brought to the table
of Europe new and cheaper food. Keynes summarizes these ups and downs
with the following words:
Before the eighteenth century mankind entertained no false hopes.
To lay the illusions which grew popular at that age’s latter end,
Malthus disclosed a Devil. For half a century all serious econom-
ical writings held that Devil in clear prospect. For the next half
century he was chained up and out of sight. Now perhaps we
have loosed him again. (Keynes (1920), p. 10)
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In “Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population” (1937),
Keynes recognizes that an increasing population has a very important in-
fluence on the demand for capital and that an era of increasing population
tends to promote optimism in business expectations. The demand for capi-
tal depends on the numbers of consumers, the average level of consumption
(that is, the standard of life), and the average period of production (that
is, technological progress). According to Keynes, the increase of demand for
capital is primarily due to the first two elements and only on a minor degree
to technical changes. It may seem at first sight that Keynes contents Malthu-
sian theory, but then he adds that the previous considerations are true only
on the condition that the increase in resources or consumption actually take
place and it is possible only if the state of employment permits that. In other
words, according to Keynes, another Devil replaces the Malthusian Devil of
Population, and this new Devil is Unemployment:
For we have now learned that we have another devil at our elbow
at least as fierce as the Malthusian - namely the devil of unem-
ployment escaping through the breakdown of effective demand.
Perhaps we could call this devil too a Malthusian devil, since it
was Malthus himself who first told us about him. [...]Now when
Malthusian devil P. is chained up, Malthusian devil U. is liable to
break loose. When devil P. of Population is chained up, we are
free of one menace; but we are more exposed to the other devil
U. of Unemployment Resources than we were before. (Keynes
(1937))
In conclusion many economists of the 1920’s-1960’s and Keynes himself
can be considered fiery Malthusian. In the above quoted writing, Keynes
writes:
In the final summing up, therefore, I do not depart from the old
Malthusian conclusion. I only wish to warn you that the chaining
up of the one devil may, if we are careless, only serve to loose
another still fiercer and more intractable. (Keynes (1937))
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On the other hand, some economists of the time suggested a complete
reversal of Malthusian theory and they believed that concerns about food
supply and available resources were out of date. Keynes himself changed his
mind: after developing his demand analysis, he started to support population
growth as a means of increasing effective demand. Still later, he arrived at
being ambivalent about population increase. Keynes’s double flip-flop and
the general attitude of the other economists show a quite strong ambivalence
towards population growth.
In the 1940s, Keynesian growth models focus on the relation between pop-
ulation, full employment of inputs (including labor) and economic growth.
In Domar (1946), full employment of inputs (labor and capital) is achieved
only if labor units and capital units grow at the same rate. If population
increases less than capital, labor force is not sufficient to employ efficiently
the capital: we have full employment of labor, but a share of capital is un-
employed. Also goods capital is out of equilibrium, because demand exceeds
supply. The contrary happens when population increases too fast. In Har-
rod (1939), capital varies so that labor is always full employed. Given that
assumption, in order to reach full employment of labor, income has to grow
at the same rate of population (g = n). If we consider the technological
progress, the income growth rate consistent with the full employment of the
labor force is higher, since it is necessary to equip the new labor units with
the new technology. Even if Keynesian models study the relation between
income and population, they only focus on the necessary conditions in order
to reach full employment of inputs. Anyway, population growth is exogenous
and these models do not develop a theory on population and its dynamics.
One decade later, neoclassical models focus on the same subject. In the
neoclassical models by Solow, Nelson, Denison, Koopmans, Cass and others,
population growth is still exogenous or, at least, its micro-foundations are
ignored. These models replace the classical production function given by
equation (1.1) with the neoclassical technology. Even if population increases
geometrically, savings and investment assure a capital formation which match
or surpass the rate of population growth, depending on the rate of advance
in production technology. Following the golden rule, technology, population
and physical capital rise at constant geometrical rates.
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Solow’s work (1956) is representative of all neoclassical models. Solow
presents an exogenous growth model that focuses on the role of factors ac-
cumulation in the growth process. The neoclassical production function ex-
hibits labor and physical capital as inputs. The marginal productivity of
both the factors is positive and decreasing; returns to scale are constant.
Markets are perfectly competitive and ruled by the theorem of product ex-
haustion. Economy converges to full employment equilibrium, for both the
factors, when technology in use produces an output per capita such that
saving and investment are sufficient (and not higher) to fit all the new labor
inputs out without changing the technology. If we consider also the techno-
logical progress, the rate consistent with the full employment of the factors
is higher, since it is necessary to equip the new labor inputs with a more
efficient technology, according to the technological progress. In equilibrium,
all the variables (population, capital and income) growth at the same rate,
and the system converges to the balanced growth. Given the properties of
the neoclassical production function, the level of capital per worker which
permits to achieve the balanced growth is unique. Since the level of capital
per worker is affected by saving, it is important to find a rule determining the
optimal level of saving. The golden rule of capital accumulation tells us that
the level of saving has to be such that the marginal productivity of capital
is equal to the natural growth rate, that is the population growth rate.
However, in Solow’s and neoclassical models the rate of population growth
n is exogenous and the micro-foundations and determinants of fertility are
completely ignored, as in the Keynesian growth models. In addition to that,
the rate n affects the level of per capita income, but not its steady state
growth rate, that is affected only by the technology growth (that is itself
exogenous).
In conclusion, we can say that the Neoclassical models of the 1950s, as
well as the Keynesian growth models developed in the 1920s, focus on the
relation between two macro variables, income and fertility, and its link with
the full employment in the factors market. In addition, neither Keynesian or
Neoclassical models consider fertility as an endogenous variable or study its
micro foundations.
Starting from the 1960s, Population Economics began to focus on the
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following two problems:
1. endogenizing fertility;
2. explaining the non-monotonic relation between income and fertility
shown by empirical evidence.
At this point, it is interesting to observe that, even if we endogenize
fertility in the neoclassical model, it is not able to generate a non monotonic
relation between income and fertility.
Consider an overlapping generations model, where time is discrete. We
have a perfect competitive economy where only one good is produced using
physical capital K and labor L as inputs. The factors supplies are given by
Lt+1 = ntLt
Kt+1 = St,
where Lt is the size of the adult population at time t and nt is the number
of children per adult at time t, and not the rate of population growth. The
stock of capital at time t+ 1 is equal to the aggregate saving at time t.
The output at time t is given by:
Yt = F (Kt, Lt) ≡ Ltf(kt), (1.9)
where kt ≡
Kt
Lt
is the stock of physical capital per worker.
The production function reflects the neoclassical assumptions, hence:
• f(0) = 0
• f ′ > 0
• f ′′ < 0
• limk→0f
′ =∞
• limk→∞f
′ = 0.
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The producers profit maximization give us the factors demand:
rt = f
′(kt) ≡ r(kt),
wt = f(kt)− f
′(kt)kt ≡ w(kt).
Individuals live through three periods. During childhood, they are passive
agents and they make no decision. They consume a fraction τ of their
parental time. Parenthood is the active period of life. Adults allocate their
unit of time endowment between labor force participation, child rearing and
save for retirement. For simplicity, we assume that they do not consume in
this period of life. We could introduce a positive consumption during adult-
hood, but it would make the model more complicated, without changing its
main results. Finally, in the old age individuals consume their saving. The
preferences of any individual born in period t − 1 and adult at time t are
described by the following equation:
Ut = γ lnnt + (1− γ) ln ct+1, (1.10)
where ct+1 is the level of consumption in the old age and γ measures the
degree of parental altruism towards their children.
The budget constraint in period t is given by
wt ≥ st + wtτnt,
since children imply a time opportunity cost. st is the level of saving. In
period t+ 1 we have that
ct+1 ≤ stRt+1,
where Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1. Maximizing Ut with respect to nt we obtain
nt =
γ
τ
. (1.11)
Hence, in the Neoclassical model with endogenous fertility, the number of
children is constant and it does not depend on the level of the income. On
the contrary, we have that saving depends on the level of income, indeed:
st = (1− γ)wt.
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If we consider the evolution of the economy:
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Lt+1
=
Ltst
ntLt
= τ
1− γ
γ
w(kt) = φ(kt), (1.12)
where φ′ > 0 and φ′′ < 0, as in equation (1.6). When we look for the
steady-state value of L and y we find the same qualitative result given by
equation (1.7) and equation (1.8). Considering nt as an endogenous variable,
nothing changes respect to the previous model where fertility is exogenous.
This happens because fertility is constant and fertility is constant because
the income effect is equal to the substitute effect: wage changes do not affect
nt with log utility functions. As a consequence, neoclassical theory with
endogenous fertility is not a theory of demographic transition.
This problem is overcome by the models developed in the 1960s. These
theories mark the beginning of the Modern Thought. They assume the same
neoclassical framework above presented, considering fertility as an endoge-
nous variable, but they generate a non monotonic relation between fertil-
ity and income. This result is due to the fact that the substitution effect
dominates the income effect at sufficiently high level of income thanks to a
particular specification of the individual preferences. In this way fertility is
not constant any longer.
According to these models, the utility function is still given by equation
(1.10):
Ut = γt lnnt + (1− γt) ln ct+1,
but
γt =
{
γ if yt ≤ y˜
γ(yt) if yt > y˜ where γ
′(yt) < 0
(1.13)
where y˜ is the level of income above which parents become less altruistic. It
means that rich individuals care about their children less tan poor individu-
als.
With the introduction of this adjustment, the optimal number of children
is equal to:
nt =
γt
τ
=
{
γ
τ
if wt ≤ w˜
γ(Wt)
τ
if wt > w˜
(1.14)
Hence, fertility is not constant and it depends on the level of income.
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We can say that the Modern Thought just starts with the theories of
the 1960s and their efforts in order to endogenize fertility and explain the
non-monotonic relation between income and fertility. The first step in this
direction has certainly to be attributed to Gary S. Becker and to his work “An
Economic Analysis of Fertility”, dated 1960. He first formalizes the notion of
demand for children and finds an explanation for the non-monotonic relation
between income and fertility.
Actually, Banks (1954) dealt with demand of children before Becker, but
Banks only assumed that children are a good like most consumer goods. A
rise in the average income has a double effect on fertility. On the one hand, a
rise in income increases the number of children, since they are superior goods
(income effect). On the other hand, a rise in income affects also the taste
and values of the family. According to Banks, when income rises, families’
aspirations for social advancement increase, and this brings to a reduction
of the number of children (substitute effect). It is not possible to determine
in advance which force will dominate, so there is no theoretical prediction of
the overall effect on fertility. Leibenstein (1957) considers other two effects
of an increase in family income, but only with regard to the less developed
countries: the change in the economic benefit from a child in terms of the
child’s expected contribution to the family economy and a change in the costs
of a child in terms of the family’s expected expenditures in raising the child.
Anyway, as it was said above, both Banks and Leibenstein simply as-
sumed that a child is a good like most consumer goods. Only in 1960,
Becker formalized the notion of the demand for children as consumption
goods. Becker believes that Malthusian theory, according to which fertility
is determined by two primitive variables (age at marriage and the frequency
of coition during marriage), cannot be any longer accepted in modern so-
cieties, where the spread of the knowledge about contraceptives requires to
give more importance to the decision-making process. Giving absolute im-
portance to the decision-making process, Becker assumes that families have
perfect control over both the number and spacing of their births. Becker finds
the Malthusian theory out of date also because empirical evidence referring
to the past centuries (after the Industrial Revolution) does not show a posi-
tive monotonic relation between income and fertility, as Malthus suggested.
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Becker’s purpose is to develop a new microeconomic theory, taking family as
unit of analysis, in order to explain the behavior of modern economies. With
regard to that, Becker and Barro write:
Economists have become reluctant to bring endogenous fertil-
ity and population change into models of economic growth and
macroeconomic performance. They lost confidence in the Malthu-
sian system because it has several unattractive implications, such
as a positive relation between fertility rates and levels of per
capita income. The new household economics has stimulated a
modest revival of models that integrate endogenous population
change into an analysis of economic growth. Our paper is a con-
tribution to this revival. Its implications are much more in line
with the behavior of modern economies than are those of the
Malthusian system. (Barro and Becker (1989), p. 499)
The main idea that set up the basis of the Becker’s theory of the demand
of children is that “children are durable consumption and production goods”.
They are consumption goods because they are source of satisfaction. They
may be production goods because they sometimes provide money income.
Since neither the outlays on children nor the income yielded by them are
fixed in the time, but they vary according to their age, they are durable
goods. This idea does not imply that satisfaction and costs associated with
children are morally the same associated with other durable goods, but,
anyhow, children provide utility and, as a consequence, the theory of the
demand is suitable in order to study the demand for children.
As the other goods, children involve costs, too. The net cost of children
equals “the present value of expected outlays plus the imputed value of the
parents’ service, minus the present value of the expected money return plus
the imputed value of the child’s services”2.
Becker theorizes that families have to decide not only the number of
children, but also the amount spent on them, that is the quantity and quality
of children. He stresses that for “higher quality children” he means only
“more expensive children”, and not morally better.
2See Becker (1960), p. 213.
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Following the hypothesis that children are superior goods, a rise in income
increases the amount spent on children. Becker assumes that the quantity in-
come elasticity is relatively small but positive and that the quality elasticity
is relatively large. This is consistent with the evidence that social pressure
leads richer family to spend more on children and to have fewer children
that poorer ones. Contrary to Banks, Becker thinks that income changes do
not affect the tastes and values (religion, race, age) of families. Making the
assumption that quantity income elasticity is relatively small and that the
quality elasticity is relatively large, Becker comes to the same conclusion of
Banks. We have to stress that such conclusions simply come from an assump-
tion. In other words, Becker explains the non monotonic relation between
income and fertility through a particular hypothesis on family preferences:
as the family income rises, parents give more and more importance to the
quality of children and less importance to their quantity. Some decades later,
many of the economists attempting to explain the Demographic Transition
(Galor, for instance), do not accept this approach.
The trade-off between quantity and quality of children is analyzed again
in Becker and Lewis (1973). Both quantity and quality enter as distinct
arguments into the utility function of parents. Like in Becker (1960), the
income elasticity of demand for quality is higher than that for quantity, so
the fertility rate may be negatively correlated with the level of income even if
both the quantity and quality of children are superior goods. Furthermore, in
Becker and Lewis (1973) the negative correlation between number of children
and level of the income is explained even when quality of children does not
enter into the utility function of parents.
In conclusion, we can assert that the proper Modern Period starts in
the 1960s with the formulation of demand for children by Gary S. Becker.
The beginning and the spread of the Modern Period is characterized by the
attempt to endogenize fertility and by the systematic use of empirical data.
From this moment, we can distinguish two chronological phases:
1. the development of theories and models where population is endoge-
nous, but economic growth is exogenous;
2. the development of theories and models where both population and
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economic growth are endogenous. We can say that the first systematic
analysis considering both population and economic growth as endoge-
nous variables was developed in 1990 by Becker, Murphy and Tamura.
With regard to the approach of the modern Population Economics, we
can identify two branches:
1. microeconomic models. They focus on the micro foundations of fertil-
ity decisions. They study the relation between fertility and income,
fertility and investment in education, fertility and intergenerational
transfers, taking household as unit of reference and analysis. These
theories and models make up the so called “Family Economics”. The
relation between development and fertility is studied from the perspec-
tive of family economics. This perspective focuses on the features and
changes in the social and economic environment that lead families to
vary their fertility rate;
2. macroeconomic models. They do not ignore the micro-foundations of
fertility decisions, but they plan the number of children determined at
the micro level into the total fertility rate at the macro level and they
study the relation between the total fertility rate with other macro
variables. The relation between development and fertility is studied
from the perspective of the theory of growth. This perspective focuses
on the effect of population growth on the level of capital per worker
and thus on the level of income per worker.
The more recent theories and models tried to integrate these two ap-
proaches. They consider the household fertility and labor-supply choice to-
gether with a growth model where wages are endogenously determined. On
the one hand, growth affects wages and thus household decisions (through
income and substitute effect) about the level of fertility, the investment in
human capital and labor force participation. On the other hand, families’
decisions in turn feed back through the aggregate production mechanism to
affect economic growth (in particular through investment in human capital
decisions).
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1.5 Economic Approaches to the Demographic
Transition
In the previous sections, we tried to present the different theories on popula-
tion following a chronological order in the history of the economic thought.
We now focus in detail on the fertility models and theories developed in the
Modern Period, where population is considered as an endogenous variable.
Modern economists attempt to explain fertility decisions, that is why and
how many children individuals decide to have. In particular, their efforts
are directed to the challenge to explain the non monotonic relation between
income and fertility and the Demographic Transition that started in West-
ern Europe with the Industrial Revolution. Obviously, population growth
and Demographic Transition are determined both by fertility and mortality.
A complete inquiry on the subject should consider also the complementary
element to fertility, that is mortality. However the subject of this survey is
given by fertility theories, so we confine our remarks to the fertility issue.
We are dealing with mortality only in few cases (child and infant mortality),
but it will be functional to the fertility analysis.
The modern Population Economics theories we are going to present have
two elements in common:
1. they refer to the Neoclassical framework, with a Neoclassical produc-
tion function;
2. they are economic theories, since they are based on economic factors.
Other approaches to the problem do exist and we will briefly discuss
about that in the next sections.
In spite of these common elements, these models give different explana-
tions to fertility dynamics and to the relation between fertility and income.
Some of these theories take into consideration only fertility and income, other
theories (the more recent ones) consider also other variables that affect fertil-
ity and its relation with income, such as return on human capital, technolog-
ical progress, infant mortality, gender gap, etc. All the following presented
theories are correct, but it seems that no one of them is capable, by itself, to
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explain completely fertility dynamics. Since fertility and Demographic Tran-
sition are very complex phenomena, it seems impossible to explain them
through one single theory, as far as the theory is systematic and organic.
The best approach would consist in taking into consideration the contributes
of all the different theories. On the other hand, this would be very complex
and it would be impossible to formalize that in a theoretical economic model.
Coming back to the existing possible explanations to the problem, among
the modern Population Economics theories we can find the different following
ones:
1. quantity vs quality of children and income effect (Becker (1960, 1981),
Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker and Barro (1988, 1989));
2. the decline in infant and child mortality (Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Doepeke
(2005));
3. the old age security hypothesis (Cigno (1993), Cigno, Giannelli and
Rosati (1998), Ehrlich and Lui (1991));
4. the gender gap (Galor and Weil (1996), Lagerlo¨f (2003));
5. return on human capital (Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990));
6. technological progress and return on human capital: the Unified Theory
(Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Galor (2005));
7. evolutionary theory (Galor and Moav (2002));
8. inequality and human capital accumulation (Kremer and Chen (2002),
de la Croix and Doepke (2004), Galor and Moav (2004)).
We find a quite significant difference between the first group of models and
the other ones. The first models are the earliest ones and they were developed
in the 1960s. These models explain the non monotonic relation between
fertility and income asserting that a rise in the level of income per capita
promoted the switch from quantity to quality of children. In other words,
they explain the relation between fertility and income through the income
effect, without taking into consideration any other variables except fertility
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and income. Within this framework, Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) consider
the effects of changes in child cost, differences in the rate of technical progress,
shifts in productivity and in the degree of parental altruism, the introduction
of taxes on capital, social security and the decline in child mortality. Anyway,
all these factors affect fertility through the income effect, so we can say that
this approach ultimately explains the relation between fertility and income
without considering any other variable.
On the contrary, the more recent theories (groups 2-8) explain the non-
monotonic relation between fertility and income asserting that other variables
(return on human capital, technological progress, decline in infant mortality,
etc.) interfere in and affect that relation. In particular, the gradual rise in the
demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution
as well as in the process of industrialization of less developed countries and
its close association with the timing of the Demographic Transition suggested
to the economists that the rise in the demand for human capital is the most
significant force behind the Demographic Transition. Empirical evidence
suggests that households were induced to increase their investment in human
capital of their children, reducing the number of their offspring.
We are now going to present the contents of the above quoted theories.
1.5.1 Quantity vs Quality of Children and Income Ef-
fect
As previously shown, the Neoclassical model with endogenous fertility does
not generate a non-monotonic relation between income and fertility and the
result we get is a constant number of children per adult. This result is due to
the fact that the income effect perfectly compensates the substitution effect.
Becker (1960, 1981) overcomes this problem by taking into consideration
the same framework but assuming particular family preferences such that,
for sufficiently high level of income, the substitution effect dominates the
income effect.
After Becker’s article in 1960, some economists explained the negative
correlation between quantity and quality of children saying that there is a
low substitution elasticity in the family’s utility function between parents’
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consumption or level of living and that of their children. In Becker and Lewis
(1973) the authors pursue is to prove that the interaction between quality
and quantity as well as quantity or quality alone can be understood “without
assuming that, either in the utility function or in household production, quan-
tity and quality are more closely related that any two commodities chosen at
random”.
The utility function of the head dynasty is given by:
U = U(n, q, c), (1.15)
where n is the number of children, q the quality of children and c the rate of
consumption of all other commodities. The family has an income I that is
spent for children (both for quantity and quality) and for consumption. Let
pi be the price of nq and pic the price of c. Hence, the budget constraint is
I = nqpi + cpiy. (1.16)
From these equations, we can saw that the authors do not make special
assumption about the elasticities of substitution among n, q and c.
Maximizing the utility function, the two authors obtain this important
result:
The shadow price of children with respect to number pn is pos-
itively related to q, the level of quality, and the shadow price
with respect to quality pq is positively related to n, the number
of children. The economic interpretation is that an increase in
quality is more expensive if there are more children because the
increase has to apply to more units; similarly, an increase in quan-
tity is more expensive if the children are higher quality, because
higher-quality children cost more. (Becker and Lewis (1973), p.
80)
In other words, the shadow price of children with respect to their number,
that is the cost of an additional child, holding their quality constant, is greater
the higher their quality is. At the same time, the shadow price of children
with respect to their quality, that is the cost of a unit increase in quality
holding number constant, is greater the greater the number of children is.
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After that, Becker and Lewis study the income effect and the price effect.
With regard to the first question, they compute the “true” income elas-
ticities of n, q and c and the “observed” ones. The true elasticities are
derived by changing income and holding constant the price of n, q and c.
For this purpose, the appropriate prices are the shadow prices (whose ratios
in equilibrium are equal to the marginal rates of substitution in the utility
function) and the appropriate income is the total expenditure R on n, q and
c calculated at their shadow prices. Whereas, the observed elasticities are
derived changing the income I and holding the prices pi and pic constant.
The observed elasticities are smaller than the true ones in the ratio I/R.
The authors give this explanation:
The direct effect of the increase in I, holding the pi’s but not
the p’s constant, in general is to increase n,q and c. However,
increases in n and q cause the shadow prices pn and pq to rise.
Thus, the percentage increase in real income in the sense of R
deflated by an index of the p’s is less than the percentage increase
in money income I. This price effect of an increase in money
income resembles somewhat the price effect resulting from a rise
in money income caused by a rise in wage rates. The increase, in
ratio terms, is less in real income than in money income, because
the costs of producing commodities in the household are increased
by the rise in the price of time. (Becker and Lewis (1973), p. 81)
Studying the price effects, Becker and Lewis find the opposite results: the
observed price elasticity of quantity exceeds that of quality.
Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) deal with a very similar framework and
they motivate the decline in fertility with an increase in the level of income.
In their models, individuals live for two periods: childhood and parent-
hood. Parents are altruistic towards their children in the sense that parental
utility depends not only on their own consumption, but also on the number
of children and on the future utility of each child. The utility function of an
adult of the ith generation is:
Ui = u(ci) + a(ni)niUi+1, (1.17)
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where ci is the amount of consumption of individual i , ni the number of his
children, Ui+1 the future utility of each child, and a(ni) > 0 the degree of
altruism towards each child. The model is based on the following assumption:
• the degree of altruism per child a(ni) is a decreasing function in the
number of children, that is a′ < 0. Secondly, a(1) < 1. It means
that, even if parents are altruistic in the sense that they care about
both the quantity and the quality of their children, they are selfish in
the sense that the marginal utility of their own consumption exceeds
the marginal utility derived from his child’s consumption when they
have one child (n = 1). Furthermore, a(ni) has constant elasticity with
respect to the number of children: a(ni) = α(ni)
−ε, with 0 < α < 1
and 0 < ε < 1. As a consequence, for a given Ui+1, the marginal utility
of children is positive but decreasing, that is U ′i > 0 and U
′′
i < 0;
• the elasticity of u with respect ci is constant, that is u(ci) = (ci)
σ, with
σ < 1.
If we consider all the generation i = 0..∞ within a given dynasty, sub-
stituting Ui as function of Ui+1 and so on, we obtain the dynastic utility
function:
U0 = Σ
∞
i=0α
i(Ni)
1−εu(ci), (1.18)
where N = Πi−1j=0nj is the number of descendants of the dynastic head, with
N0 = 1.
Regarding the budget constraint, the income is given by the wage wi and
the returns on the endowment of physical capital ki at the interest rate ri.
Individual i spends his income in consumption goods and in child caring.
The rearing cost for each child is equal to βi. In addition to that, individual
i leaves a bequest of non depreciable capital ki+1 to each child. Hence, the
budget constraint is given by:
wi + (1 + ri)ki ≥ ci + ni(βi + ki+1). (1.19)
When we consider the maximization problem, we can imagine that the
dynastic head pick the entire time path (he chooses the path of consumption
per adult c0, c1, c2,..., the path of capital stock per adult, k1, k2,..., and the
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path of the number of descendants N1, N2,...) or that any descendants face a
problem of the same form, without any incentive to deviate from the previous
choices. In addition, the model neglects integer restrictions on the number
of children.
The first order conditions are given by
u′(ci)
u′(ci+1)
= α
(1 + ri+1)
(ni)ε
, (1.20)
u(ci) [1− ε− σ(ci)] = u
′(ci) [βi−1(1 + ri)− wi] .
The first equation is an arbitrage condition for shifting consumption from
one generation to the next one. The utility rate of substitution between
consumption in periods i+ 1 and i depends on the time preference factor α
and the interest rate ri+1. As in the standard literature, a rise in ri+1 or α
increases ci+1 relative to ci. In Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) we have in
addition that an increase in fertility decreases ci+1 relative to ci, for given
values of α and ri+1. Indeed a higher ni lowers the altruism towards each
child a(ni) and hence increases the discount on future consumption. In other
words, in this model lower altruism is equivalent to a higher rate of time
preference.
The second equation tells us that the marginal benefit of an additional
child or equivalently of an additional adult descendant of the next generation
has to be equal to his marginal cost.
The first condition says that the fertility rate ni is an increasing function
in the interest rate ri+1 and in the pure rate of altruism α.
The second condition says that consumption is positive only when the cost
of rearing a child exceeds the present value of his lifetime earning (that is,
when children are a financial burden). It also implies that the consumption ci
is a positive function of the net cost of producing another descendant, indeed
each individual is endowed with higher level of consumption when children
are more expensive to produce.
In the previous literature, consumption per descendant grows over time
if the real interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference and an increase
of the interest rate raises the rate of growth over time in consumption. In
Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) the consumption per person rises over time
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if the net cost of creating descendant increases. An increase of the interest
rate raises the level but not the rate of growth of the consumption per person
over time, that is independent of the level of the interest rate, of the rate
of time preference and of pure rate of altruism. However, since an increase
of ri+1 raises the fertility rate n i, an increases of ri+1 also raises the rate of
growth over time in the total consumption of descendants.
In the model there exist unique steady-state values for n∗, c∗ and k∗.
The values (n∗, c∗, k∗) are globally stable and they are reached in only one
generation. In addition, n∗ is a positive function in r and α and it does not
depend on the cost of children, c∗ is a positive function of the net cost of
children β(1 + r)− w.
The mechanism of the model is based on the trade-off between quantity
and quality of children. The level of income affects this trade-off and de-
termines the rate of fertility. Anyway, the income effect can be hindered or
accelerated by other complementary effects. Becker and Barro (1988, 1989)
consider the effects of the different elements (technological progress, child
mortality, social security, taxation, changes in the cost of rising children,
shifts in productivity, etc.). However, it is only a matter of comparative
statistics and dynamics: the fundamental mechanism is based on the income
effect and the other complementary factors just influence the power of this
effect.
In Barro and Becker (1989) we find a further development with respect
to the article dated 1988. In Barro and Becker (1989) the determination
of interest rates and wage rates is simultaneous with the determination of
population growth and capital accumulation. The interest rate and the wage
rate are determined by profit maximization in a competitive economy. If we
indicate with g the exogenous rate of technical progress, we find that there
exists an unique steady state for the values of k, n, c, w and β3 and that the
amount per person yi, ci and wi all grow at the rate g.
In addition, for a given r, higher steady-state per capita growth g is
associated with a lower growth rate of population. In the space (n; r) it is
possible to determine simultaneously the interest rate and the population
3Now β is equal to a(1 + g)i + bwi, where a(1 + g)
i is the child cost in terms of units
of goods and b is the cost in terms of units of parental time.
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growth. Some conditions ensure that the steady-state exists and it is unique.
The steady-state rate of population growth is positively related to the degree
of altruism toward children and to the steady-state long-term interest rate,
and it is negatively related to the rate of growth between generations in per
capita consumption.
In conclusion, the main point of the above explained theories is that the
decline in fertility is due to the rise in income per capita and its asymmetric
effects on the income of households and on the opportunity cost of raising
children. We should infer that the demographic transition was triggered by
the increase in the level of income. In other words, these theories suggest
that the timing of the demographic transition across countries would reflect
differences in income per capita and that countries with the same level of
income per capita would experience the demographic transition in the same
period. In addition, they suggest that, prior to the demographic transition,
within a country fertility would decline at sufficient high levels of income.
However, empirical evidence shows that it did not happen: starting from
1870, on the eve of the demographic transition, the decline of fertility oc-
curred in the same decade across Western European countries that differed
significantly in their income per capita (see England, Sweden, Finland, Nor-
way and Germany). Furthermore, the level of income per capita within these
countries did not significantly increase during the demographic transition.
1.5.2 The Decline in Infant and Child Mortality
Evidence shows that mortality decline preceded fertility decline and this
brought many economists and (demographers) to think of a casual link from
falling mortality to falling fertility and to see the two phenomena as compo-
nents of a single demographic transition. Actually, parents give utility from
the number and the quality of their surviving children. Therefore, we would
expect that a decline in infant and child mortality brings to a reduction in
total fertility rates. However, it does not necessary involve a reduction in
the number of children reaching adulthood. As a consequence, the decline
in infant and child mortality may not explain the reversal of the positive
relation between income and fertility.
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Consider the previous utility function given by (1.10), that is:
Ut = γ ln (ns)t + (1− γ) ln ct+1,
where (ns)t is the number of surviving children (i.e., the net fertility rate).
ns is given by:
(ns)t = p (nb)t , (1.21)
where p is the survival probability of a child and (nb )t the number of born
children (i.e., the total fertility rate).
The budget constraint is given by
wt ≥ st + τwt(ns)t, (1.22)
where τwt is the time cost of raising one survival child. We are ignoring the
cost of died children. From the optimization we obtain the same result of
the neoclassical model with endogenous fertility given by (1.11):
(ns)t =
γ
τ
(1.23)
st = (1− γ)wt.
Hence, the net fertility rate is constant. However
(ns)t =
γ
τ
= p (nb)t ⇒ (nb)t =
γ
τpt
. (1.24)
If we investigate how a decline in child mortality affects fertility, we ob-
serve two different effects:
1. if p raises (crude death rate declines), nb declines, so the crude birth
rate or the total fertility rate declines. This result is consistent with the
empirical evidence until the demographic transition. Indeed, prior the
demographic transition the crude death rate started to decline. The
resources pro capita increased and, in a Malthusian regime, it brought
to an increase of the crude birth rate. The point is that after the 1870’s
the crude death rate has continued to decline, but the crude birth rate
started to decline. As a consequence, a decline in child mortality cannot
explain the reduction of fertility, because the decline in child mortality
took place also before the reduction in fertility;
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2. if p raises (crude death rate declines), ns =
γ
τ
is constant. ns can be
considered the net reproduction rate (the number of female children
surviving to fecund age). This theoretical result is not consistent with
empirical evidence, indeed as the crude death rate declined starting
from the 1730’s, the net reproduction rate raised in a first moment,
but then it declined (after the 1870’s).
In conclusion, we can say that the decline in child and infant mortality
affected fertility for sure, but it cannot explain the demographic transition.
An increase in p can affect the net fertility rate ns only if:
1. parents are risk adverse with respect to surviving children;
2. risk aversion with respect to ns is greater than risk aversion with respect
consumption;
3. replacement of died children is insignificant;
4. income saved by avoid unproductive pregnancies does not rise fertility
significantly (if a child dies, the saved resources that parents would
have spend for him are not devoted to another new birth);
5. physiological reasons (to reach the desired number of children ns par-
ents had to face nb pregnancies. Assume that the physiological limit
is n¯ < nb. In this case parents can have only n1 = pn¯ < ns children.
If p increases and becomes equal to 1, parents can have n2 = n¯ > n1:
respect to n1 fertility increased, even if mortality declined).
Also Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) refuse the idea that the decline in
child mortality can explain the decline in fertility. They prove that the decline
in child mortality has only temporary (and positive) effects on the rate of
population growth.
If we consider again the model developed by Becker and Barro (1988,
1989), we can study the effect of a temporary change in the child cost β.
Assume that βj increases, but that βi with i 6= j is constant. The con-
sumption cj+1 rises, while all other ci do not change, nj falls (children are
more expensive), nj+1 increases and after the (j+1)st generation n does not
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change. If the change in β is permanent, consumption per person rises in
generation j + 1 and in each subsequent generation equi-proportionally, nj
falls, while fertility in all subsequent generation is unchanged. It is possible
to show that, within this model, a decline in child mortality corresponds to
a decline in the cost of raising surviving children. Assume, for simplicity,
that wage rates and interest rates are constant over time and that there is
not uncertainty about child deaths. Let βs be the cost of rearing a child to
adulthood and βm be the cost of a child that dies prior becoming an adult.
The expected cost of nb births is [pβs + (1 − p)βm]. The cost per surviving
child given nb births is equal to:
β =
[pβs + (1− p)βm
pnb
= βs +
(1− p)
p
βm. (1.25)
Parents maximize their utility with respect to the expected number of sur-
viving children ns.
An increase in p (a decline in child mortality) lowers the cost of raising
surviving children. As explained above, in this model a temporary decline in
β raises the demand for surviving children (children are less expensive) only
for the initial generation, but it does not increase in the next generations.
Since the demand for surviving children increases, birth rates increase too,
even if the higher probability to survive lowers the number of births necessary
to reach a given number of survivors. If child mortality continues to decline
over time, the cost per surviving child permanently falls. As it was shown
before, a permanent decline in β brings only to a temporary increase in
the fertility rate. Indeed, if child mortality falls over time, the demand
for surviving children increases for more than a generation. However, the
rate of decline in child mortality slow down once it approaches zero. As a
consequence, also the rate of decline of producing survivors slows. Eventually
it becomes equal to zero.
In conclusion, according to Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) the cumulative
decline in child mortality does not affect the demand of surviving children.
Doepke (2005) examines three extensions of the above presented Barro
and Becker’s model. The result is always the same: a falling mortality de-
creases the total fertility rate nb, but it has no significant effect on the net
fertility ns. For mortality decline to have a negative effect on net fertility,
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it is necessary to assume implausible conditions. In particular, we have to
assume that parents response to child mortality ex ante by hoarding new-
borns and ex post by replacing dead children. A decline in child mortality
will translate into a decline in net fertility only if the hoarding behavior is
sufficiently strong.
As we said before, Doepke takes into consideration three extensions of
the model by Becker and Barro (1988, 1989).
1. Model A: Becker-Barro with continuous fertility choice.
This is the standard version of Becker and Barro’s model. The only
difference with respect to the original model is the definition of children
costs. Doepke considers βm as the cost per each birth and βs as the
additional cost for each surviving child. In other words, for nb births,
only ns children involve a cost equal to (βm + βs), whereas all the nb
surviving children involve a cost equal to βm. Given the income w, the
budget constraint is:
w ≥ c+ (βm + pβs)nb. (1.26)
As in Becker and Barro (1988, 1989), nb is restricted to be an integer,
but it is not true for p, since it is a fraction (in particular, it is the
fraction of surviving children, given nb births). As a consequence, the
number of surviving children ns is not constrained to be an integer, so
we get the standard continuous fertility choice. Mortality is determin-
istic in the sense that p is the fraction of surviving children. We obtain
the solution for nb as function of p. With regard to the effect of a
decline in child mortality on fertility, we obtain the following result: as
the child mortality declines (that is, as p increases), what happens to
the total fertility rate nb depends on which cost (βm or βs) dominates
(nb is an increasing function of p if βm > 0 and βs = 0, whereas nb
is an decreasing function of p if βm = 0 and βs > 0). Anyway, the
net fertility rate ns always rises or is constant as the child mortality
declines. We can unambiguously assert that a decline in child mortality
does not lower the net fertility rate.
2. Model B: Stochastic Becker-Barro with discrete fertility choice.
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This setup is the first real extension to Becker and Barro’s model. Fer-
tility is restricted to be an integer, and the survival is stochastic, so the
realized number of children is uncertain. In particular, the distribution
of surviving children is assumed to be binomial (for each birth there
is a constant probability of death). In this case we obtain that the
solution for nb is still a function of p. If βm = 0, the total fertility nb is
non-increasing in p. It means that if there is no birth-specific cost, the
optimal number of births declines as survival rates increase. Only sur-
viving children are costly (βm = 0) and parents only care about them,
hence parents adjust their total fertility to stay close to the desired
fertility.
3. Model C: Stochastic Becker-Barro with discrete and sequential fertility
choice.
This model preserves the integer constraint and the stochastic survival
of Model B and introduces sequential fertility. In each period, parents
can give birth to a single child. Children live for two periods and in the
third period of their life they are adults. The new born infants survive
with probability pi until the next period, whereas the probability of
surviving the second period is py. Once a child has survived for two
periods, he will survive until adulthood for sure. This setup permits to
distinguish between infant and child mortality. In each period, parents
has to decide whether to give birth to a single child or not. This
decision is conditional on the survival of older children and on the fact
that parents are fecund only until period t¯: in order to reach the desired
number of children, parents can “hoar” children as a precaution, but
they cannot hoar children after t¯. In this model parents have a fixed
income in each sub period and they cannot borrow or lend in order to
smooth their income over time. In model C total fertility rate nb is a
function of pi. If βm = 0 and py = 1, then nb is non-increasing in pi.
Hence, in both stochastic models (Model B and C), if the birth-specific
cost βm is equal to zero, total fertility rate nb does not increase as survival
rates increase.
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Doepke checks these analytical and qualitative results by a calibration of
the model. The theoretical results are confirmed by the quantitative find-
ings. In addition, the quantitative results are not sensitive to the choice of
parameters, since Doepke do not find a single case where an increase in the
survival probability results in substantial net fertility decline.
At the end of his work, Doepke concludes with the following passage:
In summary, each model predicts that the total fertility falls with
infant mortality, but none of the models predicts a fall in net
fertility rates. Relative to the data, the models suggest that only
a small proportion of observed fertility decline, and none of the
net fertility decline, is accounted for by declining infant mortality.
(Doepke (2005), p. 347)
Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) studies qualitatively and quantitatively the effects
of the decline in mortality rates on fertility, education and economic growth.
The idea comes from the evidence of fact that in the last two centuries the life
expectancy at birth doubled in most parts of the world. This phenomenon
was accompanied by a decline in the fertility rates and this brought demogra-
phers to consider declines in mortality and fertility as components of a single
demographic transition. In other words, demographers believe the fertility
decline was due to the mortality decline and to improved survival chances of
the offspring.
In addition to the effect on fertility, Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) investigates
also the link between the decline in mortality and accumulation of human
capital. On the one hand, some researchers believe that a decline in infant
and child mortality does not actually affect the accumulation of human cap-
ital, since human capital investment decisions are taken after childhood. On
the other hand empirical evidence suggests that mortality decline has an im-
portant incentive to increase investment in education at any age and that
the return to human capital is highest before age 5.
Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) considers an overlapping generations model where
only one good is produced using land and human capital as inputs. The
production function is the same given by equation (1.1), but we have hu-
man capital instead that labor units. It exhibits constant returns to scale,
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according to the Neoclassical production technology. The output at period t
is given by
Yt = AH
α
t X
1−α, (1.27)
where A is a productivity parameter. It is fixed over time, as land. The
output for capita is equal to:
yt = Ah
α
t x
1−α
t ≡ y(ht, xt). (1.28)
We do not have property rights on land, so the return to land is zero and the
wage per capita is equal to the average product:
wt = Aα
(
xt
ht
)1−α
. (1.29)
Individuals live for two periods. During childhood, they consume a frac-
tion of their parents’ unit time endowment. In the second period of life,
individuals allocate their resources between consumption and child rearing.
Parents’ preferences are defined over their consumption ct and over both the
quantity ns and the quality (i.e., the level of human capital ht+1) of their
surviving children:
Ut = γ ln ct + (1− γ)Et ln((ns)tht+1), (1.30)
where Et is the parental expectation as of time t.
Children human capital production depends on the level of parental hu-
man capital ht and on the level of children education et parents decide to
invest on:
ht+1 = e
β
t ht. (1.31)
Parents allocate their potential income between consumption and child
rearing. Quantity and quality of children needs a friction ν and et of parental
time, respectively. Parents devote a fraction (ν + et) of time to any child,
when each child’s survival is uncertain. In other words, parents provide
education to every nb newborn child before the uncertainty about survival is
realized. Hence, the budget constraint is equal to:
wtht = wtht(ν + et)(nb)t + ct. (1.32)
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The stochastic variable “number of survival children” follows a binomial
distribution and the probability that (ns)t out of (nb)t children will survive
is equal to:
f((ns)t, (nb)t, pt) =
(
(nb)t
(ns)t
)
p
(ns)t
t (1− pt)
(nb)t−(ns)t ,
where pt is the survival probability of each child. As previously, we assume
pt constant over time.
Maximizing Ut , we obtain the following results:
• ∂(nb)t
∂p
< 0, ∂et
∂p
> 0 ∀p
• Lt+1
Lt
= L((nb)t, p)
• limp→0
∂
(
Lt+1
Lt
)
∂p
> 0
• limp→1
∂
(
Lt+1
Lt
)
∂p
< 0 if β ∼= 1
•
∂2
(
Lt+1
Lt
)
∂p2
< 0 ∀p.
An exogenous increase in the survival probability p decreases the precau-
tionary demand for children and raises the investment in their education.
When the probability p tends to 0 (high mortality), if p increases popula-
tion growth unambiguously increases. This situation reflects the Malthusian
regime, where the population growth rate depends positively on the survival
chances. Whereas, when p tends to 1 (very low mortality) if p increases pop-
ulation growth decreases only if return to education is high enough (β ∼= 1).
This second situation reflects a non-Malthusian regime: the survival prob-
ability is high and it has a positive effect on the number of survivors. On
the other hand, this effect is more than offset by the decline in fertility due
to the fact that, if return to education is sufficiently high, parents replace
quantity with quality of children. As a consequence, the final outcome is
that population growth decreases.
Assume now that p changes over time. In particular, it is plausible to
think that the survival probability is a positive and concave function of the
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Figure 1.1: Population Growth and Survival Probability
level of income per capita:
pt ≡ p(yt), py > 0, pyy < 0. (1.33)
Given the hump-shaped relation Lt+1
Lt
= L((nb)t, p) and the concave relation
pt ≡ p(yt), we obtain a hump-shaped relation between the population growth
rate and the income per capita, that is
Lt+1
Lt
= L((nb)t, p(yt)) = L((nb)t, yt). (1.34)
As figure (1.2) shows, we have a negative population growth rate
(
Lt+1
Lt
< 1
)
for high level of yt if ν > (1 − γ)(1 − β). It means that, for a high level of
income per capita, the population growth rate is negative if:
• for a given return to education β, parents care a lot about their own
consumption (high γ) or the fixed cost per child ν is high, or
• for a given γ and a given ν, the return to education is high (high β).
These two situations are consistent with the zero or negative population
growth of the developed countries.
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Figure 1.2: Population Growth and Income per Capita
In conclusion, in order to obtain significant effects of mortality decline
on net fertility, we have to assume quite restrictive conditions, in particular
with regard to parental behavior (risk adverse individuals with respect to
surviving children and high precautionary demand for children.) We can
claim that (infant) mortality decline may affect the total fertility rate, but it
has no significant effect on the net fertility rate. This result brings us to infer
that a decline in infant mortality cannot explain the demographic transition
and that we have to look for other explanations.
1.5.3 The Old-Age Security Hypothesis
The main idea developed by this theory is that children are a sort of invest-
ment goods. This hypothesis is suitable for poor economies where capital
market is not developed and it is difficult to smooth and transfer wealth over
time. According to this approach, fertility decline and demographic transi-
tion are related to the development of capital markets and to other factors
that make unnecessary children to give support to their old age parents (an
increase in the return to saving, the introduction of social security and re-
52 A Survey on Population Theories
tirement system, etc.). Obviously, this theory recognizes a psychological and
anthropological motivation to have children, but a non-altruistic utility func-
tion is adopted in order to isolate the effect of the old-age security motive on
fertility. In addition, empirical evidence shows us that family is still a social
security cushion also in the modern and developed societies4.
Consider an undeveloped economy with a storage technology that gen-
erates a return equal to R and a primitive production function that gives a
wage equal to W . Saving is subjected to depreciation: if the amount st is
saved, the interest rate R accrues only on st(1− δ)
α, where α < 1 measures
the degree of capital markets’ imperfection. This framework does not allow
an efficient consumption smoothing over time. For this reason, the following
social rule is introduced: a portion β ∈ (0; 1) of W is devoted to parental
support.
Individuals live three periods. During childhood, they consume x units of
their parental income (they do not involve a time cost). During adulthood,
individuals earn the wage W . They devote βW to parental support and
allocate the remaining (1 − β)W between child rearing (xnt) and saving
(st). In the last period of life, individuals consume their savings and βWnt.
The utility function of any individual at period t depends on his own future
consumption. For simplicity we assume that
Ut = ct+1. (1.35)
The budget constraint at period t is given by:
(1− β)W ≥ st + xnt,
whereas, in the next period
(1− δ)sαt R + βWnt ≥ ct+1.
The optimization with respect to nt gives us that the return to saving has to
4For instance, U.S. House of Representatives (1988) reports that today the average
American woman spends 17 years of her adult life caring for a dependent child and 18
years for her elderly parents, while in 1900 the number of years were, respectively, 19 and
9.
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be equal to the return to child. Solving for nt, we get
nt =
(1− β)W
x
−
(
α(1− δ)xR
βW
) 1
1−α 1
x
. (1.36)
If α → 1 or δ → 0, (i.e., if capital market tends to perfection), the number
of children declines, indeed
∂nt
∂α
< 0;
∂nt
∂(1− δ)
< 0. (1.37)
Among the theories developed within the Family Economics, we find sev-
eral models dealing with the old-age security hypothesis. Cigno (1993) and
Cigno, Giannelli and Rosati (1998) study an overlapping generations econ-
omy based on intergenerational monetary transfers. This model will be pre-
sented in detail in the next chapter, anyway it is useful to show its general
framework in this survey.
In these models parents have children only to obtain an economic support
in the last period of their life (they have a pure non-altruistic utility function).
Individuals live for three periods. Children are passive agents and consume a
fraction of their parents’ income. In the second period of their life, individuals
earn the wageW . The income is allocate between: a) consumption b) saving
c) a monetary transfer equal to x towards old-age parents d) a monetary
transfer towards each child. In particular, adults face the fix cost f for each
child and they can transfer to each of them an additional amount b. In the old
age, individuals consume their saving and the amount xn received by their
children. Therefore, the lifetime utility of any individual (at the beginning
of his life) is given by:
Uc = ln(b) + φ ln(W − (f + b)n− x− s) + φ
2 ln(xn+ s(1 + r)), (1.38)
whereas, the utility of any adult is given by:
Ua = ln(W − (f + b)n− x− s) + φ ln(xn+ s(1 + r)). (1.39)
Any decision is made during adulthood, hence individuals maximize Ua.
Any adult has to decide how many children to have (n), how much to save
(s) and how much to transfer to each child (b) and to his old parents (x).
The couple of intergenerational transfers (b;x) is called family constitution.
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With regard to the number of children, we find a corner solution: since
children are only capital goods, parents decide to have children only if the
return to them
(
given by x
f+b
)
is higher than the return to saving. We
expect that, as we previously said, the development of the capital market
brings about a decline in fertility.
With regard to the family constitution, since individuals are selfish and
have children only for non-altruistic motive, they have no reason to transfer
b > 0 to each child and x > 0 to their old parents. As a consequence,
a complex set of rules is introduced in order to guarantee that each adult
generation transfers (b;x). These rules provide also for the introduction of
a new constitution. It means that any adult generation has the possibility
to choose a constitution different from the one inherited from the previous
generation.
At this point, a family constitution is defined self-enforcing if it supports
a sub-game-perfect Nash equilibrium, whereas it is defined negotiation-proof
if no adult generation decides to change it, even if they have the opportunity
to do that.
The principal contribute of these models is their effort to find, not only
the optimal family constitution for any adult generation, but also the one
that is negotiation-proof. The first best for any adult generation would be to
choose the family constitution that maximizes Ua. However, their children
would be motivated to change that constitution and punish their parents
transferring x = 0 to them. For this reason, any adult generation is obliged
to choose, not the constitution that maximize Ua, but the one that will be
respect by their children. In other words, any adult generation is obliged to
choice a negotiation-proof family constitution. According to Cigno, Giannelli
and Rosati (1998), this constitution is given by the one which maximizes Uc.
However, they do not prove that it is the unique negotiation-proof consti-
tution. In the next chapter it will be explained that the constitution which
maximizes Uc is negotiation-proof by definition and hence, once introduced,
it will never be changed. The point is that individuals will never decide to
introduce such a constitution. In particular it will be posited that also the
couple (b;x) which maximizes Ua is negotiation proof. It means that the
first generation of a certain dynasty can choose his first best because it is
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negotiation-proof and no one will have incentives to change that.
The model developed by Ehrlich and Lui (1991) is very interesting because
it connects fertility to intergenerational transfers, longevity (even if it is
exogenous), and economic growth. In addition, it compares the dynamics of
the economy when intergenerational transfers are purely motivated by self-
interest and the old-age security hypothesis to the case where parents have
children also for altruistic motives.
This is an overlapping generations model where individuals live three
periods: childhood, adulthood and old age. Children and old-age parents
completely depend on the material support given by young parents (i.e.,
adults). Adults are endowed with one unit of labor time, a fixed stock of
raw labor capital H¯ and a stock of human capital Ht previously acquired
thanks to the investment in their education by their old-age parents. Adults
devote v units of labor time to raise each child and ht units of labor time
to educate each child. The future human capital of each child is equal to
Ht+1 = A(H¯ +Ht)ht. In addition, adults transfer a certain amount to their
old-age parents. The amount is determined as a share of the stock of their
human capitalHt acquired during childhood thanks to the investment of their
parents. The compensation rate is equal to wt, so any adult transfers wtHt to
his old-age parents with probability pi2, that is the exogenous probability for
any adult individual to survive to old age. If the wage per (H¯+Ht) efficiency
units is equal to 1, the consumption flow of the representative adult at time
t is given by:
ct = (H¯ +Ht)(1− vnt − htnt)− pi2wtHt,
where nt is the number of his children. The implicit contract between gener-
ations concerning the inter generational transfers ensures a consumption at
time ct+1 equal to
ct+1 = pi1ntwt+1Ht+1,
where pi1 is the exogenous probability that the representative adult’s children
will survive to adulthood, wt+1 the future compensation rate and Ht+1 the
future level of human capital of each child. The representative adult will
survive to old age and will consume ct+1 with probability pi2.
Hence, an implicit contract between generations provides for a flow of in-
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tergenerational transfers that ensure material support to children and old-age
individuals. Some conditions and rules are introduced in order to guarantee
that this implicit contract will be honored by all generations (that is, the
contract is self-enforcing): a) parents and children have identical preferences
b) violating the contract always involves a penalty in the form of a similar
behavior by the violator’s family, c) consumption during adulthood and con-
sumption during old age are sufficiently non substitutable, d) the economy
has an infinite horizon.
Ehrlich and Lui (1991) take into consideration three different frameworks.
1. In the first case parents invest in the quantity and quality of their
children only in order to secure old-age material support. In this case
their utility function depends just on ct and ct+1. As long as wt+1 > 0,
the rate of return to quality always exceeds that to quantity, hence
the optimal solution for the quality of children is always positive and
the optimal solution for the number of children is a corner solution
where the total fertility rate pi1nt is strictly positive and at its lowest
permissible value. With regard to the choice of the compensation rate
wt+1, parents determine a value of wt+1 that is optimal for each child
and compatible with the above explained investments rule in children.
The first order condition gives an equation which provides an unique
solution for wt+1 that applies in all time periods. The solution wt+1 =
w is positive, it does not depend on the level of human capital Ht ,
but it is inversely related to all the exogenous determinants of the
discounted rate of return to human capital. If we study the dynamics
of the economy, we get two steady states: a growth equilibrium where
human capital grows at the same rate of per capita consumption (see
line b in figure (1.3)), and a stagnant equilibrium where human capital
is constant over time (see point X in figure (1.3)). In addition, we have
that the optimal compensation rate maximizes the marginal growth
rate of human capital and hence the economy’s long run growth rate
in the growth equilibrium. Exogenous increases in longevity through
either pi1 or pi2, an increase in the efficiency of investment A, a reduction
in the rate of time preference, a reduction in the cost of rearing children
v, raise the economy’s level and rate of economic growth. The elasticity
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of the economy’s steady state growth rate with respect to pi1 exceeds
the corresponding elasticity with respect to pi2, for all value of pi1 and
pi2.
Ht+1
Ht
a
b
X
Figure 1.3: Human Capital Growth under the Force of Material Dependency
2. Secondly, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) consider the case in which parents
decide to have children also because they obtain from them direct util-
ity, in addition to material security. This additional source of utility
is called “companionship”. For simplicity, it is assumed that com-
panionship is enjoyed by parents in their last period of life and it is
insured, just like material support, by all surviving children. The util-
ity flow provided by companionship is an increasing function of the
number of surviving children pi1nt and of their human capital Ht. In
other words, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) add the traditional parental altru-
ism to the old-age security motive to have children: parents care about
both the quantity and quality of their children. The terms of the im-
plicit contract between generations now include companionship as well
as material support. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the
compensation rate is constant. In addition, we have to stress that the
58 A Survey on Population Theories
threat of losing companionship in addition to old-age material support
improves the prospect that the implicit contract between generations
will be self-enforcing. When we look for the optimal quantity and qual-
ity of children, in order to obtain an interior solution for both quantity
and quality, we have to assume that parents give more importance to
the number of surviving children than to their quality. In this second
framework, the emergence of a demographic transition is possible. In-
deed, a sufficiently high stock of human capital increases the return to
quality until it exceeds the return to quantity. In this case the optimal
fertility rate falls to its minimal level, as in the previous case of pure
self-interest. Anyway, contrary to Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
in this model return to quality never falls below the return to quantity,
hence this model does not allow for a stable equilibrium involving zero
investment in human capital. If companionship does not depend on
human capital of children, it means that parents care about children’s
human capital only in order to get a material support in the last period
of their life. In this case, we have interior solutions in both nt and ht
and two possible steady states: one is a stable and stagnant equilibrium
of zero growth rate (see point A in figure (1.4)), the other is a stable,
self generating growth equilibrium (see line b in figure (1.4)). If the
economy is initially in a stagnant equilibrium, an increase in pi1 or pi2
raises the stock of human capital. If the increase of pi1 is once-for-all,
human capital may reach a higher stationary level or may continue to
increase over time. Returns to quality increase, hence fertility declines
towards its minimal level and the economy converges to the sustained
growth equilibrium.
3. Finally, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) consider the case in which additional
means of self-insuring old-age material needs exist. In particular, par-
ents have the possibility to save a part st of their income. In this frame-
work, parents have to choose the optimal saving rate along with the
optimal quantity and quality of children. Although saving introduces
an alternative to investment in children’s human capital as a means
of providing old-age material support, parents continue to invest in
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Figure 1.4: Human Capital Growth under the Combine Force of Material
Dependency and Altruism
both quantity and quality of children. It is due to two factors: first
of all, there is an altruistic motive for investment in children’s quality
and hence savings and investment in children are imperfect substitutes.
Secondly, the model assumes diminishing marginal product of saving
in producing old-age consumption. Since parents continue to invest in
both quantity and quality of children also in this framework, the pre-
vious consideration about the dynamics of the economy are still valid.
In general, we can say that the old-age security hypothesis is very con-
troversial. It seems to be refused by economists, whereas anthropologists are
more inclined to take it into consideration. We will present a more detailed
analysis of the old-age security hypothesis in the next chapter. We refer to
the next chapter also for further considerations on the economic literature
dealing with this approach.
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1.5.4 The Gender Gap
The process of development brought about a decline in the wage differentia-
tion between men and women. If we consider the ratio between female wage
W f and male wage Wm, data show that W f/Wm has increased over time,
starting from the nineteenth century. At the same time, the fertility rate has
declined. That being so, some theories suggest there is a cause-effect link
between the decline in gender wage differential and the decline in fertility
rates.
The model developed by Galor and Weil (1996) presents three relations:
1. household’s fertility decisions depend on the relative wage of women
and men;
2. population growth affects the level of capital per worker;
3. there is a positive feedback loop, since the level of capital per worker
affects in its turn the relative wages of women and men.
Regarding the production side of the model, we have three factors of
production: physical capital K, physical labor Lp and mental labor Lm, such
that:
Yt = F (Kt;L
p
t ;L
m
t ).
The key assumption of the model is that, the richer in physical capital is the
economy, the more highly rewarded is mental labor relative to the physical
labor. It means that an increase in K raises the marginal product of Lm
proportionally more than the marginal product of Lp. Equivalently, physi-
cal capital complements Lm more than Lp. All factors earn their marginal
products. The return to a unit of physical labor at time t is wpt , whereas the
return to a unit of mental labor at time t is wpt .
We have two kinds of workers: men and women. During childhood and
old age, men and women are identical. In adulthood, men and women differ
in their endowments of the two types of labor input: men and women have
equal endowments of mental labor, but men have more physical strength.
For simplicity, Galor and Weil (1996) assume that women have no physical
strength. It means that men earn wpt +w
m
t , whereas women earn w
m
t . Given
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the assumption explained above, we have that an increase in the amount of
K raises the return to mental labor wm and thus reduces the proportional
wage gap between men and women.
With regard to individuals, this is an overlapping generations model
where individuals live three periods. During childhood, individuals consume
a fixed amount of parental time. In the second period, individuals allocate
their time between child rearing and labor force participation. For simplic-
ity, it is assumed that individuals do not consume in this period. In the last
period of their life, individuals consume their savings.
The basic unit of analysis is the couple, that has joint consumption and
utility. The couple receives utility from the number of children and from
consumption in the last period of life, hence the utility function is still given
by equation (1.10):
Ut = γ lnnt + (1− γ) ln ct+1,
where nt is the number of children that the couple has. Equivalently, nt is
the number of couples that each couple has as children.
Since the only input required to raise children is time, the opportunity
cost of children is proportional to the market wage. The model does not
assume that women are better at raising children than men: men and women
rear their children according to the opportunity cost for child. Suppose z is
the time required to raise a child. If women spend time raising children, the
cost of a child is equal to zwm , whereas, if men spend time raising children,
the cost of a child is z(wmt + w
p
t ). As a consequence, if znt ≤ 1 only women
rise children. If znt > 1, women spend their full time to rise children and
men only a part of their time. Hence, the couple’s budget constraint in the
first period is given by:
wpt + 2w
m
t ≥ w
m
t znt + st if znt ≤ 1
wpt + 2w
m
t ≥ w
m
t + (w
m
t + w
p
t )(znt − 1) + st if znt > 1.
In the second period, the budget constraint is given by:
st(1 + rt+1) ≥ ct+1.
Couples has to decide how many children to have or, in other words, how
to allocate their time between labor force participation and raising children.
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Maximizing the couples’ utility with respect to nt, we find three possible
optima:
1. for a sufficiently low relative wage of mental labor, men and women are
completely specialized: women do not join the labor force and devote
their unit of time endowment to raise children full-time
(
that is, nt =
1
z
)
,
whereas men work full-time. The family income is given by wmt + w
p
t
(see point A in figure (1.5));
2. as the relative wage of mental labor raises, women work part-time (see
point B in figure (1.5)) and men work full-time
(
that is, nt <
1
z
)
;
3. if γ > 1/2, women do not work and raise children full-time, no matter
how high the wage of mental labor.
If women raise children full-time, an increase in men’s wages has a pure
income effect and the demand for children raises. On the contrary, an in-
crease in women’s wages has both an income effect (the household’s income
increases) and a substitution effect (the price of children increases, too). The
overall effect on fertility of a proportional increase in men’s and women’s
wages is at priori ambiguous. In the above presented model, the utility func-
tion is such that proportional increases in men’s and women’s wages keep
fertility constant. Given the above utility function, the determinant element
is the women’s relative wage: if the women’s relative wage increases, fertility
falls.
The second part of the model concerns the effect of population growth on
the level of capital per worker. Solving the previous maximization problem,
households determine how many children to have and how much to save. At
this point it is possible to study the dynamics of the per-couple capital stock
given by kt ≡ Kt/L
p
t . We have that:
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Lt+1
=
Ltst
Ltnt
=
st
nt
.
The dynamics of kt+1 ultimately depends on nt and female labor force partic-
ipation. The steady state value k¯ determines uniquely a stationary fertility
rate n¯ and a stationary level of per-couple output y¯. Even under a set of
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Figure 1.5: Time Spent Raising Children with γ ≤ 1
2
parameters that generally guarantees the uniqueness of the steady-state equi-
librium, in this model we have multiple steady state equilibria because the
rate of growth accelerates as women join the labor force.
The final part of the model presents the link that leads to a positive
feedback loop: increases in the capital intensity of the economy raise the
relative wages of women. In turn, this leads women to substitute children
with labor force participation. As a consequence, household’s income and
savings increase and population growth falls. This increases the level of
capital per worker and the mechanism recurs again. High relative wages for
women are thus both a product of and a casual factor in economic growth.
Given this feedback, the explained model is an example of the new branch
of theoretical models attempting to integrate the macro and the micro ap-
proach. In the first part of the model the economic context determines the
micro behavior of the families. In the second part, the fertility decisions of
the families affect the macro context (the level of capital per worker). Fi-
nally, the macro context affected by households’ decision influences in turn
families’ behavior.
According to this model, there is a positive, monotonic relation between
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income per capita and women’s labor force participation, and thus a negative,
monotonic relation between income and fertility. However, empirical evidence
shows that before the demographic transition fertility initially increased, and
then it started to fall. In the same way, empirical evidence shows that the
relation between income and female labor force participation is U-shaped. If
we introduce two variations, the above presented model can generate such
a relation and the initial increase in the fertility rate. The two necessary
variations are the following ones:
1. supply constraints: at low levels of income, couples face a supply con-
strain in the number of survival children they can produce. Increases
in the level of income pull the number of children nearer to the desired
level and thus women devote more time to child rearing and less time
to labor force participation. However, at high level of income, the sup-
ply constraint is no longer binding and the actual number of children
is equal to the desired one,
2. two-sectors model: consider an economy with a tradition sector, that is
not fully rival to child rearing, and a modern sector, that is fully rival to
child rearing. When capital accumulates, men’s wages and household’s
income increase, so fertility rises because of the income effect.
Contrary to Galor and Weil (1996), Lagerlo¨f (2003) takes into consid-
eration the role of gender equality together with the traditional trade-off
between quantity and quality of children. Lagerlo¨f does not distinguish be-
tween mental and physical labor and he only considers human capital. Men
and women may be endowed with different amount of human capital. It is
not due to different abilities, but only to the fact that parents can decide to
invest different amount of resources in the education of sons and daughters.
Sons and daughters receive different level of education according to the av-
erage level of human capital among men and women. If the average level of
human capital among men is high, parents invest little in their daughters’
human capital because their sons-in-law will provide a high income to their
daughters. At the same way, parents decide to invest little in their sons’
education if the average level of human capital is high among women.
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Lagerlo¨f’s model is an overlapping generations model where individuals
live two periods: childhood and adulthood. We have two kinds of people,
men and women, that have identical preferences and capabilities, but they
are endowed with different amount of human capital (hm for men and hf for
women) because they received different level of education by their parents.
We consider the ratio
µt ≡
hft
hmt
(1.40)
as a measure of gender equality.
The couples care about their consumption ct, the number of children nt
(half of whom are daughters and half are sons) and the full income of the
households into which their children will enter. Let hmt+1 and h
f
t+1 be the
human capital of the sons and daughters of the couple, respectively, and
h¯mt+1and h¯
f
t+1 the human capital of the sons-in-law and daughters-in-law of
the couple, respectively. The utility function of any couple is given by:
Ut = (1−β) ln ct+β
{
lnnt + δ
[
ln
(
w(hmt+1 + h¯
f
t+1)
)
+ ln
(
w(h¯mt+1 + h
f
t+1)
)]}
.
(1.41)
Regardless of the investment in education, each child cost b units of time and
a units of consumption good, hence the cost per child is equal to:
qt = a+ bwh
i i = m, f.
For whatever reason, at time t we have that hm > hf , so women spend time
raising children. Let τ ft and τ
m
t be the time spent educating sons and daugh-
ters, respectively (where hit+1 = Aτ
i
th
f
t , i = m,f). The budget constraint for
any couple is given by:
w(hmt + h
f
t ) ≥ ct + ntqt +
(nt
2
)
(τm + τ f )whft .
Maximizing Ut with respect to nt, h
m
t+1 and h
f
t+1, we obtain that the higher
is the income of the future spouses of their children (h¯mt+1and h¯
f
t+1), the
lower is the marginal utility for the atomistic parent couple from investing
in their children. A high average level of human capital among men induces
parents to invest little in their daughters’ human capital, and vice versa if
the average human capital level of women is high. This is what sustains
66 A Survey on Population Theories
Nash equilibria with discrimination between sons and daughters. In a Nash
equilibrium hmt+1 = h¯
m
t+1 and h
f
t+1 =h¯
f
t+1, so we have that
hmt+1 + h
f
t+1 =
δ
1− δ
qt.
Any combination of hmt+1 > 0 and h
f
t+1 > 0 which satisfies the above equation
is a Nash equilibrium.
With regard to the fertility rate, it is now possible to solve the model
with respect to nt. We obtain that a proportional increase in male and
female human capital (that is, µt remains fixed) leads to higher fertility.
Regarding the growth rate of the sum of male and female human capital,
we have to distinguish two cases:
1. µ constant over time. If µ > 1−δ
δbw−(1−δ)
, the economy converges to
a sustained growth where the growth rate is increasing in µ and the
fertility rate is decreasing in µ. If µ < 1−δ
δbw−(1−δ)
, the economy is in a
Malthusian poverty trap, where fertility is independent of µ;
2. µ changes over time. We can have different paths for µt. Fitting the
model to the data, Lagerlo¨f finds that µ was more less equal to zero
(hf = 0) until the seventeenth century, then it started growing grad-
ually until it reached unity in the last decades. Initially, even though
the rise in µt was permanent, the effect on fertility and human capital
growth was temporary: the rise in µt was too small to push the econ-
omy to sustained growth and both fertility and human capital growth
went back to their poverty-trap values. When µt increased enough, like
in last decades, the economy converged to the sustained growth and
fertility felt down.
In conclusion, according to Lagerlo¨f (2003) gender equality acts in the
following way: when the spouses’ human capital levels become more equal,
women’s time become more expensive and couples substitute quantity for
quality of their children. Fertility falls, whereas human capital growths and
income per capita growth rises. As human capita and income rise, mortality
falls. Eventually, the combine effect of decline in fertility and mortality can
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bring population to growth. When mortality becomes very low, mortality
decline becomes less significant and it is dominated by the effect of decline
in fertility. As a consequence, population growth declines.
This model captures the very gradual take-off from Malthusian regime to
sustained growth that occurred in Europe. The transition from one economic
regime to the other one is gradual thanks to two elements: gender equality
increases linearly over time and there is a good cost of children a, that is
more significant at low levels of income. A rise in gender equality creates a
quality-quantity substitution in the production of children and this rises the
income of the next generation. In poor economies, rising incomes generate
an income effect that partially offsets the substitution effect produced by the
rise in gender equality. As economies become richer, the good cost of children
becomes less significant and the substitution effect given by the rise in gender
equality dominates the income effect. As a consequence, in economies where
the gender equality increases linearly, per capita income growth rates tend
to rise slowly in the beginning and then to accelerate.
1.5.5 Return to Human Capital
We previously showed that the earliest theories of the Modern Period tried
to explain the non-monotonic relation between income and fertility through
the income effect, without considering any other variable except income and
fertility. The more recent theories took into consideration the effect of other
variables on the relation between income and fertility, such as the infant
and child mortality and the wage gender gap. However, in the last decades
economists’ attention has been focusing on the role of human capital and
its return. No theories of the Pre Modern Period paid attention to the role
of human capital because before the Industrial Revolution the role of first
engine of economic growth was played by physic capital. Starting with the
Industrial Revolution, human capital has been replacing physical capital as
first engine of economic development. Empirical evidence shows that the
demographic transition and the significative increase of demand for human
capital took place simultaneously. This brought economists to consider the
increasing return to human capital as the most important decisive factor in
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the explanation of the demographic transition.
The model developed by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) is one of
the first systematic analysis treating both population and income growth
as endogenous variables and dealing with the role of human capital in the
relation between fertility and income. The focus is still on the income effect
on the trade-off between quantity and quality if children, but the idea of
quality of children is completely new compared to the previous theories.
As we shown before, the idea of quality of children corresponded with the
future utility of children like in Becker (1960) and Becker and Barro (1988,
1989) or with a generic variable q like in Becker and Lewis (1973). From
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) the idea of quality of children has been
corresponding with the future level of human capital of children.
In this model fertility is endogenously determined and return to human
capital is increasing in the stock of human capital. When the stock of human
capital is scarce, return to human capital is low relative to return to children.
On the contrary, if the stock of human capital is abundant, return to human
capital is high relative to return to children. This mechanism explains the
existence of two stable steady state: in the undeveloped Malthusian steady
state the stock and the return to human capital are low, families have many
children and do not invest in their education, whereas in the developed coun-
tries, where the stock and the return to human capital are high, families have
few children and invest in their education.
The framework of this model is very similar to the one described in Becker
and Barro (1988, 1989), but we can identify the following differences:
1. in Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) the focus is on the role of hu-
man capital, whereas in Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) the focus is on
physical capital,
2. Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) investigate the link between two
macro variables (fertility and economic growth), whereas the model de-
veloped by Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) is a micro economic analysis
on families’ fertility choice.
The theory presented by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) is based on
four main assumptions:
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1. the production and rearing of children are very time intensive. This
assumption has an important implication concerning the effect of a rise
in the level of income on the number of children. If the wage rate
increases, the number of children rises because of the income effect.
On the other hand, the opportunity cost of time rises and so parents
decide to have fewer children. Given that the rearing of children is
very time intensive, the substitution effect is assumed to dominate the
income effect, so the number of children is a decreasing function of the
wage rate;
2. as in Becker and Barro (1988, 1989), the discount rate applied by par-
ents to the per capita consumption of their children (that is, the degree
of altruism of parents a(n)) decreases in the number of children;
3. the production of human capital is human capital intensive: to produce
1 unit of human capital it is necessary to use more human capital
than the human capital necessary to produce 1 unit of output in the
consumption, child rearing and physical capital sectors;
4. the return to physical capital falls as the per capita stock of physical
capital increases. On the contrary, the return to human capital does
not monotonically decrease as the stock of human capital increases.
When the stock of human capital is low, the return to human capital
is low. When the stock increases, the rates of return grow at least for
a while. Eventually the return to human capital may begin to decline
as it becomes increasingly difficult to absorb more knowledge.
As it was said before, respect to Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) and Becker
and Lewis (1973) the trade-off between quantity and quality of children be-
comes a trade-off between quantity of children and investment in their human
capital accumulation. Since human capital is the prime engine of economic
growth, family decisions regarding how many children to have and how much
educate them affect the stock of human capital in the economy and economic
growth. On the other hand, family decisions regarding the number and ed-
ucation of children is affected by the level of stock of human capital in the
economy. In other words, we find again an interaction between the economic
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context and families’ decisions and fertility and economic growth are jointly
determined.
Assume to ignore physical capital, for the moment.
When the stock of human capital H is very low (zero or close to zero),
wages and the return to investment in human capital Rh(H) are very low,
too. Because of that, the time spent rearing children is relatively cheap,
so families have many children. Since the number of children n is high,
the degree of parental altruism a(n) is low and the discount rate on future
consumption, [a(n)]−1, is high, such that
[a(n)]−1 > Rh(H) when H → 0. (1.42)
This situation represents a stable steady state that corresponds to the Malthu-
sian trap, where people have many children and do not invest in their edu-
cation.
As H increases, Rh rises, n and a(n) decrease until [a(n)]
−1 = Rh(H).
The investment in human capital becomes positive, but the economy goes
back to the Malthusian trap, as long as the investment in human capital is
less than the capital that wears out.
The investment in human capital continues to rise as the stock and the
return to human capital increase. Whereas, the number of children falls since
the economy reaches a new stable steady state where
[a(n∗)]−1 = Rh(H
∗), (1.43)
where n∗ and H∗ are the steady state fertility rate and investment in educa-
tion.
Between H = 0 and H = H∗ we can individuate a third unstable steady
state corresponding to Hˆ: for H < Hˆ the economy goes back to the Malthu-
sian trap, whereas for H > Hˆ the economy converges to H∗. The multiple
steady-state equilibria are showed in figure (1.6).
If we introduce physical capital too, we have to assume that the degree of
complementarity or substitution between human and physical capital is such
that the stock per capita of physical capital at the steady state H = H∗ is
likely to be larger than at the steady state H = 0.
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∗
Figure 1.6: Human Capital Growth and Multiple Steady-State Equilibria
The dynamics of the model id similar to the one in absence of physi-
cal capital. We have a stable steady state corresponding to undeveloped
economies, where per capita income and the amounts of both physical and
human capital are low and fertility is high. The other stable steady state
corresponds to developed economies, with low level of fertility and high levels
of income, physical capital and human capital. As we explained above, the
return to human capital is higher in developed economies than in undevel-
oped economies. On the contrary, the return to physical capital in developed
economies may be higher or lower than in undeveloped ones depending on
birth rates on both steady states and the rate of consumption in the devel-
oped steady state.
We have to stress that human capital has a more important role than
physical capital in determining the steady state because the return to human
capital rises at least for a while as human capital increases, whereas the return
to physical capital decreases monotonically as physical capital rises. In other
words, the central element that determines the steady state the economy
converges to is only the initial level of human capital, while the initial stock
of physical capital has no influence.
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From the model developed by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), theo-
ries concerning the role of human capital in the demographic transition have
been starting to spread widely. We can say that the dominant economic
thought accepted and further developed the idea that the role of human cap-
ital in the process of industrialization was the main cause of the decline in
fertility. We are now going to present more recent models dealing with this
approach.
1.5.6 Technological Progress and Return to Human
Capital: the Unified Theory
The effort of Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) is to develop one single theory
capable to explain all the stages of the process of development. Their start-
ing point is that all existing non-unified growth models are unable to cap-
ture the growth process over human history: Malthusian models can capture
the growth process during the Malthusian epoch but are incompatible with
the transition to the modern growth regime, Neoclassical growth models
(with endogenous or exogenous technological change) are consistent with the
growth process during the contemporary modern growth regime, but they
fail to capture the Malthusian epoch, the economic origin of the take-off
from the Malthusian epoch into the post Malthusian regime as well as the
demographic transition. On the contrary, this theory is called by its au-
thors “unified” because it captures in a single framework the epoch of the
Malthusian stagnation, the era of modern growth and the principal factors
that brought the transition between the two regimes.
The Unified Theory explains the non-monotonic evolution of fertility with
respect to the income through the effect of the gradual rise in the demand
for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution.
The model presents four main elements:
1. Malthusian elements. There is a positive effect of income per capita on
fertility, a subsistence level of consumption and a level of income per
capita stationary over time;
2. technological progress. It is driven by population size and population
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quality, that is human capital accumulation;
3. the demand for human capital. What really matters for the investment
in human capital is not the level of technology, but its increase. If we
do not have technological changing or progress, children can acquire
human capital from their parents and there is no reason to invest in
human capital. On the contrary, the technological progress makes par-
ents’ human capital obsoleted and it becomes necessary to invest in
education of the children;
4. quantity-quality trade off. At first, the demand for human capital
increases both quantity and quality of children, then it increases the
quality and decreases the quantity.
The mechanism of the model is based on the following points:
1. parents substitute quantity with quality of children not in response
to the level of the income, as in the above presented models, but in
response to technological progress, which raises the return to human
capital;
2. as technological progress affects return and investment in human cap-
ital, in its turn parents’ investment in the education of their children
affects the speed of technological progress;
3. for a given level of education, the speed of technological progress is also
a positive function of the overall size of the population;
4. as in the classical literature, there is a fixed factor of production and a
subsistence level of consumption.
The Unified Theory deals with an overlapping generations model, where
the time is discrete and only one good is produced using land X (fixed over
time) and efficiency units of labor H. The production side of the model is
described by equation (1.27) used by Kalemli-Ozacn, but in this case tech-
nology evolves over time. The output at period t is therefore given by:
Yt = H
α
t (AtX)
1−α, (1.44)
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where Ht is the number of efficiency units of labor at time t, X is the amount
of land (fixed) and At is the endogenous technological level at time t, so that
the product AtX is the amount of effective resources. We focus on the output
per worker and the factors per worker:
yt ≡
Yt
Lt
=
(
Ht
Lt
)α(
AtX
Lt
)1−α
= hαt x
1−α
t . (1.45)
In addition, it is assumed there are no property rights over land, so that
the rent on land is null and wage per efficiency unit is equal to its average
product.
With regard to the individuals, let Lt be the number of individuals that
reach adulthood in period t and nt be the number of children per adult in
t, such that Lt+1 = ntLt. Individuals live for two periods: childhood and
adulthood. In this model we have neither physical capital, nor saving, nor
a third period of life for which it is necessary to save. During childhood,
individuals are passive agents and they consume a fraction of their parents’
time, whereas in the second period of life individuals allocate their unit of
time endowment between child rearing and labor force participation.
The preferences of generation t are given by
Ut = γ ln(ntht+1) + (1− γ) ln(ct), (1.46)
where ct is the consumption of individual t, nt the number of his children
and ht+1 the future level of human capital of each child at period t + 1,
that is the quality of children. Parents care about both the quantity and
the quality of their children and the parameter γ measures their level of
altruism towards their children. There is a subsistence level of consumption
c˜ and the preferences are defined in the set ct ≥ c˜. The utility function is
strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-concave and so it satisfies
the conventional boundary conditions that assure that for a sufficiently high
income there is an interior solution for the maximization problem.
The potential income of individual t endowed with ht efficiency units of
labor is given by:
zt ≡ wtht.
The only input required to produce both child quantity and child quality is
time: τ is the fraction of the parent’s unit time endowment necessary to raise
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a child, regardless of the quality, whereas et+1 is the fraction of time required
to raise a child with a level of education equal to et+1. As a consequence,
the time cost for individual t of raising nt children with a level of education
et+1 is given by wthtnt(τ + et+1). Individual t spends the rest of income zt
for consumption ct, so the budget constraint is given by
zt ≥ wthtnt(τ + et+1) + ct. (1.47)
The other constraint is given by the subsistence level of consumption c˜. Let
z˜ be the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just
binding.
Regarding the production of human capital, the level of human capital at
time t+1 is function of the level of education et+1 and of the rate of progress
in technology. The rate of technological progress is equal to
gt+1 ≡
At+1 − At
At
, (1.48)
so we have that
ht+1 = h(et+1; gt+1). (1.49)
The model is based on the following assumptions:
• ht+1 is a positive function of et+1 (he > 0) and hee < 0
• the erosion effect makes ht+1 a negative function of gt+1 (hg < 0) and
hgg > 0
• education lessens the erosion effect of the technological progress on
human capital, so that heg > 0
• h(0; 0) = 1. In absence of investment in quality, each individual has a
basic level of human capital that is normalized to 1, if the technological
environment is stationary
• he(0; 0) = 0. Investment in quality is not beneficial in a stationary
technological environment
• limg→∞ h(0; g) = 0. In absence of investment in quality, there is a
sufficiently rapid technological progress that due to the erosion effect
renders the existing human capital obsolete.
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Within this framework, each adult at time t determines the number of
children and their level of education that maximizes his utility subject to
wtht [1− nt(τ + et+1] ≥ c˜
(nt; et+1) ≥ 0.
The solution with respect to nt depends on the level of the income zt. We
have that:
nt(τ + et+1) =
{
γ if zt ≥ z˜
1− c˜
zt
if zt ≤ z˜
(1.50)
and that
ct =
{
(1− γ)zt if zt ≥ z˜
c˜ if zt ≤ z˜
(1.51)
If the level of potential income is above the level at which the subsistence
constraint is binding, the fraction of time spent raising children is γ, whereas
the fraction 1−γ is devoted to labor force participation. If the income is below
z˜, the subsistence constraint is binding and the fraction of time necessary to
assure c˜ is larger than 1− γ. As a consequence, the fraction of time devoted
to child rearing is below γ. As long as zt ≤ z˜, individuals always consume
c˜ and a raise of the income affects the fraction of time devoted to children:
as zt increases, individuals can get c˜ with a smaller labor force participation
and the fraction of the time devoted to children increases. When zt reaches
and overcomes the level z˜, a raise of the income no longer affects the time
devoted to children. The fraction of time devoted to child rearing remains
constantly equal to γ.
This solution indicates the allocation of time between child rearing and
labor force participation, but we do not yet know anything about the allo-
cation of parental time between quantity and quality of children. We obtain
this information maximizing Ut with respect to et+1. Solving that problem
we have that the first order conditions are always the same, independently
to the level of income (zt ≥ z˜ or zt ≤ z˜). The fact that we obtain the same
conditions both for zt ≥ z˜ and for zt ≤ z˜ suggests that the investment in
education does not depend on the level of the income.
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We obtain that there exists gˆ such that
et+1 = e(gt+1)
{
= 0 if gt+1 ≤ gˆ
> 0 if gt+1 > gˆ
(1.52)
and
e′(gt+1) > 0 if gt+1 > gˆ
while
e′′(gt+1) < 0 by assumption.
Contrary to the investment in the quantity of children, we have that the
time investment in the quality of children does not depend on the level of
the income, but only on the rate of technological progress. In particular, we
have that the optimal investment is a non-decreasing function of the rate of
technological progress: it is zero if gt+1 is below the critical level gˆ > 0, and
it is a positive function of gt+1 if gt+1 > gˆ.
Given the optimal level of et+1, we can write nt as
nt =
{
nb(gt+1) if zt ≥ z˜
na(gt+1;xt; et; gt) if zt < z˜
(1.53)
We get that:
1. ∂nt
∂gt+1
≤ 0 and ∂et+1
∂gt+1
≥ 0
2. ∂nt
∂zt
> 0 and ∂et+1
∂zt
= 0 if zt < z˜
3. ∂nt
∂zt
= ∂et+1
∂zt
= 0 if zt > z˜.
In conclusion, according to the Unified Theory, if the subsistence con-
sumption constraint is binding, an increase of the income raises the number
of children, but it does not affect the level of their education. If the constraint
is not binding, the effect is null also on the number of children. Indepen-
dently to the subsistence consumption constraint, the technological progress
has always a non-positive effect on the number of children and a non-negative
effect on their education.
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In the second part of the model, Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) study the
evolution of the economy. It is fully described by the sequence
{xt; yt; et;Lt}
∞
t=0 .
In order to study the evolution of the economy, the main assumption is that
the technological progress gt+1 depends on the size of the working population
and on its level of human capital, hence
gt+1 = g(Lt; et). (1.54)
In addition, it is assumed that:
• g(Lt; 0) > 0
• gL > 0 and gLL < 0
• ge > 0 and gee < 0
• limL→∞gL(Lt; et) = 0.
In the analysis of the evolution of the economy, we identify two regimes:
one for zt ≤ z˜ and one for zt > z˜, even if the evolutions of gt and et are
independent of whether the subsistence constraint is binding. Moreover, if
we consider Lt constant, the evolutions of et and gt are jointly determined
and they do not depend on the evolution of xt. Therefore, the evolution of
the economy is described by the following steps:
1. for a small population size, the economy is characterized by a globally
stable steady state equilibrium where e = 0 and g = gl (see figure
(1.7));
2. for a moderate population size, we have two locally stable steady states
equilibria. In the lower equilibrium e = 0 and g = gl, whereas in the
upper equilibrium e = eh and g = gh. In addition, we have an interior
unstable equilibrium where e = eu and g = gu (see figure (1.8));
3. for a large population size, the economy is characterized by an unique
globally stable steady state equilibrium e = eh and g = gh (see figure
(1.9)).
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s)
Figure 1.7: The Evolution of gt and et for a Small Population
When we consider also the evolution of xt, we get an analysis that per-
mits us to study the evolution of the economy from the Malthusian regime,
through the Post Malthusian regime, to the demographic transition and mod-
ern growth. This analysis is based on a sequence of phase diagrams in the
plan (et, xt;L). Each phase diagrams describes the economy within each
regime, for a given population size. The diagrams contain three elements:
a) the Malthusian Frontier (MF), that separates the regions in which the
subsistence constraint is binding from those where it is not, b) the XX locus,
that is given by all triplets of (et;xt; gt) such that, for a given population
size, the effective resources per worker are constant, and c) the EE locus,
that is given by all triplets of (et;xt; gt) such that the the quality of labor et
is constant.
Within that economy, we can distinguish the following regimes of the
process of development:
1. Malthusian regime (small population). In the early stages of develop-
ment, population size is relatively small and the implied slow rate of
technological progress does not provide an incentive to invest in edu-
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Figure 1.8: The Evolution of gt and et for a Moderate Population
cation. The economy is characterized by a globally stable steady state
equilibrium S = (e = 0;x = x¯(gt)) (see figure (1.10)). This situa-
tion corresponds to the Malthusian trap: effective resources per capita,
education and output per capita are constant;
2. post Malthusian regime (moderate population). The slow growth in
population that takes place in the Malthusian regime makes the pop-
ulation size moderate. The implied rate gt raises. We have a multiple
stable steady state equilibrium (see figure (1.11)). The Malthusian
steady-state equilibrium M1 = (0, x˜) is locally stable. On the contrary,
the steady-state M2 = (e
u, xu) is unstable. Since the economy starts in
the vicinity of the Malthusian steady state, it remains there. However,
as gt continues to rise in reaction to the increasing population size, the
Malthusian equilibrium vanishes and, for education levels above eu, the
economy converges to a stationary level of education eh and possibly to
a steady-state growth rate of xt, given the population size. Income per
capita raises and it has two opposite effects on population: on the one
hand, it eases households’ budget constraint and they allocate more re-
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Figure 1.9: The Evolution of gt and et for a Large Population
sources for raising children, on the other hand it induces a reallocation
of resources towards child quality. In the post Malthusian regime, the
demand for human capital is still limited and the first effect dominates
on the second one. The interaction between human capital accumu-
lation and technological progress generates a virtuous cycle until the
economy crosses the Malthusian frontier;
3. sustained growth (large population). When the economy crosses the
Malthusian frontier, the demographic transition takes place. The off-
setting effect of population growth on the growth rate of income per
capita is eliminated and it permits a transition to a state of sustained
economic growth. The economy converges globally to an educational
level eh and possibly to a steady-state growth rate of xt, given the pop-
ulation size (see figure (1.12)). The output per capita and population
are constant.
As it was previously said, Becker and Barro (1988, 1989) explained the
decline in fertility through a rise in the level of the income and the income
effect. They considered also other complementary factors, but such comple-
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Figure 1.10: The Evolution of xt and et for a Small Population
mentary factors always affect fertility through an income effect. In the same
way, Galor (2005) recognizes there are other valid explanations to demo-
graphic transition, but they are only complementary theories because they
act through the mechanism at the base of the Unified Theory. In other
words, factors such as the decline in child and infant mortality, the rise in
life expectancy, the decline in the wage gender gap, the emergence of public
education, the decline in child labor only reinforce the mechanism of the Uni-
fied Theory. Galor thinks that when these theories are used autonomously,
they cannot explain the evolution of the economy and the demographic tran-
sition.
We can summarize the main contributes of the Unified Theory in two
points:
1. it provides an intertemporal reconciliation between the Malthusian/classical
elements and the modern approach,
2. it encompasses in one single model the three distinct regimes that have
characterized the process of economic development (Malthusian regime,
post Malthusian regime and modern growth regime).
1.5 Economic Approaches to the Demographic Transition 83
xt
et
EE EE EEXX
MF
M1
M2
eu eˆ eh
Figure 1.11: The Evolution of xt and et for a Moderate Population
According to the first point, we see that the Unified Theory takes into
consideration both Malthusian elements (the positive effect of income per
capita on fertility, a subsistence level of consumption and a level of income
per capita stationary over time) and modern ones (quality-quantity trade-off,
demand for human capital, endogenous technological progress). In this sense
Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) define their theory “unified”.
With regard to the second point, the two authors point out the failure of
the previous theories to explain the entire process of development: some the-
oretical results are consistent with the evidence referring to the Malthusian
regime, but they cannot explain the dynamics of the modern growth regime,
whereas other models are consistent with the sustained growth regime, but
they do not fit the Malthusian period. Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) develop
one single model that carries inside all the three phases of the process of
economic development.
The Unified Theory has great ambitious, for sure. Actually, this theory
captures more than others the entire dynamics of the process of development
and it is capable to explain both the Malthusian poverty trap and the sus-
tained growth regime. The effort to consider other complementary factors
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Figure 1.12: The Evolution of xt and et for a Large Population
(child and infant mortality, life expectancy, wage gender gap, different edu-
cation systems, etc.) is commendable, too. However, the emphasis on the
obtained results seems to be too strong. All things considered, the Unified
Theory is not the only (and first) one to encompass in one single model the
three distinct regimes that have characterized the process of economic de-
velopment. As we saw before, already in 1990 Becker, Murphy and Tamura
explained the takeoff from the Malthusian regime to the sustained growth
regime through the demand for human capita and within one single frame-
work. We should rather say that the Unified Theory gives important con-
tributes to develop that original approach. Of course, the theory developed
by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) is one of the more organic and systematic
analysis dealing with the process of economic developed. Also the effort to
recognize the importance of other factors and theories is not so praiseworthy.
As explained before, Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) and Galor (2005) do not
recognize the validity of the theories taken by themselves, but only when
they are used as support to the Unified Theory. The attitude to consider one
single theory capable to explain all the process of development by itself has
made somebody smile: Mokyr refers to the above presented Unified Theory
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as the “Theory of Everything”.
1.5.7 The Evolutionary Unified Theory
In the above presented Unified Theory, every variable is endogenous except
the genetic traits. The further developed formulated by Galor and Moav
(2002) consists in considering the genetic characteristics as endogenous vari-
ables that evolve over time through the natural selection. The Unified Theory
becomes the Unified Evolutionary Theory. The fundamental premise of this
theory is that the composition of the characteristics of the human species
that are relevant for the economic development has not been stationary. We
have two types of individuals and they have children that maintain the ge-
netic traits of the parents, but the two types of individuals have different
fertility rates. The evolution of the fertility rates of the two types of the
individuals determines the composition of population over time. The aim of
this theory is to capture and to explain the reciprocal interaction between
the evolution of the distribution of genetic traits and the process of economic
development from the Malthusian epoch to the state of sustained growth.
The main point is that the individuals whose traits are complementary to
the economic environment give an evolutionary advantage (a larger number
of surviving offspring) and the representation of their traits in the population
gradually increases, contributing in its turn to the process of development.
The evolutionary pressure during the Malthusian era increased the fraction
of individuals whose characteristics were complementary to the growth pro-
cess. This selection brought the take-off from the Malthusian epoch to the
sustained economic growth regime.
This is another “unified” theory because it contains different elements:
• Malthusian elements: a) we have a subsistence consumption constrain.
For sufficiently low levels of income, the subsistence constrain is binding
and it leads to a physiological limit on the number of children, b) there
is a fixed factor of production, that is land, c) we have an endogenous
and positive effect of income per capita on population growth: increases
in wages induce an increase in population and the land-labor ratio
declines. If technological progress is low, the decline in the labor-land
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ratio leads to a decrease of wages and output per capita and they return
back to their Malthusian levels. If technological progress is rapid, the
decline in the labor-land ratio does not led to a decrease of wages and
output per capita,
• Darwinian elements: individuals are not heterogenous. They differ
each other in the characteristics affecting their earning capacity. Nat-
ural selection leads some individuals to get an evolutionary advantage
(that is, higher fertility rate with respect the other individuals) and
this changes the composition of population. Individuals do not operate
consciously in order to assure their evolutionary advantage. However,
their preferences and decisions assure that the individuals whose traits
are complementary to the economic environment dominate the popula-
tion. Individuals’ preferences capture these Darwinian elements since
they are defined on the trade-off between resources allocated to parents
and to children and on the trade-off between quantity and quality of
children,
• links between evolution and process of economic growth. The techno-
logical progress depends on the average level of human capital. In its
turn, the average level of human capital is affected by the evolution
of the human species and by the representation of individuals whose
preferences are biased toward child quality,
• links between technological progress and sustained economic growth.
Technological transition raises the return to human capital and it leads
parents to substitute child quality for child quantity.
The framework of this model is identical to the one used in the Unified
Theory by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000). The preference of the member i
of generation t are given by (1.46), but Galor and Moav (2002) introduce
a further specification for the weight given to the quality of children, so we
have:
U it = (1− γ) ln c
i
t + γ[lnn
i
t + β
i lnht+1], (1.55)
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where γ is the weight given to children, regardless of their quality, and βi
the weight given to their quality relatively to their quantity. The type of
individual is given by the value of βi. The parameter βi is transmitted from
generation to generation within a dynasty and it remains stationary across
time. It means that preferences are hereditary. The distribution of types
βi evolves over time due to the effect of natural selection on the fertility
rates and the relative size of each dynasty. A quantity-biased preference
has a positive effect on fertility rate and may therefore generate a direct
evolutionary advantage. On the other hand, a quantity-biased preference
has a negative effect on the quality of children, on their future income, on
their fitness and may therefore generate an evolutionary disadvantage. The
main hypothesis is that the quality-biased preference generate higher earning
capacity and therefore an evolutionary advantage in the long run.
The amount of consumption beyond the subsistence level has a positive
effect on the parental fitness and so on the survival of the lineage. On the
other hand, this positive effect is counterbalanced by the implied reduction
in resources devoted to the children that generates a negative effect on the
survival of the lineage.
The Evolutionary Unified Theory differs from the Unified Theory in two
dimensions:
1. micro framework. When individual i of generation t maximizes U it with
respect to nit and e
i
t+1, we get that, if z
i
t ≤ c˜, then n
i
t = 0 and type
i becomes extinct. The solution for eit+1 is not equal to the one of
the Unified Theory because now eit+1 depends also on β
i. We obtain
that the expenditure in education is positive only if βi is exceeds the
threshold level β¯. As in the Unified Theory, we get the following results:
•
∂nit
∂gt+1
≤ 0 and
∂eit+1
∂gt+1
≥ 0
•
∂nit
∂zit
> 0 and
∂eit+1
∂zit
= 0 if zit < z˜
•
∂nit
∂zit
=
∂eit+1
∂zit
= 0 if zit > z˜.
It follows that for zit > z˜ the sole determinant variable, for a given gt+1,
is the parental type βi. Suppose that at period 0 there are a number
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La0 of identical adult individuals of quality type (that is, β
a > β¯), and
a number Lb0 of identical adult individuals of quantity type (that is,
βb < β¯). Population at time t is given by Lt = L
a
t + L
b
t . Thanks to
the above reported results, we can compare the fertility and education
rates between quality types and quantity types. We get
nat


> nbt for xt < x˜t
= nbt for xt = x˜t
< nbt for xt > x˜t
and
ea(gt) > e
b(gt) for all t
hat > h
b
t for all t.
2. Macro framework. When we study the evolution of the economy and
the steady state equilibria, we have an additional variable respect to
the case of the Unified Theory. This additional variable is given by
the fraction of quality type individuals in generation t, q ≡
Lat
Lt
. This
variable is not constant, but evolves over time. The evolution of the
economy is given by the evolution of et, gt+1, n
i
t, qt and Ht. In the
Malthusian regime, when the subsistence constraint is binding and in-
dividuals struggle for survival, quality type individuals have an evo-
lutionary advantage over quantity type individuals (nat > n
b
t), even if
their preference bias against quantity. As the effective resources per ef-
ficiency unit of labor increases (xt > x˜t), the Malthusian pressure and
the subsistence constraint relax and quantity type individuals get the
evolutionary advantage. Indeed, the technological progress that raises
the effective resources per capita increases initially the fertility rates of
both types of individuals, but ultimately it generates a substitution of
quality for quantity. As a consequence, fertility rates decline.
In conclusion we can say that the fundamental mechanism is identical to
the one of the Unified Theory, but everything is made more complicated by
the fact that individuals differs for the weight given to the quality relatively
to the quantity of children.
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1.5.8 Inequality, Fertility and Human Capital Accu-
mulation
We now briefly present some considerations on the link between income dis-
tribution, fertility, human capital accumulation and economic growth. As
widely showed, there is a strict interaction between income and fertility. We
identify a two-direction relation:
• on the one hand, the macroeconomic context and the wage rates deter-
mine families’ decisions about the number of children and the invest-
ment in their education,
• on the other hand, families’ decisions affect the macroeconomic context
through the accumulation of physical and human capital.
We now analyze the same interaction in a context of inequality in the
distribution of the income:
• given the income effect on families’ decisions, we expect that different
levels of income lead to differentials in fertility and education rates,
• given the effect of families’ decisions on the macroeconomic context,
we expect that differentials in fertility and education rates affect the
macroeconomic context and economic growth.
With regard to the first link, we already showed how different levels of
income actually lead to differentials in fertility and education rates. It is true
both when we compare rich countries to poor countries and when we compare
rich families to poor families. As previously seen, there exist different theories
and approaches that explain in different ways the evolution of the trade-off
between number of children and education of children as the level of the
income varies over time.
On the contrary, nothing has been said until this moment on the second
link. Actually, the presented Evolutionary Growth Theory studies the com-
position of population, how the fraction of more educated people evolves over
time and how this affects the economic growth. On the other hand, in the
Evolutionary Growth Theory the composition of population (the fraction of
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more educated individuals relative to the fraction of less educated individu-
als) is not due to an income effect (all the individuals have the same income),
but only to genetic factors.
We now wonder if and how the presence of differentials in fertility and
education rates, due to differences in the distribution of income, affects eco-
nomic growth. In particular, we wonder if inequality promotes or works
against the process of development. The economic literature on that subject
is very wide, but the most of the models investigating the effect of inequality
on economic growth are not theories on population because they consider
fertility as an exogenous variable. We will quote some of these model, but
we will focus our attention on the models connecting the effect of inequality
on growth with endogenous fertility.
Kremer and Chen (2002) take for granted the effect of income on fertility
and focus on how income differential between two groups of people (poor and
rich) can generate a fertility differential between the two groups. Taking as
given the income effect on fertility, Kremer and Chen (2002) assume that the
relation between income and fertility is negative (that is, fertility declines as
income raises). The authors do not investigate the origin of that negative
relation and specify that it can be due to both the explanations presented in
the economic literature: a) assuming particular preferences of the parents.
They substitute quantity for quality of children as their income arises because
rich parents have a lower shadow price of child quality, or b) rearing children
requires time. As wages increase, the opportunity cost of time spent rearing
children raises and the substitution effect outweighs the income effect.
Given the fact that the level of income determines the number of children,
the model investigates how income differential between two groups of people
(poor and rich) can generate a fertility differential between the two groups.
The labor force is formed by skilled and unskilled workers and they are
complements in the production. The wage of skilled workers, ws, is higher
than the wage of unskilled workers, wu. In particular, we have that
wst
wut
=
1
Rt
, (1.56)
where Rt is the ratio between skilled and unskilled workers at time t.
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Any child decides how many ci units of time invest in his own education,
according to the expected wage premium. Apart from individual capabilities,
children have not equal opportunities and children of unskilled workers are
more likely to be unskilled. This means that all the children of skilled workers
and only a proportion θ of the children of unskilled workers need cL units of
time to become skilled, whereas the rest of 1− θ of the children of unskilled
workers need cH > cL units of time to become skilled. We call high-cost and
low-cost individuals all the individuals that, respectively, need cH and cL
units of time to become skilled. Any individual that invests ci units of time
to become skilled will give a wage ws, so his net wage premium is (1− ci)ws.
On the contrary, any individual that decides to invest no units of time in
education will give wu. Obviously, any individual decides to become skilled
only if (1− ci)ws ≥ wu and this condition is set only when
(1− ci) ≥ Rt. (1.57)
The following different situations can occur:
• Rt = 1−c
H : low-cost individuals prefer to become skilled and high-cost
individuals are indifferent between becoming skilled or unskilled,
• 1− cH < Rt < 1− c
L: low-cost individuals prefer to become skilled and
high-cost individuals prefer to become unskilled,
• Rt = 1− c
L: low-cost individuals are indifferent and high-cost individ-
uals prefer to become unskilled,
• Rt > 1− c
L: no one decides to become skilled,
• Rt < 1− c
H : everyone decides to become skilled.
In equilibrium we have that 1− cH ≤ Rt ≤ 1− c
L, so all the children of
the skilled workers become skilled, whereas only a fraction of the children of
the unskilled workers becomes skilled.
The model assumes that, at time t, in the economy there are Lst skilled
workers and Lut unskilled workers. Each of the L
s
t workers has n
s
t children,
whereas each of the Lut workers have n
u
t > n
s
t children. The young generation
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(nstL
s
t + n
u
tL
u
t ) decides whether invest in education or not and the new ratio
between skilled and unskilled workers will be equal to Rt+1 =
Lst+1
Lut+1
. As
explained above, in equilibrium 1− cH ≤ Rt ≤ 1− c
L and all the children of
the skilled workers become skilled. Since nut > n
s
t , in order that Rt+1 = Rt,
the fertility differential between nst − n
u
t has to be offset by some children
of unskilled workers becoming skilled. Let γt be the fraction of children of
unskilled workers becoming skilled. We have that:
Rt+1 =
Lst+1
Lut+1
=
nstL
s
t + γtn
u
tL
u
t
(1− γt)nutL
u
t
=
R2t + γt
1− γt
. (1.58)
We can compute the value that γt must satisfy in order that Rt+1 = Rt, given
1− cH ≤ Rt ≤ 1− c
L.
The steady-state is defined for Rt+1 = Rt = R
∗ and γt+1 = γt = γ
∗. Any
steady-state satisfies:
1
1− γ∗
R∗2 −R∗ +
γ∗
1− γ∗
= 0.
If cL, cH and θ do not overcome certain critical values, we find three steady
states (see figure (1.13)), where:
1. R∗ = 1 − cL. This ratio between skilled and unskilled induces a wage
differential such that γ ≤ θ: among the children of the unskilled work-
ers, all with a high cost of education do not invest in education and
some or all of those with a low cost of education (θ) decide to invest in
education,
2. R∗ = 1 − cH . This ratio between skilled and unskilled induces a wage
differential such that γ ≥ θ: among the children of the unskilled work-
ers, all with a low cost of education (θ) decide to invest in education
and some of those with a high cost of education may do so as well,
3. 1− cL < R∗ < 1− cH . This ratio between skilled and unskilled induces
a wage differential such that γ = θ.
Which steady state the economy converges to depends on initial condi-
tions. If the initial ratio, and hence the initial fertility differential, between
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skilled and unskilled are sufficiently great, then, even if a proportion θ of the
children of the unskilled workers becomes skilled, the fertility differential is so
high that the proportion of unskilled works rises in the next period and their
wage will fall. Inequality increases and the wage differential becomes equal
to 1
1−cH
. On the contrary, if the initial ratio, and hence the initial fertility
differential, between skilled and unskilled are small enough, then the propor-
tion of unskilled works falls in the next period and their wage increases. The
wage differential falls to 1
1−cL
.
Rt+1
RtR
∗ = 1− cH
R∗ = 1− cL
R∗ = 1− cL
R∗ = 1− cH
Rt+1 = f(Rt)
Figure 1.13: Multiple Steady-State Equilibria
The above explained model assumes that income affects fertility and that
for this reason an income differential between individuals brings about a
fertility differential. On the other hand, the model proves the existence of a
relation between the initial income differential and the one which the economy
converges to. In particular, the model shows that the higher is the initial
level of inequality, the higher is the level of inequality which the economy
converges to.
This model has important implications concerning economic policies: in
order to avoid an increase in the proportion of unskilled workers and in the
wage differential between the two groups of individual, it is necessary to
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increase the proportion of children with low cost of education or to decrease
the cost of education itself.
Finally, we have to stress that this model investigates the link between
the initial level of inequality and the level of inequality which the economy
converges to, that is the effect of the initial inequality on the evolution of
inequality itself. In other words, Kremer and Chen (2002) do not focus on
the direct effect of inequality on economic growth. We could try to infer
some considerations about economic growth from the ratio between skilled
and unskilled workers the economy converges to. Obviously, the ratio be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers affects economic growth and we could
infer that if the proportion of unskilled works falls the level of output ben-
efits from that. However, this conclusion is not obvious and it would be
necessary to study how the level of output is affected by the composition
between skilled and unskilled workers. In Kremer and Chen (2002) this
analysis on the production side and economic growth is absent. The same
is true for Morand (1999). Morand (1999) studies the effect of inequality on
human capital accumulation. Obviously human capital accumulation could
be a good proxy for economic growth, but the study of the direct effect of
inequality on economic growth could be very different.
On this point, we can say that the model developed by de la Croix and
Doepke (2004) represents a further step with respect to Kremer and Chen
(2002). Kremer and Chen (2002) study the relation between inequality and
fertility differential, de la Croix and Doepke (2004) focus on the link between
fertility differential and growth. As in Kremer and Chen (2002), a higher level
of inequality brings about a higher fertility differential. In addition, de la
Croix and Doepke (2004) prove that a higher differential fertility involves a
lower growth.
De la Croix and Doepke (2004) develop an overlapping generations model
where people live for three periods: childhood, adulthood and old age. All
decisions are made in the second period of life. The utility function of any
individual that is adult at time t is given by:
Ut = ln(ct) + β ln(dt+1) + γ ln(ntht+1), (1.59)
1.5 Economic Approaches to the Demographic Transition 95
where ct and dt+1 are the levels of consumption during adulthood and old age,
respectively, and β is the preference discount factor. Adults care also about
the number of children, nt, and the future human capital of their children,
ht+1, according to the altruism factor γ. Any parent has a level of human
capital equal to ht and he receives a wage equal to wtht. In addition, parents
save st for old age consumption and they spend a fraction φ of their unit
of time endowment in order to rear their children. Also the education of
their children needs time, but it is provided by teachers and not by parents.
The level of human capital of teachers equals the average human capital of
population, h¯t. As a consequence, the cost to transfer et units of education
to nt children is given by etntwth¯t. The fact that education is provided by
teachers implies that education is not an opportunity time cost for parents
and so it does not depend on their wage. In other words, education is a
fixed cost, so it is relatively low for rich parents and relatively high for poor
parents. On the contrary, the quantity of children requires parents’ time,
so it is relatively costly for well-paid parents and relatively cheap for poor
parents. This is crucial for generating fertility and educational differentials:
parents with high human capital and high wages substitute child quality for
child quantity.
The budget constraint of any adult individual is given by:
wtht(1− φnt) ≥ ct + st + etntwth¯t,
whereas, the budget constraint for the last period of life is:
dt+1 = Rt+1st,
where Rt+1 is the interest factor. Even if education is provided by teachers
and education cost is given by teachers’ wage, human capital is also trans-
ferred within the family and by the community. This transmission is free.
Therefore, the future human capital of the children ht+1 is given by:
ht+1 = Bt(θ + et)
η(ht)
τ (h¯t)
κ, (1.60)
where Bt > 0 is an efficiency parameter which increases deterministically at
a constant rate. The parameters τ ∈ [0; 1] and κ ∈ [0; 1] capture the internal
96 A Survey on Population Theories
transmission of human capital within the family and the externalities at the
social (or school) level, respectively. In addition, we suppose that θ > 0
and η ∈ (0; 1). The presence of θ guarantees that if parents decide to invest
et+1 = 0 in the education of their children, the level of future human capital
ht+1 is still positive.
Individuals are heterogenous because they have different levels of human
capital and hence different levels of income. This implies that individuals
take different decisions concerning the number and the level of education of
their children. Given a certain distribution function of human capital among
population, the key variable for decisions is the relative human capital of a
household compared to the average human capital h¯t of population, that is
xt ≡
ht
h¯t
. (1.61)
We can distinguish two classes of households: the one with a relative human
capital above the critical level θ
φη
, and the one with a relative human capital
lower than that critical level.
For the first group of households (skilled and rich) the optimal number of
children (n∗)R and the optimal investment in their education (e∗)R are such
that
∂(n∗)R
∂xt
< 0 and
∂(e∗)R
∂xt
> 0. (1.62)
It means that skilled people invest relatively more in the quality of their
children than in their quality because the cost of education is fix, while the
time cost of raising many children increases with income.
On the contrary, for the unskilled and poor households we have that
(n∗)P =
γ
φ(1 + β + γ)
> (n∗)R and (e∗)P = 0, (1.63)
hence we find a corner solution where the investment in human capital is null
and fertility is constant and higher than fertility across rich households.
There are two channels through which inequality affects economic growth:
1. inequality in human capital (that is, the difference in xt) leads to in-
equality in education ((e∗)R > (e∗)P = 0). Since the production func-
tion for human capital is concave, this lowers future average human
capital,
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2. people with lower human capital have also a higher number of children.
This differential fertility increases the weight in the population of fam-
ilies with low human capital, lowering again the future average human
capital.
Finally, the authors prove that if ηφ > θ and if households differ only in
their initial level of human capital, there is a balanced growth path where
there is no longer inequality among households. Obviously, inequality persists
if we introduce ability shocks among families.
In conclusion, we can say that Kremer and Chen (2002) find a positive
effect of inequality on fertility differential, whereas de la Croix and Doepke
(2004) focus on a further step and they find that fertility differentials have
a negative effect on growth. We have other models that explain the effect
of inequality on growth through the channel of the accumulation of physical
capital. On the contrary, de la Croix and Doepke (2004) link inequality and
growth through fertility differential and accumulation of human capital (i.e.,
education differential).
In spite of the differences between the model developed by de la Croix
and Doepke (2004) and the one developed by Kremer and Chen (2002), the
policy implications suggested by the two models are quite similar. In de la
Croix and Doepke (2004), since fertility differential and not inequality per
se has a negative effect on growth, it is not sure if redistributive policies
would increase economic performance. As a consequence, policies aimed at
equalizing access to education would be more effective, as in Kremer and
Chen (2002).
In the economic literature, the interaction between income distribution,
fertility and economic growth is explained through the channel of physical
capital accumulation or through the channel of human capital accumulation.
The channel of physical capital is investigated by the Classical approach,
whereas the Modern approach focuses on the role of human capital.
According to the Classical approach, saving is an increasing function
of wealth, so inequality channels resources towards individuals with higher
marginal propensity to save. This increases capital accumulation and fosters
development. The Classical approach was originated by Smith (1776) and
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was further developed by Keynes (1920), Lewis (1954), Kaldor (1957) and
Bourguignon (1981).
The Modern approach is based on the Credit Market Imperfections ap-
proach and the Socio-Political approach.
The Capital Market Imperfections approach considers the presence of
credit market imperfections (differences in the interest rates for borrowers
and lenders) and local non-convexities in the production of human capital
(indivisibility of academic degree, fixed cost) and in production project (min-
imal project size). In Galor and Zeira (1993), inequality has different effects
depending on the state of economy. In non-poor economies, in the presence
of credit market imperfections, inequality brings about an under investment
in human capital and lowers both the output and the economic growth in the
short run and in the long run. Whereas, in poor economies, in the presence
of credit market imperfections, inequality permits some investment in hu-
man capital and increases both the output and growth in the short run and
in the long run. In Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton
(1997) imperfections are given by the presence of individual-specific produc-
tion project of minimal size. Inequality brings about an under investment in
projects and lowers the level of output and the economic growth. In Benabou
(1996) and Durlauf (1996) we have local externalities in the production of hu-
man capital. Inequality causes a segregation of individuals into homogenous
communities and hence inequality persists. In Ferstman, Murphy and Weiss
(1996), individuals generate direct utility from the status associated with ed-
ucation. Given credit market imperfections, inequality leads rich, low-ability
individuals to invest in human capital. Returns to human capital decline and
the incentives for investment in human capital for poor, high-ability individ-
uals decline. The economy converges to an inefficient allocation of talents
across individuals. Anyway, these models study the effect of income distribu-
tion on economic growth considering population as an exogenous variable, so
they are not theories on population. On the contrary, the model developed
by de la Croix and Doepke (2002) studies the effect of income distribution
on economic growth considering fertility as an endogenous variable. This
model belongs to the Credit Market Imperfections approach, since individ-
uals cannot borrow to finance their own education. As previously seen, in
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this framework inequality holds back the accumulation of human capital and
economic growth.
The Socio-Political approach suggests that inequality restrains economic
growth because it increases socio-political instability. In Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) inequality brings about a politi-
cal pressure for redistribution. Redistribution takes place through a discre-
tionary taxation. The reduction in the profitability of investments leads to
a reduction of investment in physical and human capital and, ultimately, to
a reduction of economic growth. Benabou (2000) considers also a positive
effect of the pressure for redistribution that is the growth of public expen-
diture for infrastructures, education and so on. Introducing this element,
inequality has an ambiguous effect on growth. Also in this case, we have to
stress that the above quoted models are not theories on population because
they consider fertility as an exogenous variable.
In conclusion, we can say that the Classical approach stresses the positive
effect of inequality on economic growth, whereas the Modern approach (both
the Credit Market imperfections approach and the Socio-Political approach)
emphasizes the negative effect of inequality.
Galor and Moav (2004) integrate the Classical and the Modern approaches
considering the two channels through which income distribution affects eco-
nomic growth (physical capital and human capital accumulation) together.
Their model provides a reconciliation between the conflicting viewpoints of
the Classical and the Modern approach about the effect of inequality on eco-
nomic growth, asserting that the role of inequality changes in the process of
development. Galor and Moav (2004) analyze the link between inequality
and growth considering the different stages of the process of development,
starting from the early stages when the physical capital is the prime machine
of economic growth and coming to the more advanced stages, where human
capital accumulation replaces physical capital accumulation. According to
this scheme, the role and the effect of inequality on economic growth has
changing over time.
According to Galor and Moav (2004), the thesis of the Classical approach
(that is, there is a positive effect of inequality on economic growth) reflects
the early stages of economic development, when physical capital accumula-
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tion is the prime engine of economic growth. On the contrary, when human
capital becomes the prime engine of economic development, equality pro-
motes human capital accumulation and economic growth, especially if there
are credit constraints for the access to education. As wages increase, credit
constraints become less binding and the differences in the marginal propen-
sity to save decline, so that the impact of income distribution on economic
growth becomes less significant.
The model is based on the statement of fact that there is a significant
asymmetry between human capital accumulation and physical capital accu-
mulation. Human capital is inherently embodied in humans and physiological
constraints subject its accumulation at the individual level to diminishing re-
turns. The aggregate stock of human capital depends on the distribution of
investment in human capital across individuals and it is larger if its accu-
mulation is widely spread among individuals. On the contrary, the marginal
returns to physical capital and the aggregate productivity of the stock of
physical capital do not depend on its distribution across individuals. Inequal-
ity promotes physical capital accumulation because the marginal propensity
to save rises with income, whereas equality promotes human capital accumu-
lation, as loans as credit constraints are binding. In the early stages of indus-
trialization, the physical capital accumulation is the prime engine of growth.
Since the stock of physical capital is still scarce, the rate of return to human
capital is lower than the return to physical capital. Inequality promotes the
accumulation of physical capital and it dominates its negative effect on in-
vestment in human capital, so inequality stimulates economic growth (the
Classical approach is correct). Since there is a strong capital-skill comple-
mentarity in the process of development, in the later stages of development
economic growth is fueled by physical and human capital accumulation and
the return to human capital increases. The positive effect of inequality on
aggregate saving is now dominated by its negative effect on investment in
human capital. Hence, in the latest stages of development equality promotes
human capital accumulation and economic growth (the Modern approach is
confirmed in these stages). The qualitative impact of inequality on economic
growth changes in the time because of the replacement of physical capital
accumulation by human capital accumulation.
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As the Unified Theory, the model developed by Galor and Moav (2004)
encompasses in one single model the different stages of the process of eco-
nomic development, but it considers population as an exogenous variable.
In particular, it is assumed to be constant over time and to measure 1. On
the other hand, the Unified Theory considers population as an endogenous
variable, but it does not focus so carefully on the role of inequality in the
process of development. In the third chapter of this work, we will integrate
these two frameworks.
1.6 Family Economics
Family Economics considers households as units of analysis and studies their
behavior and choices, not only the ones that strictly belong to the economic
framework (consumption, labor force participation, etc.), but also the de-
mographic ones, such as fertility, marriage and migration rates. Actually,
Family Economics focuses on the interaction between economic and demo-
graphic behavior. We can say that the New Household Economics was born
in the 1960s, thanks to the theory developed by Becker and above presented.
Families’ economic-demographic behavior is studied through a micro eco-
nomic approach. The starting point is that families pursue the maximization
of their utility, in a context where their economic resources are limited. Con-
trary to the approach of the macro economic models presented in the previous
section, the micro economic approach permits to study in details the micro
foundations of households’ choices. Family Economics considers the greatest
possible number of variables as endogenous and it accepts only few exogenous
informations. In other words, Family Economics is more scrupulous in the
study of the micro foundations of families’ behavior and it focuses on several
important details that the above presented macro economic models cannot
consider.
Households’ demographic behavior is explained through:
1. families’ tastes. Families may or may not give more importance to
children respect to alternative consumption goods,
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2. relative prices. The cost of children relative to alternative consumption
goods changes over time,
3. technology. Market may or may not provide the same services provided
by families.
In general, Family Economics explains the economic-demographic behav-
ior especially through the role of the relative prices. Technological changes
are expressed, in the ultimate analysis, as a changing in the relative prices.
“Tastes” are taken as given because the economic approach, contrary to the
anthropological and sociological one, considers “tastes” as something too ab-
stract and fleeting. The difference between economists and anthropologists,
sociologists and demographers consists right in this point (see next Section).
Obviously, even the economists, who are the most reluctant to consider
anything but strict self-interest, have to admit that something else occurs
within families. However, the study of the family belongs to economy, too.
Indeed, relations, exchanges and transfers within a family can sometimes
be motived also by economic considerations. Sometimes altruism and love
within a family are (at least partly) only apparent. Reciprocity within a so-
cial group, such as a family, is sometimes sustained also thanks to economic
mechanisms. Social contracts are sometimes observed also thanks to eco-
nomic reasons. Some individual behavior, also within families, is sometimes
the product of a slow evolution that selected the more profitable (in the strict
economic meaning) choices. This is true for Economics in general, but it par-
ticularly matters for Family Economics that deals with relations, behavior
and choices concerning very strictly private issues, such as whether to have
children or not, how many children to have, how much money to transfer to
each of them, and so on.
It is impossible to quantify the part of the story which is explained by
psychological, sociological and anthropological motivations and the part of
the story which is on the contrary explained by and due to rational and eco-
nomic factors. Anyway, the above considerations are sufficient to recognize
the reasons and the merits of Family Economics.
Even if we believe the reasons and the merits of the economic approach,
we have to recognize that Family Economics presents some limits:
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• recourse to analytical and conceptual tools usually used to study deci-
sions very different from the ones taken into consideration by families.
In general, families have to face important and the irreversible deci-
sions. To decide whether to have children or not, how many children
to have, how much to invest in their future is very different from to
decide which consumption good to buy, so it could be rash to study
the first type of decisions with the same tools usually used to analyze
the second type of decisions,
• recourse to analytical and conceptual tools usually used to analyze the
behavior of single individuals. Families are considered as a single unit
of analysis, but they are actually composed by different individuals
with different utility functions. The aggregation of different utility
functions is always a problematic question. Becker provided a partial
solution through the introduction of the dynastic head,
• recourse to analytical and conceptual tools usually used to analyze rela-
tions between unrelated individuals. In spite of the introduction of the
“degree of altruism” towards other members of the family, emotional
elements and factors usually remain too unknown and unexplored,
• families’ decisions are based on present evaluations of future stakes.
We should have not only to refer to subjective probabilities, but also
to consider that the present values of prices/costs/benefits perceived
by families are subjective, too,
• the assumption that the families’ tastes are constant over time can be
considered correct in the short run, but it is very difficult to accept this
assumption when we study and compare the demographic behavior in
the time and in the space.
Obviously, not all the models developed within Family Economics are
theories on population, since a part of them considers fertility as an exogenous
variable. In this survey, we are interested in theories on population, and hence
in the models of Family Economics dealing with the choice of the optimal
number of children. We can find some common elements in the fertility
theories which belong to Family Economics:
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• as it was said before, family is the unit of analysis. Households maxi-
mize their utility, having economic resources limited. Households’ be-
havior is mainly determined by the relative prices,
• considering families’ decisions, Family Economics focuses on the con-
cept of time and opportunity cost. Budget constraint and time con-
straint are jointly considered because, apart from a stock of wealth,
families actually have one single resource at their disposal, that is time,
• families produce two types of goods: specific goods and goods that
can be provided also by the market. The first group of goods basically
consists in children. Among the second group of goods we find cares, the
possibility to insure against economic adversities, uncertainty, old age,
the possibility to save and to smooth consumption over time. In this
case, individuals can seek the help of their families or of the market.
Families involves some advantages (it is easier to find an agreement
among few people, transaction costs are lower, information is more
complete, the risk is lower, the mutual supervision is more efficient,
there is an adverse selection), but the relative advantage of the family
declines when the costs and the quality of the alternative supply of the
same goods and services improve and when the families’ endowment of
time becomes scarcer.
Among these models we find different frameworks:
• models where parents are non altruistic, in the sense that they care
neither about the quantity of children nor about their quality;
• models where parents are altruistic towards other generations (the pre-
vious one and/or the next one);
• models where parents face the traditional trade-off between quantity of
children and their quality meant as education;
• models where parents face the trade-off between quantity of children
and their quality meant as wealth and provided by monetary transfers.
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Transfers within families are very peculiar. They may concern money
(transfers inter vivos or bequests) or help and services (cares or loans to
children or to old parents), they may have market substitutes (loans by credit
market) or may not (as in the case of affection and cares). Exchanges and
transfers within families may be perceived as such (I give to my children,
bringing them up to give back in the future) or may not (I give to my children,
without thinking that they might ever give back). Transfers within families
may basically be driven by two reason:
• altruism
• self-interest.
Sometimes the difference between the two motivations is not so clear.
First of all, when we speak about “altruism” within an economic approach,
we inevitably leave out emotional elements that cannot be taken into consid-
eration by an economic analysis. In addition, sometimes altruism between
the members of a family is only apparent. It means that sometimes individ-
uals transfers services or goods to their relatives hiding their self-interest.
In other words, relationships and transfers between individuals of the same
family mobilize several types of “reciprocities”. These reciprocities may be
due to different reasons, which can intervene jointly. Love is only one of the
possible reason and sometimes love is only apparent. As we said before, par-
ents may transfer services and goods to their children just for love, without
thinking that they might ever give back, or may bring them up to give back
in the future (Becker (1996) himself suggests that parents prepare for their
old age in inculcating in their children a sentiment of guilt about lack of
support of their old parents).
Among the models of Family Economics considering fertility as an endoge-
nous variable, we remind the works by Cigno (1993) and by Cigno, Giannelli
and Rosati (1998). We already quoted these models in the section about the
old-age security hypothesis and we will widely consider them again in the
following chapter, so we prefer not to dwell on that now.
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1.7 Alternative Approaches: Anthropology and
Demography
All the theories we have presented until now have in common the fact that
they are economic theories. They try to explain the demographic transition
and demographic behavior through economic factors. Obviously, economic
theories recognize the importance of social and institutional elements and,
as we showed before, they sometimes take into consideration such elements
in theoretical models. Economists believe in the importance of cultural and
institutional factors such as the gender gap, the altruism and love within fam-
ilies and so on, like demographers, anthropologists, sociologists and psychol-
ogists do. The difference is that economists believe that the significant effect
of such elements can be presented and studied through an economic anal-
ysis and the interaction with economic factors. In other words, economists
believe that any behavior can be studied as a behavior implemented by a
homo economicus that acts following economic criteria. With regard to that,
a passage from Becker (1960) is very meaningful:
The inability of demographers to predict western birth rates ac-
curately in the postwar period has had a salutary influence on de-
mographic research. Most predictions had been either on simple
extrapolations of past trends or on extrapolations that adjusted
for changes in the age-sex-marital composition of the population.
Socio-economic considerations are entirely absent from the for-
mer and are primitive and largely implicit in the latter. [...]
Psychologists have tried to place (family size decision making)
within a framework suggested by psychological theory; sociolo-
gists have tried one suggested by sociological theory, but most
persons would admit that neither framework has been particu-
larly successful in organizing the information on fertility. Two
considerations encouraged me to analyze family size decisions
within an economic framework. The first is that Malthus’ fa-
mous discussion was built upon strongly economic framework;
mine can be viewed as a generalization and development of his.
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Second, although no single variable in the Indianapolis survey5
explained more than a small fraction of the variation in fertil-
ity, economic variables did better than others. (Becker (1960), p.
209-210)
As we explained in Section 1.6, the discussion on the validity of the eco-
nomic approach is very old. A lot of different approaches and disciplines
focus on the fact that human behavior cannot be explained by equations and
theoretical models and that it is particularly true for behavior and decisions
concerning private matters, such as whether to have children or not, how
many children to have, and so on.
According to Kolm (2000), Economics has four types of reasons to be
concerned with such issues (population, fertility, demographic behaviors):
factual reasons, normative reasons, the usefulness of analytical tools and the
tradition of the discipline. On the other hand, it is not possible to surpass
other factors and elements, different from the economic ones, that give im-
portant contributes in the study of population. Kolm himself admits that
population concerns psychology, sociology, demography and anthropology,
too. For economics the most important role is played by markets and ex-
change, whereas for anthropology this role is played by reciprocity, and for
sociology by norms and status.
As it was said in Section 1.6, economists explains the economic-demographic
behavior especially through the role of the relative prices. “Tastes” are taken
as given because economists consider them something too abstract and too
difficult to be measured. It is particularly true for the Marginalists. Other
schools of economic thought are less reluctant to take into consideration
tastes, however we can say that in general Economics does not give them
much importance. Economists are reluctant to take into consideration the
variable “tastes” because it is a concept too fleeting and the risk is to make
this variable as a “wild card” through which hide the incapability to explain
the real causes of individual behavior. According to Economics, demographic
behavior can be explained through what it is profitable and through what it
5Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility, ed. by Whelpton P.K. and
C.V. Kiser, Milbank Memorial Fund, Vols. 1-4.
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is not profitable and it is connected to the relative prices (for example, the
relative price of a child).
On the contrary, anthropologists and sociologists believe that the most
important role is played by tastes and their evolution, such as the importance
given to the fact to have a child in comparison to the importance given to
the possession of an alternative good, such as a nice car.
One of the most savage criticism towards the economic approach comes
from Caldwell (1976). He reprimands economists (but also demographers) for
being ethnocentric. He stresses how the traditional Demographic Transition
Theory, starting from Malthus to Notestein (1945) and others, considers poor
societies characterized by high fertility vividly “irrational”.
Actually, in Malthus the idea of the brutishness of the poor and their
inability and unwillingness to help themselves is very strong. According to
Notestein (1945), in premodern societies fertility is kept high by a series of
props, such as religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, community
customs and so on. On the contrary, in the Western modern societies more
positive forces were able to destroy the props. The “more positive forces”
consist in the urbanization, the erosion of the traditional family, the growth
of individualism, the development of a rational and secular point of view.
Caldwell (1976) notices how the economic literature is full of ethnocentric
claims and points of view. We find the idea of a contrast between the tradi-
tional societies and the growing rationalism of modern life, the belief that in
premodern societies women have mainly a non-rational approach - religious,
superstitious and incurious - towards sex and reproduction, the idea of the
necessity of a shift in attitudes from traditions and fatalism of peasant soci-
eties towards modern concepts and rationalism, the idea of a great difficulty
to influence deep-seated attitudes, the belief that there are many simple peo-
ples that understand very little about why reproduction occurs and how it
can be prevented and that people directed by tradition resist rational inter-
vention and choice between behavioral patterns, the idea that to urge upon
a traditional people a rational technical means of birth control is to chal-
lenge the tenacious hold of a hard-won culture to which choice and change
are enemy. The basic idea is that the fertility behavior of the Third World
arises largely from ignorance and should be combated with education, indus-
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trialization, modernization or near synonyms like the modern development
process.
In other words, Caldwell picks out in the economic literature a contrast
between rationality of the modern societies and non-rationality of premodern
societies that comes from an ethnocentric point of view. Actually, the eco-
nomic theories later developed tried to explain the high fertility as a rational
response to a given social and economic framework. Anyway, also in this case
the economic approach does not try to capture the extra economic factors,
but to justify certain behavior from an “economically rational” point of view.
In addition, the concept of “economically rational” is still too influenced by
the Western culture.
In conclusion, we can say that the economic approach is still self-centered
with respect to:
• other disciplines. In spite of the effort to take into consideration cul-
tural and institutional elements in the utility functions of agents, the
concept of economically rational is still far from the specificity that
characterizes each social and cultural framework. In other words, the
use of the homo economicus as a unit of analysis leaves other important
elements out,
• other cultures (ethnocentrism). Even if we accept to use the homo
economicus as a unit of analysis, the definition of economically rational
is influenced by cultural factors. What can be defined as economically
rational in a certain cultural environment may be not economically
rational in other environments. In other words, the objective function
to maximize is not the same in all contexts.
When we say that Economics is still self-centered with respect to other
disciplines, we have to stress that the same thing could be said for the other
disciplines, too. If we consider theories on population developed in Eco-
nomics, Demography, Sociology and Anthropology, we notice that each dis-
cipline is willing to recognize the importance of alternative approaches, but
each of them ultimately considers itself as the one capable to capture the
main part of the story. The reciprocal efforts to derive subsidiary explana-
tions from other disciplines are not sufficient since each discipline ultimately
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has the false presumption of being able to give the best explanation of the
investigated phenomena.
An appropriate study about population issue (and about any other phe-
nomenon) should follow a real interdisciplinary approach. Unfortunately, we
seldom have examples of such interdisciplinary approaches. It is particularly
true in the academic world, where everyone seems to pay more attention to
the “defence” of the validity of their own discipline than to give a complete
and exhaustive explanation of the phenomena.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
The issue concerning population, its size and its growth has always been felt
strongly in the history of the economic thought. The attention of economists
has been focused now on population size, now on population growth and now
on its relation with income. Also the pros and cons of population growth
have been differently considered over time.
Population growth is determined both by fertility and mortality, but we
dealt only with theories on fertility. The number of births has been analyzing
by economic theories in relation with:
• the opportunity cost of children (the cost of children is measured in
terms of consumption goods or in terms of time units or both),
• the trade-off between quantity and quality of children (in a context
where parents cares about the quality of their children for love or for
self-interest or both).
The relation between fertility and income has been studying as a recipro-
cal interaction: on the one hand the economic context affects demographic
behavior, on the other hand demographic behavior influence the economic
framework. Since there is an interaction between fertility and income, then
there is an interaction between fertility and income distribution that deter-
mines fertility and education differential between different levels of income.
The theories presented in this survey have in common the fact that they
follow an economic approach, indeed they provides for explanations based on
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economic factors and economic mechanisms. Among the economic approach
we find different possible explanations to population dynamics: some theories
emphasize the role of the trade-off between quantity and quality of children
and of the income effect, other theories stress the importance of the return to
human capital, other ones focus on the role of women, and so on. No one of
these theories has the presumption to provide for a complete and exhaustive
explanation of the demographic phenomena by itself. Indeed, each theory is
based on particular and restrictive hypotheses (parents are self-interested or
altruistic, human capital has a significant role in the production technology
or not, markets may or may not substitute family, etc.) and hence the results
provided by theories are consistent only with the distinctive economic and
social framework they refer to.
Even the economic approach, considered as a whole, captures only a par-
tial explanation of population dynamics, since it is explained also by extra
economic factors, taken into consideration by other disciplines, such as de-
mography, anthropology, sociology. It is to be hoped that population issues
will be studied following an interdisciplinary approach, in order to capture
the complexity of phenomena.
 
Chapter 2
A Non-Altruistic Fertility
Model
2.1 Introduction
In this work we present a non-altruistic fertility model in which individuals
decide to have children to smooth their consumption and to transfer their
wealth over time. Individuals are non-altruistic in the sense that they have
children only to guarantee themselves a consumption in the last period of
their lives and in the sense that they do not care about the welfare of their
offspring. It follows that fertility depends on the so called old-age security
hypothesis1. The subject of this work are intergenerational transfers and
fertility choices and how they can be explained in a strictly non-altruistic
framework.
Before starting, we would like to make some preliminary remarks and
explain the origin and the motivations of this work. In the first chapter of
this work, we have already mentioned the reasons for and against the use of
analytical tools in the study of fertility decisions. We presented some method-
ological questions concerning the economic approach and Family Economics.
On the one hand, we presented the limits given by the use of analytical
tools, theoretical models and purely economic considerations in the analysis
of fertility and family decisions and the opportunities given by alternative ap-
1See Caldwell (1976).
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proaches (anthropological, sociological and demographic one). On the other
hand, we stressed the strength and the merits of the economic approach.
We refer to the first chapter of this thesis for a more in-depth discussion
about that. In this introduction we just want to give the reasons and the
motivations that bring us to consider and analyze a non-altruistic fertility
model.
It is quite obvious that the case in which individuals are purely self-
interested is simply a theoretical hypothesis. In the past epochs (not only
in the remote primitive ages, but also in the more recent centuries) and,
in some places, even today, individuals have children because they are a
source of wealth and fortune. Sometimes it is the case of an economic and
material wealth, other times, in some cultures, offspring have an intrinsic
value. Nevertheless, even in these cases, we cannot say that individuals have
children only because they are a source of wealth. From an anthropological
point of view, we can never deny the fact that human beings have an innate
and inner desire to conceive and to give birth to (suffice it to think about
the innate wish to preserve our species). In a certain sense, when we say
that in some cultures to have children is worth in itself, we are saying that
individuals have children because they desire them. As a consequence, from
this point of view, such behavior could be inserted in an altruistic fertility
model. In the light of these considerations, a non-altruistic fertility model
could be considered superfluous and inconsistent with empirical evidence. In
spite of that, we adopt this framework in order to focus on intergenerational
transfers and fertility choices as a result of a purely self-interested behavior.
Usually economic literature takes into consideration the altruistic and non-
altruistic components together: this chapter tries to isolate a single aspect of
this analysis. In particular, we want to study the effect of a selfish attitude on
fertility and intergenerational transfers, because we think that it is useful to
study this aspect separately, before considering the two motivations (altruism
and self-interest) together.
In addition to that, the interest on non-altruistic frameworks seems to be
justified not only by theoretical considerations, but also by empirical data.
Data show that also in the modern societies family is still a social secu-
rity cushion. Despite the introduction of social security, even in advanced
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economies, families continue to be involved in the care of their old and de-
pendent parents. U.S. House of Representatives (1988) reports that today
the average American woman spends 17 years of her adult life caring for a
dependent child and 18 years for her elderly parents, while in 1900 the num-
ber of years were, respectively, 19 and 9. Stoller (1983) shows that with the
introduction of social security and medical care, total financial support of
the old by the younger generation, including both private contributions and
social transfers, did not decline as a fraction of national income. Following
Stoller, sons still spend 15.1 hours per month and daughters 30 hours per
month caring for their old and dependent parents.
Many empirical studies investigate the nature of interfamily transfers and
they show that such transfers, besides to be substantial, are unlike altruisti-
cally motivated (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992, 2001), Bhaumik and
Nugent (2001), Cigno and Rosati (1996), Cox (1987)).
The general framework of this chapter is the same used by Cigno (1993,
2001). In his work, Cigno points out how previous literature is inconsistent
with the evidence of Family Economics. Approaches based on the assumption
of some forms of intergenerational altruism (ascending, descending or mutual
one) can explain only unidirectional transfers. When they can explain two-
way flows, they do not guarantee an efficient allocation of consumption across
generations and over their life cycle. Approaches based on a strategic self-
interest do not explain why selfish parents should voluntary make above-
subsistence transfers to their young children. Cigno uses a non-altruistic
approach and considers the above-subsistence transfers from adult parents
to children as loans and the transfers from adults to old-aged parents as
loan repayments. Children are demanded because they give opportunities
for intertemporal trade. Cigno’s approach is consistent with the evidence of
two-way traffic in the flow of transfers between parents and children.
Considering a non-altruistic model, it raises questions about the enforce-
ment of intrafamily contracts, which are typically implicit. Obviously, this is-
sue does not arise in an altruistic framework. Cigno looks for conditions such
that a system of intergenerational transfers is self-enforcing and negotiation-
proof. For self-enforcing he means that the intergenerational transfers sup-
port a sub-game-perfect Nash equilibrium. For negotiation-proof he means
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that no adult generation decides to change the current system of intergener-
ational transfers, even if they have the opportunity to do that. In particular,
Cigno argues that the negotiation-proof condition is set when the transfers
generate an intertemporally efficient allocation of consumption, which is not
guaranteed in an altruistic approach.
Even if we assume the same hypothesis and the same framework set by
Cigno, we come to different conclusions. In particular, we share the finding
that the couple of intergenerational transfers found by Cigno is negotiation-
proof and so, once introduced, it will never be changed, but we show that
it will never be introduced. Individuals decide to introduce and to keep a
different couple of intergenerational transfers that is still self-enforcing and
negotiation-proof. This couple of transfers does not provide for any above-
subsistence transfer to young children.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 briefly presents issues
and results concerning intergenerational transfers developed in the most re-
cent economic literature. Section 2.3 presents a simpler version of the model,
where individuals do not have access to the capital market, Section 2.4 con-
siders the case in which it is possible to save, Section 2.5 deals with some
extensions to the model: we introduce the presence of the State which guar-
antees some social transfers, we assume that individuals are subject to sub-
sistence level of consumption in every period of their lives, and we consider
the possibility to invest in human capital. Section 2.6 brings up some con-
siderations about a dynamic framework. Finally, Section 2.7 draws some
conclusions.
2.2 Some Issues on Intergenerational Trans-
fers
The matter under discussion in this chapter concerns two elements: inter-
generational transfers and fertility choices.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we have given an overview on theories
on population in the history of economic though, but we dealt with intergen-
erational transfers only marginally. In this section, we briefly present some
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issues concerning intergenerational transfers that have been developing by
economic literature.
With regard to intergenerational transfers, economic literature has been
investigating three important aspects:
1. their nature
2. their motivations
3. their economic characteristics.
For economists “transfer” means, in the strict sense, the ordinary trans-
fer of a good from one agent to another or a service provided by one agent
to another. More generally, the term transfer denotes any change that is
both costly in some sense for an agent and favorable to another. There are
four types of modes of transfer: taking by force, giving, exchange and reci-
procity. Taking by force does not respect the freedom of all involved agents.
Exchange is the standard exchange between self-interested people (as the
market exchanges), whereas giving is pure gift-giving. Reciprocity consists
in all other-oriented behavior, motivations and sentiments which are neither
exclusively self-interested exchange nor pure unilateral gift-giving. We can
say that reciprocity is a major type of social interaction in all groups and
organizations, family included. Transfers within families are very peculiar.
They may concern money (transfers inter vivos or bequests) or help and
services (cares or loans to children or to old-aged parents), they may have
market substitutes (loans by credit market) or may not (as in the case of
affection and cares). Exchanges and transfers within families may be per-
ceived as such (I give to my children, bringing them up to give back in the
future) or may not (I give to my children, without thinking that they might
ever give back).
With regard to motivations, transfers within families may basically be
driven by two reasons: altruism and self-interest. Sometimes the difference
between the two motivations is not so clear. Altruism between the members
of a family may be only apparent. It means that sometimes individuals trans-
fers services or goods to their relatives hiding their self-interest. Sometimes
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sentiments and emotions are driven by some underlying rationality. Some-
times transfers involve only apparent primitive sentiments and we can look
for deeper motivations. In other words, relationships and transfers between
individuals of the same family involve several types of “reciprocities”. These
reciprocities may be due to different reasons, which can intervene jointly.
Love is only one of the possible reason and sometimes love is only apparent.
Parents may transfer services and goods to their children just for love, with-
out thinking that they might ever give back, or may bring them up to give
back in the future. Sometimes parents prepare for their old age in inculcating
in their children a sentiment of guilt about lack of support old-aged parents.
The observation of the nature and motivations of transfers within families
are used for setting the framework and hypotheses of the models: in certain
contexts it would be more appropriate to use an altruistic model, in other
frameworks a self-interested model may be more appropriate, in other cases
models without transfers might be more consistent with empirical evidence.
Set the most realistic framework and hypotheses through the observation of
the nature and motivations of the intergenerational transfers, the model has
be able to provide for a description of the characteristics of the transfers. On
this point, economic literature has been interested in:
• the directions of flows and their amount
• their efficiency
• the duration of their life.
Empirical evidence shows the presence of both unidirectional transfers
and two-way flows between generations. Furthermore, transfers may be
above-subsistence, even if individuals are self-interested, or not.
The efficiency of intergenerational transfers is the most controversial issue.
Economists have been investigating the conditions that guarantee an efficient
allocation of consumption, not only over the life cycle of each generation, but
also across generations.
Finally, the fact that some rules regulating intergenerational transfers
persist over time (in the sense that they are respected form generation to
generation) is strictly connected with their efficiency.
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Considering fertility exogenous and constant, we can identify three main
basic models of intergenerational transfers.
The first type refers to the altruistic model developed by Becker (1991)
where parents care about the level of utility of their children. The utility
function of any adult is given by:
U = u(cp;V (ck)), (2.1)
where cp is the level of consumption of parents and V (ck) the level of utility of
their child. The child is not altruistic, indeed his utility function V depends
only on his level of consumption ck. Parents transfer T to their child. The
optimal transfer is such that the parent’s marginal utility of consumption
equals the child’s marginal utility of consumption, seen from the parent’s
point of view. What matters for the altruistic parents is only the sum of
their child’s and their own income. In addition, parents and children pool
their resources: a small income variation such as the total income remains
constant does not change the optimal consumption for children and parents.
In other words, there is an insurance between parent and child against any
event which leave total family income unchanged. Even if the child is not
altruistic, a rise of his income benefits the parent, because the parent lowers
his transfer. The inefficiency is given by the fact that, when T = 0, each
consumes his income. From the point of view of the parents, there might be
cases when it would be optimal if the child would transfer a positive amount
to his parents, but the child do not do that because he is not altruistic.
Anyway, inefficiency persists also in case of mutual altruism. In Stark
(1993), for example, parents care about the utility of their children and vice
versa. In this case the parent would like to consume more than the child
wants him to consume. Parents and children can agree about the direction
of the transfer because they have higher utility when a transfer is active, but
they may disagree about the amount of the transfer. In addition, the model
can converge to a further inefficiency: altruism rises transfers, but it may
lower both parents’ and children’s utilities.
The second type of models consider transfers between parents and chil-
dren as a direct exchange. Cox (1987) assumes that children are not altruistic
and that their utility positively depends on their own consumption and neg-
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atively depends on the service s that they provide to their parents. Parents
are altruistic: they take care about their consumption and the utility of their
children. In addition, parents’ utility function directly depends on s. It is
assumed that the service s has no market substitute. The parental utility
function is given by:
U = u(cp, s, V (ck, s)). (2.2)
Taking the transfer as given, children maximize their utility, without always
reaching the maximum.
The third type of models consider transfers between generations as a
means of intertemporal exchange. Contrary to the above examples, where
transfers are motived by altruism (descending or mutual), in this case a non-
altruistic utility function is taken into consideration. Family transfers are
not motived by love or altruism. They are only a means to transfer and
smooth consumption over time. Individuals use family in order to transfer
their resources over time for many reasons: there may not exist any market
substitute, it is easier to find an agreement with few people, transaction
costs are lower, information is more complete, the risk is lower, the mutual
supervision is more efficient, there exists an adverse selection, and so on.
According to this framework, non-altruistic individuals protect them-
selves against the risk like altruistic parents insure their children and al-
truistic children insure their parents.
We can find several examples of such mechanisms. In Kotlikoff and Spivak
(1981) families provide an insurance against the risk of running out of income
in old age because of higher than average longevity. In Bernheim, Shleifer
and Summers (1985) parents use the threat of disinheritance as a means to
induce their children to take care of them. The amount of the bequest is fixed
in advance by parents. Parents declare they will leave their bequest to the
child who takes best care of them. Of course, parents cannot declare who the
chosen child is too early, since they would lose the means of getting attention
and care. The system does not work if parents have only one child, or they
do not leave any inheritance or their children do not need any bequests. In
Cigno (1991) the family is a substitute or a complement to the credit market.
Children cannot borrow, so they need parental income. Since children cannot
borrow or they are impatient to consume, they borrow by their parents and
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they promise them an interest rate that is above the market rate.
It is interesting to notice how the same issue was investigated with a dif-
ferent approach by Caldwell (1976). According to Caldwell, there is a great
divide that separates the situation where the net flow of wealth is from chil-
dren toward parents and the later situation where the net flow goes form
parents to children. The alternative viewpoint consists in the fact that Cald-
well believes that such divide is not mechanistically determined by economic
conditions, but that it is almost entirely a social phenomenon.
In conclusion, given a certain motivation and a certain purpose of in-
tergenerational transfers (altruism, pure self-interest, transfers as a means
of insurance against the risk, or as a means of direct or intertemporal ex-
change, etc.), the theoretical model has to be able to explain the direction of
the transfers, their amount and to identify their self-enforceability conditions.
2.3 The Model without Saving
Following Cigno (1993, 2001), we consider an overlapping generations model
where each individual lives through three different periods:
1. childhood. In this period individuals are passive agents, indeed they
consume and receive from their parents at least the amount f which is
strictly necessary to survive,
2. parenthood. For simplicity, we consider a single individual as a couple
of parents. Individuals receive a wage W only in the second period of
their lives and any decision is made in this period,
3. old age. An old-aged individual does not work and so he/she can con-
sume and survive only if he/she has taken the necessary steps in the
second period of life.
This model is characterized by the fact that any individual is selfish and
non-altruistic. This feature has two important implications.
First of all, it means that individuals act only out of self-interest and
not for the good of their family (neither for their offspring nor for their old
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parents). In addition, it means that this is a non-altruistic fertility model, in
the sense that the number of children n does not increase the level of utility
of their parents: individuals decide to have children not because they like
and love children, but only if they can gain an economic benefit from their
offspring.
Since individuals earn a positive wageW only in the second period of life,
they have to find a way to smooth their consumption as well as secure for
themselves a positive consumption in their old age. In order to do so, they
have two possibilities:
1. to save a part of their income in the second period of life, and consume
their savings in their old age,
2. to have children and oblige their children to transfer them a positive
amount when they become old and their children become adults.
For simplicity, we start by supposing that capital market is so undevel-
oped that it is impossible to save a part of W in the second period of life
(parenthood) and to consume it in the third period of life (old age). As a
consequence, the only strategy by which individuals can secure for themselves
a positive consumption in the third period of their lives is to have children.
In this case adult individuals have to find a way to oblige their children to
eventually transfer them a positive amount when they become old and their
children become adults.
Indeed, since it is a non-altruistic model, it is impossible that an adult
individual is moved to provide a level of consumption for his/her old parent
at least equal to the level of subsistence. Thus, in this context, it becomes
necessary to create a kind of social contract which is able to oblige a gener-
ation of adult individuals to transfer a part of their income to their old-aged
parents. In addition, this type of social contract, in a non-altruistic model,
works only if it offers benefits to those who join in.
Following Cigno (1993, 2001), we define family constitution as a couple
of intergenerational transfers (b;x), where b is the amount transferred from
adults to each of their children and x is the amount transferred from adults
to their old-aged parents. We have to stress that b is a transfer inter-vivos,
and not a bequest.
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Any sort of decision is made in the second period of life. In particular,
each adult individual has to decide:
1. how many children to conceive (n)
2. how much to transfer to each child (b)
3. how much to transfer to his/her old-aged parent (x).
Since there is no possibility to save, for each adult individual it is strictly
necessary to have children in order to secure for himself/herself a positive
consumption during his/her old age. It means that, in this context, each
individual does not have to decide whether to conceive children or not, but
only how many children to conceive (in other words, n is always strictly
positive).
Given the constitution (b;x), individual i must transfer b to each of
his/her children and x to his/her old-aged parent. Once old, individual i
will received x from each of his/her offspring. For simplicity, we consider the
wage W constant from generation to generation.
In addition, each child involves a fixed cost f , which is the strictly nec-
essary amount to survive and become an adult. It means that the value of
b is determined by the family constitution (and it can be null), but parents
are obliged to pay at least the cost f > 0 for each child in any case.
Some norms are introduced in order to guarantee the respect of the rules
of any given family constitution. Given the constitution (b;x):
1. each adult individual must transfer b to each of his/her children and x
to his/her old-aged parent. If individual i does not respect this rule,
he/she will not receive x from his/her children when he/her becomes
old. This punishment has two important characteristics. First of all,
it is a credible threat, indeed each child of individual i has an economic
interest to punish his/her parent and not transfer x to him/her. Sec-
ondly, this type of punishment is a sort of assurance, in the sense that
everybody is sure to have an income equal to xn in the old age. More
properly, this is a necessary assurance, according with the fact that in a
non-altruistic model nobody is moved to transfer x to his/her old-aged
parent,
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2. individual i does not have to transfer x to his/her old parent if his/her
old-aged parent did not respect the family constitution previously. In
this case, individual i will not be punished in his/her turn by his/her
offspring. In other words, it is not possible to punish individual i if
he/she did not transfer x to his/her parent in order to punish him/her,
3. the third rule concerns the possibility of changing the current family
constitution. Any family constitution is established by adults (and only
by adults). Following Cigno (1993, 2001), we suppose that each adult
generation has the possibility to change the constitution transmitted
by the previous adult generation. If individual i introduces a new
constitution, different from the previous one, he/she does not have
to transfer x to his/her old parent and he/she will not be punished
by his/her children. The application of this rule is subject to some
restrictions. If there was no restriction, every new adult generation
could introduce a new family constitution in order to not transfer x to
their old-aged parents, without being punished. In this case it would
be impossible to assure the effectiveness of the family constitution in
order to have an income and to consume it in the last period of life.
For this reason, individual i can introduce a new constitution without
being punished by his/her children if and only if the new constitution
is the Pareto Optimal one for the next generation(s)2.
2Consider individual i and his descendants (individual i + 1, individual i + 2 , etc.).
Suppose that individual i changes the current constitution with a new one that is just a
Pareto improvement for individual i+1, but not his Pareto Optimal constitution. At this
point individual i + 1 can transfer 0 to individual i and introduce another constitution
which is again a Pareto improvement for individual i + 2, but not the Pareto Optimal
constitution. Also individual i+1 will be punished by individual i+2, that can introduce
a new family constitution which is a Pareto improvement for individual i+3. This situation
goes on until generation i + j introduces the Pareto Optimal constitution for generation
i + j + 1 (that is also the Pareto Optimal constitution for all the next generations, if we
maintain the preferences constant over time). From this simple example, we can infer that
it is possible to change the current constitution with a new one without being punished
if and only if the new constitution is Pareto Optimal for the next generation(s). In other
words, the shift from any constitution different form O to constitution O takes place
immediately, from generation i to generation i+ 1.
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According to Cigno (1993, 2001), we call a family constitution negotiation-
proof if, once introduced, it is not replaced by the next generation(s).
Let cc be the consumption in childhood, ca the consumption in the adult
age and, finally, co the consumption in the old age. During childhood, an in-
dividual consumes (f + b). The amount f represents the level of subsistence
and it is a fixed cost for the parents, while b is determined by the family
constitution. Since we are considering a model without human capital, the
amount b is not invested in education, but in several goods which are not
necessary for the child’s survival, but that increase his/her utility. In the
second period of life, parents earn a wage W (constant from generation to
generation). They allocate their income between consumption ca and inter-
generational transfers. In particular, they transfer (f + b) to each child and
x to their old-aged parent. In the third period of life, people receive x from
each of their children and consume it completely.
Let 0 < φ ≤ 1 be the intertemporal preference rate. The utility function
of any individual at the beginning of his/her life is given by
U = ln(cc) + φ ln(ca) + φ
2 ln(co), (2.3)
that is
U = ln (f + b) + φ ln(W − (f + b)n− x) + φ2 ln(xn). (2.4)
Since any type of decision is made by adults, the relevant utility function in
order to make optimal decisions and to solve optimization problems is given
by the utility function of an adult individual, that is
U1 = ln(W − (f + b)n− x) + φ ln(xn). (2.5)
From this function we can notice the difference between this model and
an altruistic fertility model. In the case presented in this work, the number of
children n does not increase the utility of an adult individual, but it increases
the consumption of an old-aged parent. Children are a sort of capital good.
Within this environment, we now consider an adult individual, individual
1, which is the first individual of a certain dynasty. In other words, individual
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1 is the first one that has to establish a family constitution3.
Since we consider individual 1 when he/she has to make all the decisions,
that is when he/she is an adult, his/her utility function is given by equation
(2.5). Individual 1 has to decide how many children to conceive (n) and
which family constitution (b;x) to introduce.
Let A = (ba;xa) be the family constitution which maximizes U1 and n
a
the optimal number of children when A is chosen as the constitution, i.e.
(ba;xa;na) = argmax {U1} = argmax {ln(W − (f + b)n− x) + φ ln(xn)} .
Solving the maximization problem, we get:
Proposition 1 The family constitution A = (ba;xa) which maximizes the
utility of any adult individual and the optimal number of children when A is
the current constitution are given by
ba = 0, (2.6)
xa =
φ
1 + 2φ
W,
na =
φ
f (1 + 2φ)
W.
Before solving this optimization problem, we could have expected that
ba = 0 , indeed individual 1 has already lived through his/her childhood, for
him/her b is just a cost, and he/she has no altruistic feelings towards his
children. As a consequence, there is no reason for individual 1 to establish a
positive b.
Once it is evident that (ba;xa;na) maximizes the utility of individual
1, before introducing constitution A, individual 1 has to be sure that each
of his children, individual 2, will honour this family constitution. In other
words, individual 1 decides to introduce A only if it is negotiation-proof.
Indeed, according to the rules explained above, individual 2, once adult,
could replace A with another constitution and transfer 0 to individual 1. On
the other hand, individual 2 can change A without being punished by his/her
3Individual 1 may belong to the first generation ever born or to the first adult generation
with old-aged parents, that is the second generation ever born.
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children, individual 3, only if he/she introduces a family constitution which is
Pareto Optimal for individual 3. Let O = (bo;xo) be such that constitution.
O maximizes the utility of individual 3, including the consumption in his
childhood. Hence, individual 2 has two possibilities:
1. strategy one: keep A. In this case the optimal number of children for
individual 2 is still na,
2. strategy two: replace A with O. In this case individual 2 will have a
different optimal number of children, n2.
Individual 2 chooses the strategy which will give him the higher pay-off.
Let a be the pay-off given by A = (ba;xa;na) and o the pay-off given by
O = (bo;xo;no):
a = ln ((ca)a) + φ ln ((co)a) = ln(W − (f + b
a)na − xa) + φ ln(xana) (2.7)
o = ln ((ca)o) + φ ln ((co)o) = ln(W − (f + b
o)no − xo) + φ ln(xono), (2.8)
where (ca)a and (ca)o are the levels of consumption during parenthood when
constitution A and O are chosen, respectively, (co)a and (co)o the levels of
consumption in the third period of life when constitution A and O are chosen,
respectively, and, finally, no is the optimal number of children when O is the
current constitution.
A good “index” through which we can express these payoffs is given by
the return on family. Call Rfa the return on family given by constitution A
and Rfo the return given by O. We have that
Rfa =
xa
f + ba
, (2.9)
and
Rfo =
xo
f + bo
. (2.10)
By definition, the pay-off given to any adult individual by A is higher than the
pay-off given to any adult individual by O or any other family constitution,
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since A maximizes the utility function of adults4. As a consequence, by
definition
a ≥ o,
and
Rfa ≥ Rfo.
We have to consider that the pay-off which individual 2 can obtain replac-
ing A with O is different from o, since, in this case, individual 2 can transfer
0 to individual 1 without being punished by individual 3. Hence, the pay-off
given by strategy two is:
h = ln ((ca)h) + φ ln ((co)h) = ln(W − (f + b
o)n2 − 0) + φ ln(x
on2), (2.11)
and we can not know, a priori, if a is higher than h.
The payoffs given by strategy one and strategy two (a and h) are both
certain.
We know with certainty that if individual 2 follows strategy one he/she
will be able to have (co)a = x
ana at his/her disposal in his/her old age
because, if individual 2 finds this strategy profitable, individual 3 will do the
same, and so he/she will transfer xa to individual 2.
At the same time, we know with certainty that if individual 2 chooses
strategy two he/she will be able to have (co)h = x
on2 at his/her disposal in his
old age. Indeed, if individual 2 introduces O, individual 3 is obliged to honour
this family constitution, and so he/she is obliged to transfer xo to individual
2. This derives from the characteristics of O, which is the constitution which
maximizes the utility of the future generation(s). Individual 3 can not change
O with any other constitution without decreasing the utility of individual
4 (and hence without being punished). By definition, constitution O, once
introduced, will be never replaced. In other words, by definition, constitution
O is negotiation-proof.
In conclusion
If a ≥ h⇒ individual 2 maintains A,
4The opposite is true if we consider the utility of any individual at the beginning of
his/her life, including childhood. In this case, by definition, constitution O guarantees the
highest pay-off.
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If a < h⇒ individual 2 introduces O.
We can present the above described situation as a game in its extensive form.
The first agent to play is individual 1. He/she has to choose a family
constitution, that is a couple of intergenerational transfers (b;x). The set of
possible moves or actions is formed by all the couples (b ≥ 0;x ≥ 0), such
that they are consistent with the budget constraint. Individual 1 can choose:
1. constitution A,
2. constitution O,
3. any other constitution different form A and from O. Let K be any one
of these constitutions.
Individual 1 knows a priori that any K is not negotiation-proof because
individual 2 will change K with O or with A5 and he/she will transfer 0
to individual 1 (see the third rule concerning the possibility to change the
current family constitution). Hence, the existence of a credible threat by
individual 2 brings individual 1 to discard any constitution different from A
and O. For this reason, in the extensive form of the game, we indicate only
the move “choose A” and the move “choose O”.
Individual 1 declares his/her move. The next period his/her child be-
comes adult and it is his/her turn to play. He(she knows what individual 1
played, so this is a perfect information game. In any node he/she is (depend-
ing on the move of individual 1, A or O), individual 2 can play:
1. constitution A,
2. constitution O,
5If individual 2 keeps K, he/she gets k = ln ((ca)k)+φ ln ((co)k) = ln(W − (f+b
k)nk−
xk)+φ ln(xknk). As we do not know a priori if a > h, at the same time we do not a priori
if k > h. If k < h, constitution K is dominated by constitution O. If k > h, constitution
K is preferred to O. Anyway, it is for sure that A is preferred to K, since A maximizes
the utility of any adult individual. As a consequence, individual 2 has always an incentive
to change K.
130 A Non-Altruistic Fertility Model
3. any other constitution different form A and O.
For the above explained reason, individual 2 rules out any other consti-
tution different form A and O.
If we indicate with the first letter the move of individual 1 and with the
second letter the move of individual 2, we get the following payoffs:
1. A − A. Individual 2 keeps A and he/she transfers xa to individual 1,
so individual 1 gets a. As above explained, we know with certainty
that if individual 2 plays A, he/she will be able to have xana at his/her
disposal in his old age, so he/she gets a, too;
2. A − O. Since individual 2 changes the previous constitution, he/she
transfers 0 to individual 1, who cannot consume anything in the last
period of life. Since preferences are expressed by log-utility, individual
1 gets a pay-off m that goes to −∞. Individual 3 will be obliged to
keep O and individual 2 gets h;
3. O − A. Since individual 2 changes the previous constitution, he/she
transfers 0 to individual 1, who gets m → −∞. Any individual that
changes O with any other constitution will be punished, so individual
2 will receive 0 in the last period of his/her life, and he/she gets m→
−∞, too;
4. O −O. Both individuals get o.
Figure (2.1) shows the extensive form of the game.
The game can be solved through backward induction, comparing the pay-
offs. Proposition 1 let us to compute a. In order to compute h and o, we
have to determine constitution O and the optimal number of children for
individual 2 when he/she decides to introduce O.
Constitution O maximizes the life time utility flow of individual 3, U3,
which also includes his consumption in childhood (and which is equal to the
life time utility flow of the next generations). Hence
(bo;xo) = argmax {U3} = argmax
{
ln(f + b) + φ ln(W − (f + b)n3 − x) + φ
2 ln(xn3)
}
,
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Figure 2.1: The Extensive Form of the Game
where n3 is the number of children of individual 3
6. We obtain (bo;xo) as
function of n3:
bo(n3) =
W − fn3
n3(1 + φ+ φ2)
, (2.12)
xo(n3) =
φ2(W − fn3)
1 + φ+ φ2
.
Individual 3 will eventually determine the optimal number of children in his
turn, n3, when he/she becomes adult. As explained above, individual 3 is
obliged to honour O, so n3 is equal to n
o (the optimal number of children
when O is the current family constitution) and it is such that it solves the
following optimization problem:
(no) = argmax {ln(W − (f + bo)n− xo) + φ ln(xon)} .
Substituting the values of bo and xo from equation (2.12), we obtain:
no =
φ
f(1 + 2φ)
W. (2.13)
6When we maximize cc, the consumption in the first period of life, we have to set the
condition of subsistence given by cc = f + b ≥ f .
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Substituting the value of n3 = n
o in equation (2.12), we get:
Proposition 2 The Pareto Optimum family constitution O = (bo, xo) that
maximizes the life time utility flow of any generation is given by
bo =
f(1 + φ)
(1 + φ+ φ2)φ
, (2.14)
xo =
Wφ2(1 + φ)
(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
.
If individual 2 introduces O, his optimal number of children is given by:
(n2) = argmax {ln(W − (f + b
o)n− 0) + φ ln(xon)} (2.15)
n2 =
Wφ2(1 + φ+ φ2)
f(1 + φ)(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)
.
If individual 2 replaces A with O, individual 2 and individual 3 respect the
rules of this family constitution, but the former does not have to transfer
anything to his/her predecessor, while the latter has to transfer xo. As a
consequence, the optimal number of children for individual 2 (n2) is different
from the optimal number of children for individual 3 (no). Thus, the levels
of utility reached by the two individuals are also different (h for individual 2
and o for individual 3, if we evaluate their utility when they are adults). In
particular, from equation (2.8) and equation (2.11), we get:
o = ln
(
W
φ(1 + φ)
(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
)
+ φ ln
(
W 2
φ3(1 + φ)
f(1 + 2φ)2(1 + φ+ φ2)
)
,
(2.16)
and
h = ln
(
W
1
1 + φ
)
+ φ ln
(
W 2
φ4
f(1 + 2φ)(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)
)
. (2.17)
We can compare h to o:
h− o = ln
(
(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
φ(1 + φ)2
)
+ φ ln
(
φ(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
(1 + φ)(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)
)
.
(2.18)
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Figure (2.2) shows that h− o is always positive for 0 < φ ≤ 1, then
h > o.
We can also verify that a ≥ o, indeed from equation (2.7)
a = ln
(
W
1
1 + 2φ
)
+ φ ln
(
W 2
φ2
f(1 + 2φ)2
)
, (2.19)
and
a− o = ln
(
1 + φ+ φ2
φ(1 + φ)
)
+ φ ln
(
1 + φ+ φ2
φ(1 + φ)
)
. (2.20)
Since 1+φ+φ
2
φ(1+φ)
> 1 ∀ 0 < φ ≤ 1, then (a− o) > 0, that is
a > o.
Individual 2 decides to introduce O only if h > a. We can compute
a− h = ln
(
1 + φ
1 + 2φ
)
+ φ ln
(
1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3
φ2(1 + 2φ)
)
. (2.21)
Figure (2.3) shows that, for 0 < φ ≤ 1, the difference a − h is always
positive. We can conclude with the following proposition:
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Proposition 3 Since a > h, for individual 2 maintaining constitution A
is always more profitable than introducing O. The same is true for all the
following generations, that will have to make the same decision in the same
context. Hence, constitution A is negotiation-proof. Individual 1 knows that
if he/she introduces the family constitution which maximizes his/her utility,
constitution A, individual 2 will maintain it, so he/she decides to introduce
A.
Coming back to the extensive form of the game showed in figure (2.1) ,
when individual 1 chooses A, individual 2 decides to play A, since a > h.
When individual 1 chooses O, individual 2 decides to play O, since o > m.
In the first node, individual 1 knows that, if he/she chooses A, individual 2
will keep A and he/she will get a and that, if he/she chooses O, individual
2 will choose O and he/she will get o. Since a > o, individual 1 decide to
introduce constitution A.
Finally, it is interesting to analyze the difference between the couples of
intergenerational transfers (ba;xa) and (bo;xo) and the difference between the
optimal numbers of children, na, no and n2.
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First of all, since ba = 0 and bo is positive, we have that
bo > ba.
With regard to xa and xo:
xa − xo =
φW
(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
> 0 ∀ 0 < φ ≤ 1,
hence xa > xo. These comparisons explain why Rfa > Rfo. Finally, if we
compare the optimal number of children:
na = no,
and
na − n2 =
−φ5 − φ4 + 2φ2 + φ
f(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ)(φ3 + φ2 + 2φ+ 1)
W > 0 ∀ 0 < φ ≤ 1,
so na = no > n2.
Hence, the optimal number of children prescribed by constitution A and
by constitution O are the same. Anyway, with the first constitution the cost
for each child is lower (in particular only equal to f) and the gross return for
child is higher (xa > xo).
If we consider the levels of consumption in the second period of life:
(ca)a = W
1
1 + 2φ
, (2.22)
(ca)h = W
1
1 + φ
,
(ca)o = W
φ(1 + φ)
(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
,
and (ca)a > (ca)h > (ca)o. With regard to the levels of consumption in the
third period of life:
(co)a = W
2 φ
2
f(1 + 2φ)2
, (2.23)
(co)h = W
2 φ
4
f(1 + 2φ)(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)
,
(co)o =W
2 φ
3(1 + φ)
f(1 + 2φ)2(1 + φ+ φ2)
,
and (co)a > (co)o > (co)h.
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2.4 The Model with Saving
Suppose now that individuals have the possibility to save. The return on
saving is constant and equal to
Rs = 1 + r − δ. (2.24)
The presence of δ means that saving is subjected to depreciation. The utility
function of individual 1 if given by:
U1 = ln(W − (f + b)n− x− s) + φ ln(xn+ sRs), (2.25)
where s is the share of W that individual 1 decides to save.
In this new framework, individual 1 can secure for himself/herself a pos-
itive income for the next period by saving and by the family constitution.
He7she has to decide how to allocate the labour income W between con-
sumption, saving and family constitution. Before solving this optimization
problem, we can expect to find a corner solution. In particular, we expect
that, if the return on saving Rs is higher than the return on family (Rf ),
individual 1 will invest only in saving. The opposite is true if the return on
family is higher than the return on saving7.
Regardless of the family constitution, the optimal level of saving and the
optimal number of children are such that
(n; s) = argmax {ln(W − (f + b)n− x− s) + φ ln(xn+ sRs)} .
We refer to the appendix for the development of the above maximization
problem. Here, we report the following result:
Proposition 4
If Rs > Rf ⇒ n = 0 and s =
φ(W − x)
(1 + φ)
, (2.26)
If Rs < Rf ⇒ n =
φ(W − x)
(f + b)(1 + φ)
and s = 0,
7We are supposing that there are no physiological limits for the number of children. If
there are physiological limits to conceiving children, we can expect that, if the return on
family is higher than the return on saving, individual 1 will decide to have the maximum
possible number of children, and to invest the residual income in saving.
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where Rf is the return on family (regardless of the family constitution),
that is
Rf =
x
f + b
. (2.27)
Hence, if Rs > Rf , individual 1 decides to have no children and to save
totally the part of income that he/she does not consume. In this case there is
no issue regarding the choice of family constitution, then x = 0 and s = φW
(1+φ)
.
Suppose that Rs < Rf . In this case individual 1 has to choose which
family constitution to introduce. In order to do so, we have to suppose that
Rs is constant over time and that individual 1 knows if individual 2 will
invest in saving or in his/her own family.
As in the case without the possibility of saving, the family constitution
which maximizes the utility of individual 1 is given by A = (ba;xa), together
with a number of children equal to na. The difference is that, in this case,
individual 1 has to be sure that Rs < Rfa, where Rfa is the return on family
given by constitution A.
If this condition is set, individual 1 introduces A only if he is sure that
individual 2 will maintain it. Individual 2 can maintain A or introduce the
family constitution that is Pareto Optimal for the next generation(s). This
constitution is still O = (bo;xo).
Notice that we have supposed that Rs is constant and that individual
1 knows that also in the next period, for individual 2, it will be true that
Rs < Rf , regardless of the family constitution, and so also for constitution
A (that is, Rs < Rfa also for individual 2).
The pay-off h given by strategy two (replacing A with O) is lower than
the pay-off given by strategy one (maintaining A), so for individual 2 it is
more profitable to honour constitution A. Individual 1 knows that and thus
he/she introduces A and he/she has na children.
In conclusion, in the context where individuals have access to the capital
market, if the return on saving is lower than the return on family, individuals
do not save, they invest only in their family, and the analysis returns to
that of the case presented in the previous section. In particular, also the
optimal number of children is always the same. In other words, the possibility
of saving changes the optimal choices (and the optimal number of children
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becomes 0) only if it offers a higher return than investing in family.
2.5 Extensions
We can now consider several extensions of the previous simple model. Our
aim is to focus on some changes in the social and economic environment and
to investigate their effect on individuals’ behavior, with particular regard
to their decisions concerning fertility and intergenerational transfers. We
will show that some of these changes do not modify families’ behavior, but
other of them may modify the solution of the model. More precisely, we will
show that constitution A is still negotiation-proof if we consider, together
with intrafamiliar transfers, also some social transfers guaranteed by the
government (Section 2.5.1). On the contrary, if we introduce a subsistence
level of consumption also in the second and in the third period of life (Section
2.5.2) and if we introduce the possibility to invest in education (Section 2.5.3),
it is not anymore true that constitution A is always negotiation-proof: it
depends, respectively, on the values of the subsistence levels of consumption
and on the value of the return on education.
2.5.1 Social Transfers
In this subsection, we consider, together with the capital market, another
substitute to the family: the government. Family guarantees private trans-
fers, whereas the state guarantees social transfers.
Suppose that the government transfers a retirement pension in the last
period of life. The pension scheme is financed with taxpayers’ income and
a share τ is deducted from the gross salary W of each working-aged parent.
Their net wage is now given by:
w = W (1− τ). (2.28)
Let N be the size of the first generation. Each individual 1 has n children,
thus the size of generation 2 is nN . Each individual 2 pays a tax equal to
τW , so the pension fund is nNτW . The fund is used to subsidize all the N
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individuals 18, hence the retirement pension for each of them is given by:
p =
nNτW
N
= nτW. (2.29)
From equation (2.29), we see that the amount of the retirement pension of
each old-aged individual depends on the number of his/her children. We
could have considered p as a constant, but it is more realistic to think that
also the social transfers are financed by middle-aged, as well as the private
transfers. The difference is that the private transfers are determined by
individuals, whereas (in this model) they cannot define the social transfers:
they have only to pay the taxes necessary to finance the social transfers, which
are determined by the government. In this sense, the retirement pension is
exogenous for individuals. On the other hand, since it is financed by middle-
aged, the size of the working population is crucial for its amount (the pension
fund is equal to nNτW ). In other words, the mechanism by which social
transfers are financed makes the fertility rate significant and substantial for
the whole economy. This is consistent with the empirical evidence, where
the ageing of population affects the social transfers system.
In this new decisional framework, the utility function of individual 1 is
Uˆ1 = ln (w − (f + b)n− x− s) + φ ln(sRs + n(x+ τW )), (2.30)
and the return on family is now equal to:
Rˆf =
x+ τW
f + b
. (2.31)
Regardless of the family constitution, the level of saving and the number
of children which maximize Uˆ1 are
(nˆ; sˆ) = argmax
{
Uˆ1
}
.
We obtain the following result:
8We suppose that each old-aged individual receive the same retirement pension from
the government. This hypothesis is consistent with the previous assumptions about the
homogeneity among salaries and taxes.
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Proposition 5
If Rs >
x+ τW
f + b
⇒ nˆ = 0 and sˆ =
φ (w − x)
(1 + φ)
=
φw
(1 + φ)
, (2.32)
If Rs <
x+ τW
f + b
⇒ nˆ =
φ (w − x)
(f + b)(1 + φ)
and sˆ = 0.
As in the previous section, if Rs > Rˆf , individual 1 decides to have no
children and to save totally the part of income that he/she does not consume.
In this case, there is no issue regarding the choice of the family constitution,
x = 0 and sˆ = φw
(1+φ)
. Notice that the optimal level of saving is still equal
to φw
(1+φ)
, as in the case without social transfers. The difference is that the
income is given by the net wage w and not by W . As a consequence, the
consumption in the second period of life is equal to:
cˆa = w − sˆ = w −
φw
(1 + φ)
=
1
1 + φ
w =
1
1 + φ
W (1− τ). (2.33)
Suppose that Rs < Rˆf . In this case individual 1 has to choose which
family constitution to introduce. In order to do that, we have to suppose
that Rs is constant over time and that individual 1 knows if individual 2
will invest in saving or in his/her own family. Individual 1 would choose
constitution Aˆ = (bˆa; xˆa) which maximizes his/her utility, that is:
(bˆa; xˆa) = argmax {ln (w − (f + b)nˆ− x− sˆ) + φ ln(sˆRs + nˆx+ p)} ,
where
nˆ =
φ (w − x)
(f + b)(1 + φ)
(2.34)
sˆ = 0.
Since w = W (1− τ), we get
Proposition 6 The family constitution Aˆ = (bˆa; xˆa) which maximizes the
utility of any adult individual and the optimal number of children when Aˆ is
the current constitution are give by
bˆa = 0, (2.35)
xˆa = W
φ− 2τφ− τ
1 + 2φ
,
nˆa = φ
W
f(1 + 2φ)
.
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We can compare constitution Aˆ to constitution A (given by Proposition
1). We have that
ba = bˆa = 0
na = nˆa = φ
W
f(1 + 2φ)
,
while xa 6= xˆa. In particular
Xˆa = xa − xˆa = Wτ > 0.
The transfer b is still equal to 0 because it is still a mere cost for individual
1. The difference between xa and xˆa is due to the fact that in this new
framework a retirement pension is guaranteed. The deduction Wτ from the
income is a sort of forced saving and its return is nτW . If individual 1 wants
to continues to consume the same amount co in the last period of life, it
is sufficient, given the number of children, to set a lower x. Since middle-
aged have to transfer to their old parents an amount xˆa < xa, they have a
higher income at their disposal. Anyway, this surplus is equal to Wτ and it
is perfectly offset by the deduction from the income. In addition, the return
on family is still equal to φW
f(1+2φ)
because xˆ
a+τW
f
= x
a
f
. In order to these
considerations, the optimal number of children is still equal to na. Choosing
(bˆa; xˆa; nˆa), individual 1 can consume cˆa = ca in the second period of his life
and cˆo = co in the last one.
As in the previous case, individual 1 has to be sure that, once chosen Aˆ,
individual 2 will respect that constitution. Individual 2 can follow strategy
one (keep Aˆ) or strategy two (replace Aˆ with Oˆ, which maximizes the utility
of the next generation(s)). Constitution Oˆ = (bˆo; xˆo) is such that:
(bˆo; xˆo) = argmax
{
Uˆ3
}
(bˆo; xˆo) = argmax
{
ln(b) + φ ln (w − (f + b)nˆ3 − x) + φ
2 ln (nˆ3(x+ τW ))
}
.
Hence
bˆo(nˆ3) =
w +Wτ − nˆ3f
nˆ3(1 + φ+ φ2)
, (2.36)
xˆo(nˆ3) =
φ2(w − nˆ3f)−Wτ(1 + φ)
1 + φ+ φ2
.
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In his/her turn, individual 3 will determine nˆ3 such that
nˆ3 = argmax {U3} = argmax
{
ln
(
w − (f + bˆo)nˆ− xˆo
)
+ φ ln (nˆ(xˆo + τW ))
}
.
We have that
nˆ3 = φ
w +Wτ
f(1 + 2φ)
= W
φ
f(1 + 2φ)
, (2.37)
where nˆ3 is the optimal number of children when Oˆ is the current family
constitution, hence nˆ3 = nˆ
o. Substituting the value of nˆ3 in equation (2.36),
we get:
Proposition 7 The Pareto Optimum family constitution Oˆ = (bˆo; xˆo) that
maximizes the life time utility flow of any generation is given by
bˆo =
f(1 + φ)
φ(1 + φ+ φ2)
, (2.38)
xˆo = W
(1 + φ)φ2 − τ (1 + 3φ+ 3φ2 + 2φ3)
(1 + φ+ φ2) (1 + 2φ)
.
Comparing constitution Oˆ to constitution O (given by Proposition 2), we
have that
bo = bˆo
no = nˆo,
while
Xˆo = xo − xˆo = Wτ > 0.
Given (bˆo; xˆo), for individual 2 the optimal number of children is
nˆ2 = argmax {U2}
nˆ2 = argmax
{
ln
(
w − (f + bˆo)n2 − 0
)
+ φ ln (n2(xˆ
o + τW ))
}
.
Since w = W (1− τ),
nˆ2 = (1− τ)Wφ
2 (1 + φ+ φ
2)
f(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)(1 + φ)
. (2.39)
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If individual 2 honours constitution Aˆ, his/her pay-off is given by:
aˆ = ln
(
w − (f + bˆa)nˆa − xˆa
)
+ φ ln (nˆa(xˆa + τW )) (2.40)
aˆ = ln
(
W
1 + 2φ
)
+ φ ln
(
φ2W 2
f(1 + 2φ)2
)
.
If individual 2 changes Aˆ with Oˆ, he/she gets a pay-off equal to:
hˆ = ln
(
w − (f + bˆo)nˆ2 − 0
)
+ φ ln (nˆ2(xˆ
o + τW )) (2.41)
hˆ = ln
(
W
1− τ
1 + φ
)
+ φ ln
(
(1− τ)W 2φ4
f(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)(1 + 2φ)
)
.
If we compute the difference y between the payoffs, we obtain:
y = aˆ− hˆ = ln
(
(1 + φ)
(1− τ)(1 + 2φ)
)
+ φ ln
(
(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)
(1− τ)φ2(1 + 2φ)
)
. (2.42)
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Figure 2.4: Difference between the Pay-off aˆ and the Pay-off hˆ
Figure (2.4) shows that the difference y = aˆ− hˆ is always above the plane
of the all values y = 0, so
aˆ− hˆ > 0.
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It means that for individual 2 it is still profitable to keep Aˆ. Individual 1
knows that and he decides to introduce Aˆ. Therefore, even when we introduce
the government and a retirement system, we get the same conclusions as
before: if the return on family (that now is equal to x+τW
f+b
) is higher than
the return on saving, constitution Aˆ is negotiation-proof.
Among social transfers, we can also consider a state benefit c to the
parents for each child. The net cost per child is now equal to k = f − c,
where it is assumed that c < f . We obtain the same results as before, with
the difference that we have k instead of f . The return on family is equal to
x+τW
k+b
and not to x+τW
f+b
. Since k < f , when we introduce a social benefit per
child, investment on family becomes more “profitable”. As a consequence,
the interest rateRs necessary to lead individuals to smooth their consumption
through capital markets and not through their family is higher. Apart from
that, we obtain the same results. The difference between the two payoffs is
still given by equation (2.42), so constitution A is still negotiation-proof and
individual 1 decide to introduce that constitution. We refer to the appendix
for a more detailed analysis of that case.
2.5.2 Subsistence Levels of Consumption
Until now, following Cigno (1993, 2001), we have assumed that there is a
subsistence level of consumption in the first period of life, equal to f , but
that there are no such constraints in the second and in the last period of life.
In this subsection we assume that individuals have to secure for themselves a
subsistence level of consumption z during adulthood and a subsistence level
of consumption v in the old age. It is not a mere analytical exercise, since the
threshold level of subsistence plays a significant role in theories concerning
fertility and growth (in particular, we remind that, until the subsistence
consumption constraint is binding, the economy converges to the Malthusian
regime). Also in our model, we will show that individuals’ behavior change
when we introduce subsistence levels of consumption.
In this new framework, individuals decide to save only if Rs > Rf and if
Rs is such that it can guarantee a level of consumption at least equal to v in
the last period of life. For simplicity, we assume that the return on family is
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higher than the return on saving and we focus on the choices concerning the
family constitution and the number of children.
We refer to the appendix for an analytical development of the case. Here,
we remind that individuals’ behavior is determined by the same mechanism
as before, expect that in this case intergenerational transfer have to set a
further condition, given by the subsistence consumption.
Individual 1 would be interested in the family constitution A˜ that maxi-
mizes his/her utility, subject to the following subsistence consumption con-
straint:
(c˜a) =W − (f + b)n˜− x− s˜ ≥ z, (2.43)
(c˜o) = xn˜+ s˜Rs ≥ v.
We obtain that:
Proposition 8 The family constitution A˜ = (b˜a; x˜a) which maximizes the
utility of any adult individual and the optimal number of children when A˜ is
the current constitution are given by:
b˜a = 0, (2.44)
x˜a =
φ(W − z) +H
2(1 + 2φ)
,
n˜a =
φ(W − z) +H
2f(1 + 2φ)
,
where
H =
√
φ2(W − z)2 + 4fv(1 + 2φ). (2.45)
As before, individual 1 has to be sure that his/her offspring will honour
that constitution. Individual 2 can keep A˜ or introduce a new constitution
O˜ = (b˜o; x˜o) which maximizes the utility of his/her children, taking into
consideration the subsistence constraint in any period of their life.
Proposition 9 The family constitution O˜ = (b˜o; x˜o) which maximizes the
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life time utility flow of any generation is given by
b˜o = (1 + φ)
(W − z)(H − φ(W − z))− 4fv
2v(1 + φ+ φ2)
, (2.46)
x˜o =
H(1 + 3φ+ φ2)− φ(W − z) (1 + φ− φ2)
2(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
.
If individual 2 decides to introduce O˜, his/her optimal number of children
will be n˜2. Keeping A˜, individual 2 gets a pay-off equal to:
a˜ = ln ((c˜a)a) + φ ln ((c˜o)a) (2.47)
a˜ = ln
(
W − (f + b˜a)n˜a − x˜a
)
+ φ ln (x˜an˜a) ,
whereas, if he/she introduces O˜, he/she gets:
h˜ = ln ((c˜a)o) + φ ln ((c˜o)o) (2.48)
h˜ = ln
(
W − (f + b˜o)n˜2 − 0
)
+ φ ln(x˜on˜2).
Contrary to the previous cases, the difference (a˜ − h˜) depends on more
than two parameters. In particular, (a˜ − h˜) depends on all the parameters
involved in the model. As a consequence, it is not longer possible to study
the difference between the two payoffs through a two-dimensions or a three-
dimensions plot. In order to study the sign of (a˜ − h˜), we normalize the
wage W to 1 and we suppose that f = v = z. Furthermore, since W =
1, we formulate the reasonable hypothesis according to which the levels of
subsistence are included between 0 and 0.2. Figure (2.5) shows that the
difference Y = a˜ − h˜ is not always above the plane where a˜ − h˜ = 0. In
conclusion, the difference between the two payoffs changes its sign in the
area where it is defined, according to the value of φ and of f = v = z. As a
consequence, we cannot say anymore that individual 2 will keep A˜. In other
words, in this new framework the family constitution which maximizes the
utility of any adult individual is not always negotiation-proof.
2.5.3 The Model with Human Capital
We now consider the last extension to the first specifications of the model
(Sections 2.3 and 2.4), that is the case in which it is possible to invest in
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human capital during childhood. In particular, we consider the case in which
middle-aged parents decide how much to invest in the education of their
children, and not the case where each individual decides how much to invest
in his/her own human capital. We suppose that the wage perceived by adult
individuals is an increasing function in the level of their own human capital.
Furthermore, the level of human capital is an increasing function in the level
of education acquired in the first period of life. Hence, the income of the
representative individual that is adult at period t is equal to:
It =Wt(ht(et)), (2.49)
where Wt is the wage per efficiency unit, ht is the number of efficiency units
and et is the level of education acquired by the worker at period t− 1.
As it was previously shown and for simplicity, we assume that the wage
Wt is constant from generation to generation (Wt = Wt+1 = W ) and that
the above function takes a multiplicative form. Then
It =Wht(et).
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In addition, with regard to the function h(e), we assume that:
h(e) = eβ, with 0 < β < 1. (2.50)
Hence
he = βe
β−1 > 0, (2.51)
hee = β(β − 1)e
β−2 < 0,
h(0) = 0,
where β measures the return on education. So we have
It = W (et)
β . (2.52)
In this new framework, if the amount b transferred from parents to chil-
dren is invested in education and it is indicated with e, the family consti-
tution is the couple of intergenerational transfers (e;x). It is assumed that
the accumulation of human capital needs the input “time”. Education may
be provided by parents or by the school system. In the first case, education
involves, for parents, an opportunity cost equal to Itet+1 (where et+1 is the
level of education invested in each child who will be an adult at period t+1).
In the second case, if we assume that individuals of the same generation are
homogeneous, the wage that parents have to pay to the teachers is still Itet+1.
As a consequence, in both the cases, the education cost for n children is equal
to et+1Itn = et+1W (et)
β n.
For simplicity, we write also the rearing cost f and the transfer x as time
costs. Hence, the consumption for any adult individual of generation t is
given by:
(c˘a)t = It(1− (f + et+1)n− x). (2.53)
We can expect that in this case, even though individuals are still non-
altruistic, parents transfer a positive amount to their children in order to in-
vest in their education (et+1 > 0), because in this way their children will per-
ceive a higher income, and so they will transfer a higher xIt+1 = xW (et+1)
β
to their old-aged parents.
Consider individual 1, who is middle-aged at period t. His/her income
is equal to W (et)
β and it is given at date t. He/she has to decide how
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many children to conceive (n), how much to invest in their education (et+1)
and how much to transfer to his/her old-aged parent (x). The subscript
t and t + 1 for e are introduced to distinguish the level of education of
individual 1 (et) and the level of education of individual 2 (et+1). We should
also use the subscript t for n and x, too. It has never been necessary in
order to two considerations. First of all, all variables which appeared in the
utility function of individual i referred to individual i, so it has never been
necessary to use any subscript. On the contrary, now, in the utility function
of individual 1, we have a level of education, et, which refers to individual
1 and a level of education, et+1, which refers to individual 2. Secondly,
we are in a static context and all individuals face the same maximization
problem where all the parameters assume the same values from generation to
generation, thus the solutions maintain the same value, too. In other words,
more properly, constitution A (constitution O) does not prescribe the values
(ba;xa) ((bo;xo)), but the general rule “maximize your utility” (“maximize
the utility of your offspring”). The point is that all the parameters (W , f ,
z and v) are constant from generation to generation, so the values (bat ;x
a
t )
((bot ;x
o
t )) are constant, too. For this reason, we can indicate them with
(ba;na) ((bo;xo)). As a consequence, also nat and n
o
t associated to A and O
are constant, thus it has been sufficient to call them simply na and no. We
will show that it is true also in this new specification of the model.
For simplicity, we indicate the level of education of individual 1 with e1
and the level of education of individual 2 with e2. In addition, it is assumed
that there is no possibility of saving.
We report individuals’ decision-making process here and not in the ap-
pendix because this allows us to notice step by step the elements in common
and the differences between the case with human capital and the case without
human capital.
The utility function of individual 1 is
U˘1 = ln (I1(1− (f + e2)n− x)) + φ ln(xI2n), (2.54)
where I1 is the income perceived by individual 1 and I2 is the future income
of individual 2. The former is equal to W (e1)
β and it is given at period t,
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the latter depends on e2 and it is equal to W (e2)
β, hence
U˘1 = ln
(
W (e1)
β(1− (f + e2)n− x)
)
+ φ ln(xW (e2)
βn). (2.55)
Individual 1 would choice the constitution A˘ = (e˘a2; x˘
a) and the number of
children n˘a such that maximize U1. We get the following result:
Proposition 10 The family constitution A˘ = (e˘a2; x˘
a) which maximizes the
utility of any individual and the optimal number of children when A˘ is the
current constitution are given by
e˘a2 = e˘
a =
βf
1− β
, (2.56)
x˘a =
φ
1 + 2φ
,
n˘a =
φ(1− β)
f(1 + 2φ)
.
We can notice that the general rule “maximize your utility” involves a
constant investment e˘a in education. It means that, also in this new speci-
fication of the model, the intergenerational transfers prescribed by the same
family constitution (in this case constitution A˘) have the same constant val-
ues from generation to generation.
Before introducing this constitution, individual 1 has to be sure that in-
dividual 2 will maintain it. Individual 2 has two possible strategies: honour
A˘ or replace A˘ with O˘ = (e˘o; x˘o), which is the Pareto optimal family consti-
tution for the next generation(s). In this case the optimal number of children
for individual 2 will be n˘2.
If individual 2 follows strategy one, he/she continues to maximize his/her
own utility, regardless of the welfare of individual 3, hence he/she choices
(e˘a3; x˘
a; n˘a) such that
(e˘a3; x˘
a; n˘a) = argmax
{
U˘2
}
(e˘a3; x˘
a; n˘a) = argmax
{
ln
(
W (e2)
β(1− (f + e3)n− x)
)
+ φ ln(xW (e3)
βn)
}
,
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where e2 is given and equal to e˘
a
2. As explained above, we have again that
e˘a3 is constant and equal to e˘
a, indeed:
e˘a3 = e˘
a =
βf
1− β
,
x˘a =
φ
1 + 2φ
,
n˘a =
φ(1− β)
f(1 + 2φ)
.
If individual 2 follows strategy two, he/she has to maximize the utility of
individual 3, thus he/she has to introduce the couple (e˘o3; x˘
o) such that
(e˘o3; x˘
o) = argmax {U3}
(e˘o3; x˘
o) = argmax {ln (I3(1− (f + e4)n˘3 − x
o)) + φ ln (I4x
on˘3)} .
Notice that in the model with human capital, the optimization of the life
utility flow does not take into consideration the consumption during child-
hood because the amount e does not affect cc, but the income in the second
period of life.
In this maximization problem, n˘3 is the number of children of individual 3
and I3 = W (e3)
β is his/her income. Contrary to what we saw in the previous
maximization, the income perceived by the adult individual, I3, is not given,
but it must be maximized with respect to the level of education.
In addition, and as explained previously, if O is introduced, individual 3
is obliged to honour this constitution, so e4 (the level of education invested
in education by individual 3 for individual 4) is equal to e3 and I4 = I3.
Hence,
(e˘o; x˘o) = argmax
{
ln
(
W (eo)β(1− (f + eo)n˘3 − x
o)
)
+ φ ln
(
W (eo)βxon˘3
)}
.
We obtain:
e˘o(n˘3) =
(1− n˘3f)β
n˘3(1 + β)
, (2.57)
x˘o(n˘3) =
φ(1− n˘3f)
(1 + β)(1 + φ)
.
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Individual 3 determines the optimal number of children n˘3 solving the fol-
lowing problem:
(n˘3) = argmax {U3} = argmax {ln ((c˘a)3) + φ ln ((c˘o)3)} ,
where (c˘a)3 and (c˘o)3 are the levels of consumption in the middle age and in
the old age for individual 3, respectively. They are equal to:
(c˘a)3 = I3(1− (f + e˘
o)n˘3 − x˘
o),
(c˘o)3 = x˘
oI4n˘3.
When individual 3 solves this problem, he/she is an adult and I3 is given.
On the other hand, I3 is a function of e˘
o, since I3 = W (e˘
o)β. Finally, we
already know that I4 = I3. Hence
(c˘a)3 = W (e˘
o)β(1− (f + e˘o)n˘3 − x˘
o),
(c˘o)3 = x˘
oW (e˘o)βn˘3.
Substituting the values of e˘o and x˘o from equation (2.57), we get that:
(ca)3 = W
(
(1− n˘3f)β
n˘3(1 + β)
)β (
1− n˘3f
(1 + β)(1 + φ)
)
,
(co)3 =
φ(1− n˘3f)
(1 + β)(1 + φ)
W
(
(1− n˘3f)β
n˘3(1 + β)
)β
n˘3.
Maximizing U˘3 with respect to n˘3, we obtain
n˘3 =
φ− β − βφ
f(1 + 2φ)
.
It must be
φ− β − βφ > 0 that is, 0 < β <
φ
1 + φ
,
where φ
1+φ
< 1.
In conclusion we get:
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Proposition 11 The Pareto Optimum constitution O˘ = (e˘o; x˘o) that maxi-
mize the life time utility flow of any generation is given by
e˘o =
fβ(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
, (2.58)
x˘o =
φ
1 + 2φ
.
We have to stress that:
• also the general rule “maximize the utility of your offspring” involves
a couple of intergenerational transfers O˘ = (e˘o; x˘o) which are constant
over time,
• the constitution (e˘o; x˘o) and n˘o exist only for β < φ
1+φ
. It means that
for β > φ
1+φ
individual 2 is obliged to keep A.
If individual 2 decides to introduce O, his/her optimal number of children
is given by
n˘2 = argmax {U2} = argmax {ln (c˘a)2 + φ ln (c˘o)2} ,
where
(c˘a)2 = I2(1− (f + e˘
o)n˘2 − 0),
(c˘o)2 = x˘
oI3n˘2.
Since individual 1 invested e˘a in the education of individual 2, we have that
I2 = W (e˘
a)β = W
(
βf
1− β
)β
.
If individual 2 introduces O and he/she invests e˘o in the education of indi-
vidual 3, I3 is equal to:
I3 = (I3)o = W (e˘
o)β = W
(
fβ(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
)β
.
Hence
(c˘a)2 = W
(
βf
1− β
)β (
1−
(
f +
fβ(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
)
n˘2
)
(c˘o)2 =
φ
1 + 2φ
W
(
fβ(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
)β
n˘2.
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Maximizing U˘2 with respect to n˘2, we obtain:
n˘2 =
φ− β − βφ
f(1 + φ)
. (2.59)
Let a˘ be the pay-off which individual 2 obtains following strategy one
(keeping A˘), and h˘ the pay-off which individual 2 gets following strategy two
(changing A˘ with O˘).
We have that:
a˘ = ln ((c˘a)a) + φ ln((c˘o)a)
h˘ = ln ((c˘a)h) + φ ln((c˘o)h) ,
where
(c˘a)a = I2 (1− (f + e˘
a)n˘a − x˘a) ,
(c˘a)h = I2 (1− (f + e˘
o)n˘2 − 0) ,
(c˘o)a = x˘
a (I3)a n˘
a,
(c˘o)h = x˘
o (I3)o n˘2.
Notice that, in c˘a, the income of individual 2 is the same following strategy
one or strategy two because in both the cases individual 2 inherits A˘ from
individual 1. This means that individual 1 invested e˘a in the education of
individual 2, so we have that I2 = W (e˘
a)β = W
(
βf
1−β
)β
. Concerning c˘o,
individual 2 will receive a share of the income of individual 3. If individual
2 keeps A, he/she invests e˘a in the education of individual 3 and the income
of individual 3 is equal to:
(I3)a = W (e˘
a)β = W
(
βf
1− β
)β
.
On the contrary, if individual 2 introduces O˘, the income of individual 3 is
given by:
(I3)o = W (e˘
o)β = W
(
fβ(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
)β
.
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Substituting the values for I2, (I3)a, (I3)o, e˘
a, x˘a, n˘a, e˘o, x˘o and n˘2, we can
compute the payoffs a˘ and h˘ and the difference K between the two.
K = (a˘− h˘) = ln
(
1 + φ
1 + 2φ
)
+ φ ln
(
φ
1 + 2φ
(
(1− β)(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
)1−β)
,
with 0 < β < φ
1+φ
< 1.
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Figure 2.6: Difference K as a Function of β and φ
Figure (2.6) shows that, for β < φ
1+φ
, the sign of the difference (a˘− h˘) is
not always the same. Contrary to the case without human capital (Section
2.3 and 2.4), where keeping A is always the first best, when we introduce the
possibility of investing in human capital, sometimes it is optimal to maintain
A and sometimes it is optimal to introduce O˘, according to the values of φ
and β.
We can compute
∂
(
a˘− h˘
)
∂β
= φ
(
φ− β − βφ
(φ(1− β)− β)2
− ln
(
(1− β)(1 + φ)
φ− β − βφ
))
> 0.
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Figure 2.7: Sign of the Derivative of K
Figure (2.7) shows that
∂(a˘−h˘)
∂β
> 0. It means that, when the return on
education increases, it becomes more and more profitable to keep constitution
A˘. Obviously, since β measures the return on education, for any constitution
(A˘ or O˘), the number of children is a negative function of the return on
education
(
∂n
∂β
< 0 for n = n˘a; n˘o; n˘2
)
, whereas the expenditure in education
is a positive function of β
(
∂e
∂β
> 0 for e = e˘a; e˘o
)
. Furthermore we have that
n˘a > n˘o > n˘2,
e˘a < e˘o,
x˘a = x˘o.
Therefore, constitution A˘ prescribes a higher number of children, but a lower
investment in education, and
∂ (n˘a − n˘o)
∂β
=
1
f(1 + 2φ)
> 0
∂ (e˘a − e˘o)
∂β
= −f
(φ− β − βφ) + β (1 + φ) (1− β)
(φ− β − βφ)2(1− β)2
< 0.
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In conclusion, in this new framework we cannot assert that constitution A
is always negotiation-proof, since the difference between the payoffs (a˘− h˘)
is not always positive. Anyway, as β (the return on education) increases,
constitution A˘ becomes more and more profitable relative to constitution
O˘. For β > φ
1+φ
, constitution (e˘o; x˘o) and n˘o do not exist. It means that,
for β > φ
1+φ
, constitution A is negotiation-proof for sure. Constitution A˘
involves a higher number of children than O˘ and the difference between n˘a
and n˘o increases with β. On the other hand, A˘ involves a lower expenditure
in education than O˘ and the difference between e˘a and e˘o decreases with β.
In other words, as the return on education rises, it becomes more and more
profitable to pick (e˘; x˘; n˘) such that e˘ is low (because the accumulation of
human capital is guaranteed by a high level of β) and n˘ is high in order to
get a high gain from family, given by x˘I2(e˘)
f+e˘I1
n.
It is interesting to compare the fertility decisions in a context without
human capital to the fertility decisions in a context with human capital.
If in Section 2.3 and 2.4 we express all costs as time costs, we have that
na = φ
f(1+2φ)
and
N˘ = n˘a − na =
−φβ
f (1 + 2φ)
,
x˘a = xa,
e > b = 0⇔ β > 0.
If the return to human capital is equal to zero, the possibility of investing in
education does not give any additional motivation (in comparison to the case
without human capital) to conceive children, so n˘a = na. If β is positive,
parents decide to have fewer children (n˘a < na), but they invest part of their
income in their education (e > 0), whereas, in the first specification of the
model, they transfer b = 0 to their children.
As in the case without human capital, we now analyze what happens if
individuals have access to capital market and they can save at the interest
rate Rs = 1 + r − δ.
The new utility function of individual 1 is given by
U`1 = ln (I1(1− (f + e2)n− x− s)) + φ ln (I2xn+ I1sRs) , (2.60)
158 A Non-Altruistic Fertility Model
where s is the share of income invested in saving, I1 = W (e1)
β is given, e2
is the amount spent in the education of individual 2 by individual 1, and
I2 = W (e2)
β. Then:
U`1 = ln
(
W (e1)
β(1− (f + e2)n− x− s)
)
+ φ ln
(
W (e2)
βxn+W (e1)sRs
)
.
Regardless of the family constitution, individual 1 is interested in finding the
optimal level of saving s` and the optimal number of children n`. We obtain
the following solution:
Proposition 12
if Rs >
(e2)
βx
(f + e2)(e1)β
≡ Rf ⇒ n` = 0 and s` =
φ (W − x)
(1 + φ)
=
φW
1 + φ
, (2.61)
If Rs >
(e2)
βx
(f + e2)(e1)β
≡ Rf ⇒ n` =
φ(1− x)
(f + b)(1 + φ)
and s` = 0.
The threshold value (e2)
βx
(f+e2)(e1)β
= (e2)
βWx
(f+e2)(e1)βW
still represents the return
on family, R`f , for individual 1. Indeed, the denominator (f + e2)(e1)
βW is
the opportunity cost for individual 1 to rear and to educate individual 2, and
the numerator (e2)
βWx is the amount that individual 1 will have back in
his/her old age from individual 2.
All in all, we come to the same conclusions as before: individual 1 invests
in saving only if the return on that is higher that the return on family, given
by R`f =
(e2)βx
(f+e2)(e1)β
. In this case x = 0 and s` = φ
(1+φ)
, that is the same amount
saved when it is not possible to invest in education and the condition Rs > Rf
is set. Supposing that Rs is constant and that individual 1 knows that for
individual 2 investing in the family will also be more profitable than investing
in saving, individual 1 introduces A` or O˘ depending on the sign of (a˘− h˘).
2.6 Dynamic Problems
In this work, we have adopted a statical approach. It is a statical approach
according to two considerations.
First of all, we are interested in finding a Nash equilibrium and a family
constitution which is kept and respected from generation to generation. We
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explained why the possible shift from constitution A to constitution O is
immediate and immediately carried out by generation 2. Secondly, this is a
static approach because we formulated two important hypotheses:
1. all the parameters involved in the model are constant,
2. the decisional environment at period t only depend on variables referred
to period t.
These two hypotheses bring about a significant consequence: the solu-
tions involved by any family constitution are constant from generation to
generation. Anyway, we have to remind that this result is valid only under
the hypotheses we formulated.
Indeed, as explained previously, constitution A does not involve the values
(ba;xa;na), nor constitution O involves the values (bo;xo;no). Constitution
A just prescribes the general rule “maximize your utility, without taking
care of the next generations” and constitution O just prescribes the general
rule “maximize the utility of your offspring”. The assumption that all the
parameters (W , f , v, z, β) are constant from generation to generation let
us to conclude that all the individuals which look for constitution A or O
will face the same optimization problem with the same parameters, thus we
find constant solutions. It means that the solutions (bat ;x
a
t ) and (b
o
t ;x
o
t ) are
the same from generation to generation and they do not depend on variables
referred to a particular period, but on constants. As a consequence, we can
indicate them with (ba;xa) and (bo;xo). The same is true for the optimal
number of children n.
The fact that the intergenerational transfers and the number of children
involved by the same family constitution are constant over time does not
occur anymore if we abandon one of the two hypotheses above (constant
parameters and independence between different periods).
Consider the first specification of the model, that is the simplest one.
To start with, we remove the first hypothesis concerning the immutability
of the parameters involved in the model. For instance, we assume that the
income labour varies over time. When individual 2 has to decide wether
to keep the general rule A or to introduce the general rule O, he has to
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determine the couple (bo2;x
o
2) which maximizes U3. Hence we have that
(bo2;x
o
2) = argmax {U3}
(bo2;x
o
2) = argmax
{
ln(f + bo2) + φ ln(W3 − (f + b
o
3)n3 − x
o
2) + φ
2 ln(xo3n3)
}
,
where W3 is the labour income of individual 3, b
o
2 is the amount transferred
from individual 2 to individual 3 and xo2 is the amount transferred by indi-
vidual 3 to individual 2 when he/she becomes old. In the same way, bo3 is
the amount that individual 3 will have to transfer to each of his/her children
and xo3 the amount the individual 3 will receive in the last period of his/her
life form each of his/her children. We have now to use the subscript 2 to
indicate the intergenerational transfers that individual 2 sets for individual 3
and the subscript 3 to indicate the couple (bo3;x
o
3) which individual 3 will set
for individual 4. Obviously, the two couples of intergenerational transfers are
strictly connected: they are the solution of the same maximization problem,
with the difference that the parameters involved in the maximization vary
over time. It means that individual 2 does not fix the highest possible value
of bo2 in order to maximize U3 because, in this case, individual 3 should trans-
fer the highest possible value of bo4 to individual 4 and it would not maximize
U3. Individual 2 sets b
o
2 taking in consideration that b
o
3 will have the same
functional form of bo2 , indeed
(bo3;x
o
3) = argmax
{
ln(f + bo3) + φ ln(W4 − (f + b
o
4)n4 − x
o
3) + φ
2 ln(xo4n3)
}
,
where W4 is the wage of individual 4.
In this new context we have that the intergenerational transfers and the
optimal number of children keep the same functional form over time because
they are generated by the application of the same general rule, but they
assume different values because they depend on different values of Wt.
Individual 2 will transfer to individual 3 the amount bo2 =
W2−fn3
n3(1+φ+φ2)
and
he/she will receive from individual 3 the amount xo2 =
φ2(W3−fn3)
1+φ+φ2
. Individual
3 will transfer to individual 4 the amount bo3 =
W3−fn4
n4(1+φ+φ2)
and he/she will re-
ceive from him/her the amount xo3 =
φ2(W4−fn4)
1+φ+φ2
. Individual 3 will determine
the optimal number of children n3 such that
n3 = argmax {ln(W3 − (f + b
o
3)n3 − x
o
2) + φ ln(x
o
3n3)} .
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We obtain
n3 =
W3φn4
W3 + fφn4
.
We can compute n4 as function of n5 and so on.
In conclusion, we have a forward looking recursive problem, which we
cannot solve without making some assumptions. In this context, individual
2 cannot compute the pay-off h without making some assumption on the
future values of the wage.
The same problem arises if we remove the second hypothesis and we sup-
pose that the control variables at period t depend on other variables refereed
to period t−1. Consider, for instance, a different decisional framework where
adult brothers are obliged to split the necessary cost in order to guarantee
the subsistence level of consumption v of their old parents. In addition to
that, they can give to their old parents an extra amount x. In this case, the
budget constraint of each individual depend on the number of the brothers.
The utility function of individual 1 becomes
U1 = ln
(
W − (f + b1)n1 −
v
n0
− x0
)
+ φ ln
((
v
n1
+ x1
)
n1
)
,
where n0 is the number of children of individual 0, that is the number of
brothers for individual 1.
The optimal number of children for individual 1, the optimal amount b1
which he/she has to transfer to his/her children and the optimal amount
x0 which he/she has to transfer to his/her old parent (individual 0), depend
on his/her budget constraint, thus they depend on the number of the brothers
(n0). The amounts transferred by individual 2 to individual 3 (b2) and to
individual 1 (x1) will depend on n1. As a consequence, they will be different,
in general, from b1 and x0.
Given the general rule A “maximize your utility”, the values that respect
this rule for individual 1 are given by (ba1;x
a
0;n
a
1). The values that respect
the same general rule A for individual 2 are given by (ba2;x
a
1;n
a
2). In this
new context, it is not possible any more to assume that (ba2;x
a
1;n
a
2) are equal
to (ba1;x
a
0;n
a
1).
In conclusion, when we introduce a dynamic approach, we find that the
same general family constitution gives solutions which are numerically dif-
ferent from generation to generation. It rises some difficulties concerning the
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computation of the pay-off given by a certain strategy (like in the case where
Wt changes over time) or the computation of the solution itself (like in the
case of a contract between brothers that oblige them to split the subsistence
level of consumption of their parents).
In this context, we may decide to analyze and to focus on the Equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the two hypotheses we introduced at the beginning of the
section are valid again. Indeed, in equilibrium we have that Wt = Wt+1
and all individuals choose to have the same number of children, that is,
all individuals have the same number of brothers. Anyway, the problems
concerning the analysis of the model when it is not in equilibrium still survive.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Even if we have adopted the same hypotheses and the same framework set
by Cigno (1993, 2001), we have come to different conclusions. According to
Cigno, individuals decide to introduce and to keep constitution O, which is
the one that guarantees an efficient allocation of consumption across gener-
ations and an above-subsistence transfer from adults to young children 9.
We agree with the fact that constitution O is negotiation-proof and, once
introduced, it will never be changed. However, it is true by definition because
O maximizes the utility of next generations. As a consequence, it is not pos-
sible to change O with another family constitution without being punished.
The point is that this is not sufficient to say that no other constitutions,
Pareto dominated, may be negotiation-proof. Indeed, we showed that O is
never introduced because individuals prefer to keep A, that, for this reason,
is negotiation-proof, too.
Cigno writes that a family constitution is negotiation-proof if it is Pareto
optimal for the next generations, and it comes from the rules of the contract
between different generations (see the norm concerning the possibility to
change the current family constitution). We agree with this consideration,
but we showed that a family constitution which is not a Pareto Optimum can
be negotiation-proof, such as constitution A. In other words, to be Pareto
9Anyway, Cigno does not prove that constitution O is the only one that set these
conditions.
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dominant is a sufficient condition, but it is not a necessary one. When Cigno
deals with the issue of picking a constitution, he considers the possibility
to change the previous one and he writes that the new adult generation at
period t does not take any notice if:
..if (i) the old constitution satisfies the Nash equilibrium condi-
tion, and if (ii) no other constitution satisfying the Nash equilib-
rium condition makes generations t, t + 1, t + 2,...better-off (let
us to call this first part of proposition “condition A”). In other
words, a constitution is negotiation-proof if, in addition to being
a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, it is not Pareto-dominated
by any other constitution which is itself a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium [...]. A family constitution is then negotiation-proof
if it maximizes the lifetime utility of the representative individ-
ual (let us to call this second part of proposition “condition B”).
(Cigno (2006), p. 15-16)
For Cigno, these two conditions are equivalent. Since constitution A does
not set the condition B, Cigno concludes that A is not negotiation-proof.
The point is that the two conditions are not equivalent. Condition B tells
us that a family constitution that maximizes the lifetime utility of the repre-
sentative individual is negotiation-proof. It is true, but it is not necessary to
maximize the lifetime utility of the representative individual in order to be
negotiation-proof. Constitution O maximizes the lifetime utility of the rep-
resentative individual and it is negotiation-proof because it is not possible to
change O with another family constitution without being punished. On the
other hand, we proved that it exists a family constitution (constitution A)
that does not maximize the lifetime utility of the representative individual,
but that is negotiation-proof.
The first condition is quite different form the second one. Condition A
requires that no other constitution makes generation t+1, t+2... better-off,
but also that no other constitution makes generation t better-off. Constitu-
tion O does not set that condition. Indeed, we proved that, at date t = 2,
constitution O makes the future generations (3, 4...) better of, but it does
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not make generation 2 better-off, since for individual 2 it is more profitable
to keep A.
Probably Cigno tacitly assumes that the opportunity for individual 2
to change A and to transfer x = 0 to individual 1 is sufficient to make
profitable to change constitution (in other words, for Cigno the fact that x
is equal to 0 for individual 2 is sufficient to say that the difference between
the payoffs (h − a) is positive). Hence, for Cigno at date t generation t can
find a new constitution that is Pareto undominated for generation t, too. On
the contrary, the fact that individual 2 transfers 0 to individual 1 does not
compensate the fact that individual 2 has to transfer bo > ba to individual
3 and that he will receive xo < xa in the last period of his life, so that
individual 2 suffers a loss of utility changing A with O (the difference (h−a)
is negative).
After presenting the simplest case (Section 2.3), we have considered some
changes in the social and economic environment in order to study their ef-
fects on the individuals’ decisions concerning fertility and intergenerational
transfers. The opportunity of an alternative investment (Section 2.4) changes
fertility decisions (and fertility falls to 0) only if the alternative investment
offers a higher return in comparison to the return on family. If we introduce
social transfers (Section 2.5.1), the general rule “maximize your utility, with-
out taking into consideration your offspring” is still negotiation-proof. On
the contrary, if we consider a subsistence level of consumption also in the
second and in the third period of life (Section 2.5.2) or the possibility of in-
vesting in education (Section 2.5.3), constitution A is not always negotiation
true. In these case, individuals decide to follow constitution A or constitu-
tion O (a ≶ h) depending on the levels of subsistence and on the return to
human capital.
The case with human capital shows that also non-altruistic parents are
led to invest in the education of their children. In this case, they invest
in the quality of their children not for love, but only to obtain a higher
gain from their family. The non altruistic model confirms the traditional
trade-off between quantity and quality of children: as the return to human
capital rises, any constitution (A or O) prescribes to decrease the number
of children and to increase the investment in their education. The family
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constitution that maximizes the utility of any adult individual (A) involves a
higher number of children and a lower level of investment in their education
in comparison to the family constitution that maximize the life time utility
flow of the children (O). As the return to human capital rises, constitution A
is more and more profitable with respect to constitution O. For sufficiently
high level of the return on education (β > φ
1+φ
) the pay-off given by A is for
sure higher than the pay-off given by O. As a consequence, in this case we
can assert that A is negotiation-proof for sure.
Finally, we have stressed the fact that we have adopted a statical approach
and that this assumption involves some significant simplifications. If we
abandon the statical framework, some important questions arise.
 
Chapter 3
Inequality, Parental Altruism
and Economic Growth
3.1 Introduction
The second chapter of this essay presented a microeconomic model on fer-
tility and intergenerational transfers. It considered the case of non-altruistic
individuals, where parents decide to have children only in order to guar-
antee for themselves an economic support in the last period of their lives,
according to the old-age security hypothesis. In addition to that, we have to
stress out that the analysis presented in the previous chapter consists in a
microeconomic model, where individual behavior does not interact with the
macroeconomic environment.
In this chapter we study a different framework, where individuals are al-
truistic and care about their children. Parental altruism may turn into a
direct monetary transfer towards the children or into an investment in their
education. In this new framework, we study the interaction between individ-
ual decisions and the macroeconomic environment: on the one hand, macroe-
conomic environment affects families’ decisions concerning the quantity and
the quality of children, on the other hand families’ decisions determine the
level and the evolution of macroeconomic variables, such as human capital
accumulation and economic growth. Within that altruistic framework, we are
interested in the investigation of the effects of income inequality on economic
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growth. We will see that these effects act through fertility and education
differentials.
In particular, we will take into consideration two types of altruism: the
case where parents care about the future wealth of their children and the
case where they take utility form transferring a positive monetary amount to
their children (altruism as joy of giving). In order to complete our analysis
in both cases of parental altruism, we will use two benchmark models.
In Section 3.2, we will briefly present how parental altruism has been
studied in the economic literature. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 study the effects
of income inequality on economic growth when fertility is endogenous and
motivated by altruistic behavior.
In particular, Section 3.3 considers the case where parental altruism is
expressed as interest and care about the future wealth of children and in-
vestment in their education. As benchmark model of altruism towards the
future wealth of the children, we will refer to the Unified Theory developed
by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor (2005). In the Unified Theory, fertil-
ity is endogenous and motivated by altruistic behavior. However, Galor and
Weil (2000) and Galor (2005) do not take into consideration income distri-
bution. As a consequence, in order to complete our analysis, we will modify
the Unified Theory introducing income inequality across individuals.
Section 3.4 considers the case where parental altruism is simply expressed
as “joy of giving”. Section 3.4.1 presents the benchmark model (Galor and
Moav (2004)) of parental altruism as joy of giving. Galor and Moav (2004)
take into consideration income inequality across individuals, but in their
analysis fertility is exogenous and constant. In order to complete our analysis,
in Section 3.4.2 we will modify the benchmark model introducing endogenous
fertility.
Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Parental Altruism
In this chapter we study parental decisions concerning quantity and quality
of children and their effect on economic growth. Our analysis is conducted
in a model characterized by two elements: a) there exists income inequality
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across parents b) altruism towards their children.
With regard to income inequality, for simplicity we will consider only two
groups of parents: the rich (R) and the poor (P ).
With regard to parental altruism, we will take into consideration two al-
truistic types of behavior: the case in which parents care about the future
wealth of their children (and thus they invest in the education of their chil-
dren) and the case in which parents get utility just in transferring a monetary
amount to their children.
In economic literature, parental altruism has been studied and described
in different ways.
The simplest way to describe parental altruism is considering children
as consumption goods, i.e. having children gives utility, such as any other
consumption goods. Let Ui be the utility function of individual i. He cares
about his own consumption, ci, and gets utility in having children, that is
Ui = u(ci;ni), (3.1)
where ∂ui
∂ni
= u′n > 0 and
∂ui
∂ci
= u′c > 0, whereas u
′′
n < 0 and u
′′
c < 0.
In addition to that, parents may care about the quality of their children.
Like the idea of “altruism”, also the concept of “quality” has been described
in different ways.
In the first models concerning that subject, the quality of children is
generally expressed by their future utility. In other words, parents care about
their own consumption, the number of children and their quality, meant as
their future level of utility (see Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973),
Becker and Barro (1988))1. In this case, we have that
Ui = u(ci;ni;Ui+1), (3.2)
where Ui+1 is the future utility of each child.
In more recent literature, the concept of quality of children has been
becoming more and more definite. In general, quality of children is meant as
the future possibility of expenditure of children, that is their future income.
1We refer to the first chapter of this essay for a more detailed analysis of the economic
literature dealing with fertility and parental altruism.
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The future income of children depends on their level of human capital, thus
on their education. In this framework, the utility function of any altruistic
parent becomes:
Ui = u(ci;ni;Wi+1(ei+1)), (3.3)
whereWi+1 is the future income of each child and ei+1 is the expenditure in his
education and human capital accumulation. Within this context, usually the
economic models consider the case where parents, caring about the number of
children and their future wealth, maximize Ui choosing the optimal number
of children ni and the optimal expenditure in their education ei+1. In other
words, usually ei+1 is a control variable referred to the parent i.
In this chapter we consider also another case, where parental altruism
towards the children’s wellbeing turns into a direct monetary transfer towards
them. In literature, this case is known as the altruistic motive bequest and
the joy of giving. The two cases (the altruistic motive bequest and the joy
of giving) are quite similar. In the first case parents care about the future
utility of their children, which depends on the monetary amount transferred
from parents to children. The preferences of parents are described by the
following utility function:
Ui = u(ci;ni;Ui+1(bi+1)), (3.4)
where bi+1 is the amount of the intergenerational transfer. Equation (3.4) is
also similar to equation (3.3). In equation (3.3) parents give for sure that
Ui+1 will depend on Wi+1 and the monetary transfer bi+1 is spent in human
capital accumulation, that is ei+1.
In the case of the joy of giving, we have that
Ui = u(ci;ni; bi+1). (3.5)
Contrary to equation (3.4), equation (3.5) involves that parents get utility
directly from transferring bi+1 to each child.
In our analysis, we are going to consider two altruistic types of behavior:
the first is the one described by equation (3.3) (altruism as investment in
education), the second is the one described by equation (3.5) (altruism as
joy of giving).
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3.3 Altruism as Investment in Education
We first consider the case in which parents are altruistic in the sense that
they care about the future wealth of each child. The wealth of each child
is given by his/her labor income, which depends on his/her level of human
capital. In its turn, the level of human capital of each child is an increasing
function of the expenditure in his/her education.
In this framework, we are interested in analyzing parental decisions con-
cerning the number of children (fertility) and the investment in their educa-
tion and how these decisions may affect the economic growth when we have
income inequality across parents (rich parents and poor parents).
In order to study the effect of income distribution on economic growth
in a context where parents care about the future wealth of children, we
refer to Unified Theory developed by Galor and Weil (2000) and by Galor
(2005) as benchmark model. However, in that model all individuals have the
same income and income distribution is not taken into consideration. As a
consequence, in order to complete our analysis we will have to modify the
benchmark model introducing income inequality.
Since the Unified Theory was widely discussed in the first chapter of this
work, in this section we only remind the main results of the Unified Theory
concerning the quantity and quality of children.
With regard to the quality of children et+1, in the Unified Theory parental
investment in the education of children depends only on the rate of techno-
logical progress. If technological progress rises slowly (gt+1 < gˆ, where gt+1
is the rate of progress in technology), children can acquire skills by their
parents and there is no reason to invest in education. On the contrary, if
technological progress grows fast (gt+1 > gˆ), parental skills become obsolete
and it is necessary to invest in the education of children. In other words, we
have that:
et+1 = e(gt+1) =
{
0 if gt+1 < gˆ
> 0 if gt+1 > gˆ
(3.6)
where e′gt+1 > 0. The point is that, according to the Unified Theory, the
expenditure in education does not depend on the level of income, but only
on gt+1. In the Evolutionary Unified Theory developed by Galor and Moav
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(2002), education depends also on βi, that is the weight that individual i gives
to the quality of children. Anyway, βi is a genetic factor and it is transmitted
from generation to generation. In other words, also in the Evolutionary
Unified Theory education is not affected by the level of income.
Since the parental expenditure in education does not depend on the level
of income, we expect that the introduction of income inequality among popu-
lation does not generate any education differential between individuals: rich
parents and poor parents invest the same amount in the education of the
children, according to the value of gt+1.
With regard to fertility, in the Unified Theory we have two optimal solu-
tions for nt, n
a and nb, according to the level of parental income (zt), that
is:
nt =
{
nb(gt+1) if zt ≥ z˜
na(gt+1;xt; et; gt) if zt < z˜
(3.7)
where z˜ is the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint
c˜ is just binding, et is the parental quality and xt is the per capita amount
of effective resources (for a more detailed presentation of the results of the
Unified Theory, we refer to the first chapter of this work). In particular we
have that:
nt =


nb ≡ β
τq+τee(gt+1)
if zt ≥ z˜
na ≡
1− c˜
zP
t
τq+τee(gt+1)
if zt < z˜
where β measures the level of parental altruism, τ q is the fraction of the
parent’s unit time endowment necessary to raise a child, regardless of the
quality, and τ e is the fraction of the parent’s unit time endowment necessary
to provide one unit of education to each child.
Given the fact that nt depends on zt, contrary to the case of human
capital accumulation, we expect that income distribution affects the size of
population. Since economic growth depends on Lt, income distribution may
affect the economic growth through the fertility rate and population size.
In conclusion, given the main framework of the benchmark model, we
expect that income inequality may affect economic growth only through the
fertility channel, but not through the process of human capital accumulation.
For simplicity, we take into consideration only two groups of individuals:
the poor (P ) and the rich (R). We assume that, within each group, individ-
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uals are homogenous (all the rich have the same income and the same is true
for the poor). Let zRt and z
P
t be the level of income for the rich and for the
poor at period t, respectively.
When we introduce income inequality in the benchmark model, a new
problem arises. The point is that in the Unified Theory the income of any
individual is given by zit ≡ wth(et+1). On the other hand, the main result of
the Unified Theory tells us that expenditure in education does not depend on
the level of income, therefore poor and rich individuals acquire the same level
of human capital, given gt+1 > gˆ. In other words, according the benchmark
model, the rich and the poor invest the same amount in their education and,
consequently, they have the same labor income (given by wth(et+1)). We can
assert that the Unified Theory gives no opportunity to income inequality to
exist. Only the fertility rate is affected by income level. As a consequence,
income inequality would generate only a fertility differential between the rich
and the poor, but their income and standard of living would be identical.
That being so, it would be impossible to identify different income classes of
individuals and to distinguish the rich form the poor.
In order to introduce income inequality in the benchmark model, we have
to consider another source of wealth, different from the labor income. In this
connection, the further problem is that the production side of the Unified
Theory only considers two production factors: the land (fixed) and human
capital. It is assumed there is non property right on land, so the rent is null.
In order to introduce income inequality and identify two income classes of
individuals, we could resort to two different schemes: a) we could introduce
property rights on land and a positive rent for the landowners. In this case
we would have two groups of individuals: the workers, with an income given
by wth(et+1), and the rich that both earn the wage wth(et+1) and collect the
rent, or b) we could introduce physical capital as third production factor. In
this case the two groups of individuals would consist in the workers and the
capitalists, that both earn the wage wth(et+1) and collect returns to physical
capital.
Both the two schemes would complicate the model. Since our purpose
is to study the effect of income inequality on economic growth, and not the
origin of income inequality, let us resort to a different scheme that considers
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an exogenous source of wealth (It) that is not related to land or physical
capital. The pros of this framework is that we do not make the model more
complicated. The cons is given by the fact that we have to accept that
exogenous source of wealth without the possibility to explain it through the
model.
According to this framework, the income of the rich is equal to:
zRt ≡ wth(et+1) + It. (3.8)
After considering the level of income of the two groups of individuals, we
have now to consider their quantity, that is the composition of population
between the rich and the poor. The variables nRt and n
P
t denote the number
of children per rich adult and per poor adult, respectively, at period t. Taking
t as the initial period, we assume that at period t there are λtLt rich adult
individuals and (1− λt)Lt poor adult individuals, where Lt is the total adult
population at period t. The number of rich and poor individuals evolves in
the time according to the fertility rates of the two dynasties, nRt and n
P
t .
We know that nit is an endogenous variable, so we should consider λt as
an endogenous variable as well. Anyway, again let us simply the model,
considering the initial fraction of rich individuals λtLt and he initial fraction
of poor individuals (1− λt)Lt as given.
Given these assumptions concerning income distribution, our aim is to
study if and how the introduction of such hypotheses affects the result of the
Unified Theory. In the Unified Theory we have that:
yt ≡
Yt
Lt
=
(
Ht
Lt
)α(
AtX
Lt
)1−α
= hαt x
1−α
t , (3.9)
so the evolution of the income per capita depends on the evolution of Ht
Lt
and AtX
Lt
. Given the fact that ht+1 depends on et+1 and gt+1, the fact that
At+1 depends on gt+1, and given that gt+1 is function of Lt and et, we can
say that, ultimately, the process of economic growth depends on the families’
decisions concerning fertility (nt) and investment in human capital (et+1).
As a consequence, we have to analyze how income inequality may affect
the economic growth through the following two channels: human capital
accumulation and population size.
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We start considering the effect of income distribution on human capital
accumulation. As we said before, parental expenditure in the education of
children does not depend on the level of income (see equation (3.6)), hence the
introduction of income inequality does not affect the “quality of population”.
On the contrary, the solution for nit depends on the level of income (see
equation (3.7)). In other words, income distribution brings about a fertility
differential between P and R, but not an educational differential. As a
consequence, income distribution may affect economic growth only through
the channel given by the population size, like we expected.
When we speak about income inequality we have to take into considera-
tion two elements: a) the initial composition of population between different
income classes (in this case P and R) and the size of each class (in this case
λtLt and (1 − λt)Lt), and b) the income level of each class (in this case z
P
t
and zRt ). Inequality increases as the differences between λt and 1 − λt and
between zP and zR become more significant. Our purpose is to investigate
if and how these elements affect the population size and, consequently, the
process of economic development. We can distinguish three different cases.
1. zRt > z
P
t > z˜. If both z
R
t and z
P
t are above z˜, the optimal solution for n
i
t
is nb both for the rich and the poor (see equation (3.7)). Since nb does
not depend on the level of income, the rich and the poor have the same
number of children. In other words, we do not have any evolutionary
advantage (i.e., a dynasty characterized by a higher fertility rate) and
the ratio between rich and poor individuals is constant over time. Given
λtLt rich parents at period t and (1 − λt)Lt poor parents at period t,
the size of population at period t+ 1 is given by
L1t+1 = λLt(1 + n
b) + (1− λ)Lt(1 + n
b)− Lt,
that is
L1t+1 = Ltn
b. (3.10)
Since nb does not depend on zit, L
1
t+1 does not depend either on the
level of income of R and P (expect for the condition zRt > z
P
t > z˜).
In addition, we notice that L1t+1 does not depend on λ. It means that
L1t+1 does not depend on the composition between R and P and on their
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income level. As a consequence, we can infer that when the subsistence
constraint is not binding both for the rich and for the poor (this scenario
corresponds to the sustained growth regime of the Unified Theory) the
process of economic development is not affected by income distribution.
2. zRt > z˜ and z
P
t < z˜. If z
R
t > z˜ and z
P
t < z˜, rich parents have n
b children
and poor parents have na children (see again equation (3.7)). In this
case we have a fertility differential. Given the same e(gt+1) for the rich
and the poor, we have that
nRt =
β
τ q + τ ee(gt+1)
≡ nb(gt+1), (3.11)
nPt =
1− c˜
zPt
τ q + τ ee(gt+1)
≡ na(gt+1; zt),
where zPt < z˜. We can compute the fertility differential
nRt − n
P
t = n
b − na =
β − 1 + c˜
zPt
τ q + τ ee
,
where z˜ ≡ c˜
1−β
and β ≡ 1− c˜
z˜
, hence
nRt − n
P
t = n
b − na =
c˜
zPt
− c˜
z˜
τ q + τ ee
.
Since zPt < z˜, then
c˜
zPt
> c˜
z˜
and nb > na, that is
nRt > n
P
t . (3.12)
Rich individuals have more children than poor individuals. It means
that rich individuals has an evolutionary advantage compared to poor
individuals. As a consequence, the ratio between rich and poor in-
dividuals is not constant over time any longer. In other words, the
rich fraction of adult population increases in the long run. The size of
population at period t+ 1 is equal to:
L2t+1 = λtLt(1 + n
R
t ) + (1− λt)Lt(1 + n
P
t )− Lt,
that is
L2t+1 = Lt(λtn
b + (1− λt)n
a). (3.13)
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We can study how L2t+1 and, consequently, the process of development
are affected by the different elements that determine income inequality,
that is the ratio λ
1−λ
and the income gap zRt − z
P
t . Since n
b > na, from
equation (3.13) we have that L2t+1 is positively affected by λt. It means
that population size and economic development are fostered when the
initial number λtLt of rich individuals is higher. On this point, we have
to remind that, as explained above, in the long run the fraction of rich
individuals among population becomes larger and larger. In order to
study how the population size is affected by the income gap zRt − z
P
t ,
we substitute the values of nb and na (that is, equation (3.11)) into
equation (3.13), and we get
L2t+1 = Lt

λtβ + (1− λt)
(
1− c˜
zPt
)
τ q + τ ee(gt+1)

 . (3.14)
Since nb does not depend on the level of zRt (except for the condition
zRt > z˜), we have that the population size L
2
t+1 is not affected by the
income level of R. On the contrary, na depends on zPt , thus L
2
t+1 de-
pends on the income level of P . In particular, L2t+1 increases as z
P
t
rises. In other words L2t+1 is a decreasing function in the difference
zRt − z
P
t . In this sense, inequality reduces population size and hinders
the process of development. On the other hand, we saw that L2t+1 is
positively affected by λt. It means that population size and economic
development are fostered when the initial number λtLt of rich individ-
uals is higher, but the income gap between the rich and the poor is low.
In corroboration of that, from equation (3.14) we can see that
∂L2t+1
∂zPt
> 0 and
∂L2t+1
∂zPt
∂λt
< 0.
3. zPt < z
R
t < z˜. If z
P
t < z
R
t < z˜ (i.e., both the dynasties are in a
Malthusian trap), both P and R have na(gt+1; zt) children. As we
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know, na is an increasing function in zit and
nRt =
1− c˜
zRt
τ q + τ ee(gt+1)
= naR, (3.15)
nPt =
1− c˜
zPt
τ q + τ ee(gt+1)
= naP ,
where
naR > n
a
P ,
since zRt > z
P
t . We get again an evolutionary advantage for the rich in-
dividuals and in the time the rich fraction of adult population increases.
Population size at period t+ 1 is now equal to:
L3t+1 = λtLt(1 + n
R
t ) + (1− λt)Lt(1 + n
P
t )− Lt,
that is
L3t+1 = Lt(λtn
a
R + (1− λt)n
a
P ). (3.16)
From equation (3.16), we can see that, since naR > n
a
P , L
3
t+1 is posi-
tively affected by λ, as in the previous case. Also in this case we have
to remind that, since naR > n
a
P , in the long run the fraction of rich
individuals among population becomes larger and larger. Substituting
the values of naR and n
a
P given by equation (3.15) into equation (3.16),
we get
L3t+1 = Lt

1− c˜zPt + λtc˜
(
zRt −z
P
t
zPt z
R
t
)
τ q + τ ee(gt+1)

 . (3.17)
Since both naR and n
a
P are increasing function in z
R
t and z
P
t , we have that
L3t+1 is positively affected by the income level both of the poor and the
rich. Given that, and supposing that the policy maker is interested in
fostering economic growth (through population growth), we wonder if
redistributional policies should favour zRt or z
P
t . On this point, we have
to take into consideration two elements: a) the marginal propensity to
conceive of the rich and the poor, that is
∂na
R
∂zRt
and
∂na
P
∂zPt
. In addition, we
have to remind that
∂na
R
∂zRt
and
∂na
P
∂zPt
are not constant, but depend on zRt
and zPt , and b) the ratio between rich individuals and poor individuals.
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If, for instance, the poor constitute the most part of population, it could
be more efficient to favour the poor, even if
∂na
R
∂zRt
>
∂na
P
∂zPt
. In other words,
in order to promote population growth and economic development,
redistributional policies should favour zRt instead of z
P
t only if:
λt
∂naR
∂zRt
> (1− λt)
∂naP
∂zPt
.
This condition comes from the fact that
∂L3t+1
∂zRt
= Ltλt
∂naR
∂zRt
and
∂L3t+1
∂zPt
= Lt(1− λt)
∂naP
∂zPt
,
and
∂L3t+1
∂zRt
>
∂L3t+1
∂zPt
if and only if λt
∂na
R
∂zRt
> (1− λt)
∂na
P
∂zPt
. This condition is
set when (
zRt
)2
(zPt )
2
+ (zRt )
2 < λt < 1, (3.18)
or, equivalently
1 <
zRt
zPt
<
√
λt
1− λt
. (3.19)
Obviously, we obtain the same condition if we consider equation (3.17)
and compute
∂L3t+1
∂zRt
= c˜Lt
λt
(zRt )
2
(τ q + τ ee(gt+1))
= Ltλt
∂naR
∂zRt
,
and
∂L3t+1
∂zPt
= c˜Lt
1− λt
(zPt )
2
(τ q + τ ee(gt+1))
= Lt(1− λt)
∂naP
∂zPt
.
We get again that
∂L3t+1
∂zRt
>
∂L3t+1
∂zPt
⇔
zRt
zPt
<
√
λt
1− λt
or
(
zRt
)2
(zPt )
2
+ (zRt )
2 < λt.
We have separately analyzed the effect of income distribution on the
process of development in three different cases: when zRt > z
P
t > z˜, when
zRt > z˜ and z
P
t < z˜, and when z
P
t < z
R
t < z˜. We now compare the different
cases among each other. In order to compare L2t+1 to L
3
t+1, we assume that
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naP = n
a (in the third case the poor have the same number of children than
in the case 2). Then we get
L3t+1 = Lt(λtn
a
R + (1− λt)n
a). (3.20)
Comparing L1t+1 with L
2
t+1, we obtain
L1t+1 − L
2
t+1 = Lt(1− λt)(n
b − na). (3.21)
Since nb > na, we have that
L1t+1 > L
2
t+1.
Comparing L2t+1 with L
3
t+1, we get
L2t+1 − L
3
t+1 = Ltλt(n
b − naR). (3.22)
Since nb > naR, we have that
L2t+1 > L
3
t+1.
Hence
L1t+1 > L
2
t+1 > L
3
t+1. (3.23)
In conclusion, our modified model generates the same three regimes of
the benchmark model, that is:
1. Malthusian regime (small population, L3t+1). We obtain the small-
est population size (and the slowest process of development) when
the subsistence constraint is binding both for the rich and the poor
(zPt < z
R
t < z˜). In this regime economic growth is fuelled when the
fraction of rich individuals is high. The point is that the economy auto-
matically converges to this situation, since the rich have an evolutionary
advantage compared to the poor. When the fraction of rich individu-
als is sufficiently high
(
λt >
(
zRt
)2
/
((
zPt
)2
+
(
zRt
)2))
population and
economic growth are further fostered if income is redistributed in favour
of the rich. In other words, in the Malthusian regime inequality has a
positive effect on economic growth;
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2. post Malthusian regime (moderate population, L2t+1). We have that
zRt > z˜ and z
P
t < z˜. In this case L
2
t+1 is fostered when the fraction
of rich individuals is higher, but it negatively depends on the income
gap zRt − z
P
t . As in the Malthusian regime, the economy automati-
cally converges to a high fraction of rich individuals since they have an
evolutionary advantage compared to the poor;
3. sustained growth (large population, L1t+1). We obtain the largest pop-
ulation size (and the fastest process of development) when the subsis-
tence constraint is not binding both for the rich and the poor (zRt >
zPt > z˜). As it was said before, in this case population size and eco-
nomic growth are not affected by income distribution.
In conclusion, we can say that income distribution:
• does not affect at all investment in education, hence it does not affect
economic growth through the channel of human capital accumulation
and the quality of population,
• has qualitatively different effects on population size (and economic
growth) according to the different stages of the process of development.
In the later stages of the process of development, income distribution
no longer affects the evolution of the economy.
The results obtained by Kremer and Chen (2002) and by de la Croix
and Doepke (2004) are quite different2. Kremer and Chen investigate the
relationship between inequality and fertility differential. In their model the
fertility differential between the rich and the poor has the opposite sign than
our model and rich parents have fewer children than the poor. In addition,
inequality brings about larger fertility differentials. It is due to the fact
that the relation between fertility and income is always monotonic. When
the rates of wage increase, the substitution effect is higher than the income
effect and the optimal number of children declines. Kremer and Chen do not
take into consideration a subsistence level of consumption and the negative
2For a more detailed analysis of the theories developed by Kremer and Chen (2002)
and by de la Croix and Doepke (2004), we refer to the first chapter of this work.
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relation between fertility and income is true for any level of income. As a
consequence, unskilled and poor individuals have always more children than
skilled and rich individuals. With regard to human capital accumulation,
it depends on the incentives provided by wage premia in comparison with
the costs of education. In other words, investment in education is affected
by income consideration. Since children of unskilled and poor parents face
higher costs of education than children of skilled and rich individuals, in
equilibrium we have a differential in education investment, contrary to our
model where rich and poor parents spend the same resources in human capital
accumulation.
De la Croix and Doepke (2004) investigate the relation between fertility
differentials and economic growth. They start from the results obtained by
Kremer and Chen: a) inequality increases the fertility differential between the
rich and the poor (where nRt < n
P
t ), b) the poor provide less education than
the rich. We find two important differences in comparison with our model:
unlike our analysis, both in Kremer and Chen (2002) and in de la Croix and
Doepke (2004) the rich have fewer children than the poor and there exists
an educational differential between the two groups. Given that, inequality
increases the fertility differential, and hence the number of individuals who
provide less education. As a consequence, an increase in inequality lowers
average education and, therefore, economic growth. As a result, inequality
has always a negative effect on economic growth.
Introducing income inequality in the Unified Theory, we have found quite
different results. The divergence is due to the fact that our model is based
on two important elements: a) the rich have more children than the poor,
b) there is no educational differential between the two groups. These two
elements come from the hypotheses and the framework we started with, that
is the Unified Theory, where ∂nt
∂zt
> 0 if zt < z˜, and
∂et+1
∂zt
= 0 for any level
of zt. As a consequence, it is no longer possible to assert that inequality
has always negative effects on economic growth (like in the economic models
where nRt < n
P
t and where the expenditure in education of the rich is higher
than the one of the poor), but we find that the qualitative effects of income
distribution on economic growth change in the different stages of the process
of development.
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3.4 Altruism as Joy of Giving
As explained before, our aim is to investigate the effects of inequality on
economic growth in an altruistic framework. Inequality acts through two dif-
ferent channels: the size of population (quantity of children) and the average
level of human capital among population (quality of children). Our analysis
considers two types of parental altruism. In the previous section, we consid-
ered the case in which parents care about the future wealth of their children.
It leads parents to invest in the education of their children. In this section we
want to focus on the case where parents are altruistic in the sense that they
simply get utility in transferring a monetary amount to each of their chil-
dren (altruism as joy of giving). In this context, children themselves decide
if and how much to invest in their education, given the monetary transfer
received by their parents. We assume that children cannot borrow, therefore
their level of education and the accumulation of human capital depend on
the amount of the intergenerational transfers. If individuals have different
levels of income, we can expect that they transfer different amounts to their
offspring. As a consequence, the process of human capital accumulation will
be affected by income distribution.
As in the previous case, we refer to a benchmark model where parental
altruism is treated as joy of giving. The benchmark we refer to is the model
developed by Galor and Moav (2004). In this model we have two types of
parents: the rich and the poor. They care about the number of children and
they get utility in transferring them a monetary amount, according to their
means. Children cannot borrow and they invest in education according to the
amount received from the parents, therefore the composition of population
considering the poor and rich the affects the process of development.
In the case of altruism as investment in education, the benchmark model
had to be modified because it did not take into consideration income inequal-
ity. In the case of altruism as joy of giving the benchmark model takes into
consideration income inequality. However, it is not sufficient to complete our
analysis, since we are interested in studying a framework where fertility is
endogenous, whereas the model by Galor and Moav takes fertility as exoge-
nous and constant over time. As a consequence, we will proceed as before:
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we will present the benchmark model of altruism as joy of giving and then we
will modify that model, introducing endogenous fertility in order to complete
our analysis on fertility, inequality and growth.
3.4.1 The Benchmark Model of Altruism as Joy of
Giving
Contrary to the Unified Theory, in Galor and Moav (2004) the production
side of the model is described by the following equation:
Yt = AF (Kt;Ht), (3.24)
where Kt and Ht are the stocks of physical and human capital, respectively,
and A is the level of technology (for simplicity, A is assumed to be constant
over time). The production function reflects the neoclassical assumptions.
The output per capita at period t is given by:
yt = Af(kt). (3.25)
The model is based on the hypothesis that human capital accumulation
and physical capital accumulation are asymmetric: the former is character-
ized by diminishing returns, whereas the latter is characterized by increasing
returns. In addition to that, we have a capital-skill complementarity. Phys-
ical capital accumulation increases the rate of return to human capital and
therefore incentives investment in education. From the profit-maximization
we have that
rt = f
′(kt) ≡ r(kt), (3.26)
wt = f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) ≡ w(kt).
In Galor and Moav (2004) population is considered exogenous and con-
stant over time. It is normalized to 1 and each individual has one single
parent and one single child. Parents care about their own consumption and
the value of the monetary amount that they transfer to their offspring. In
other words, parents get utility from the possibility to transfer a monetary
amount to their children (joy of giving). In Section 3.3, we presented the
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case where parents decide if and how much to invest in the education of their
children. In this new framework, parents are simply interested in transferring
a monetary amount to their offspring. In their turn, children decide how to
allocate the intergenerational transfer between education and saving. Pref-
erences of a member i born at period t and adult at period t+ 1 are defined
by the following utility function:
U it = (1− β) ln c
i
t+1 + β ln(θ¯ + b
i
t+1), (3.27)
where cit+1is his/her own consumption, b
i
t+1 is the total transfer to his/her
child and (1 − β) ∈ (0; 1) is the weight given to cit+1. It is assumed that
θ¯ > 0.
The weight that measures the degree of altruism is still β and the weight
given to the consumption is still (1−β). However, parental altruism appears
differently. First of all, in this new framework each individual has one single
child, therefore altruism cannot be defined with respect to the quantity of
children. In Section 3.3, parents care about the quality of children meant
as their future possibility of expenditure (i.e., their income), which depends
on their level of human capital, ht+1. In this new context, parents get util-
ity simply from transferring bit+1 to their offspring. Finally, in the previous
benchmark model (the Unified Theory) we could omit the superscript i be-
cause there was no difference among individuals. On the contrary, the new
benchmark model takes into consideration income distribution and we have
the poor (P ) and the rich (R) individuals. Hence, i = P , R.
The budget constraint is now given by
I it+1 ≥ c
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1, (3.28)
where I it+1 is the second period wealth of individual i. I
i
t+1 is given by the
labour income W it+1 and by the returns on saving x
i
t+1. With regard to the
labor income, if wt+1 is the wage per efficiency unit at period t+ 1 and h
i
t+1
is the level of human capital of individual i, we have that
Wt+1 = wt+1h
i
t+1 = wt+1h(e
i
t).
Concerning the return on saving xit+1, we have to remind that individual i
receives bit from his/her parent in his/her first period of life. He/she spends a
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fraction eit of b
i in education and saves the rest sit = b
i
t−e
i
t. Let Rt+1 ≡ 1+rt+1
be the net return on sit. Since rt+1 is function of kt+1, Rt+1 depends on kt+1,
too. At period t+ 1, we have that
xit+1 = s
i
tRt+1(kt+1).
In all, the second period wealth of individual i is equal to:
I it+1 = wt+1h(e
i
t) + s
i
tRt+1(kt+1). (3.29)
At the microeconomic level, individual i of generation t decides how much
to invest in his/her own education, eit, and how much to transfer to his/her
child, bit+1.
With regard to the choice of eit, individual i determines e
i
t in order to
maximize the second period wealth, I it+1. If there is no constraint, we have
that
wt+1h
′(et) = Rt+1. (3.30)
Since both wt+1 and Rt+1 depend on kt+1, we get
et = e(kt+1). (3.31)
Let k˜ be the level of kt+1 below which individuals do not invest in human
capital. We have that the unconstrained investment in education is given by:
et = e(kt+1)
{
= 0 if kt+1 ≤ k˜
> 0 if kt+1 > k˜
(3.32)
If we suppose that individuals cannot borrow, we get that
eit = min
[
e(kt+1), b
i
t
]
. (3.33)
Hence, the expenditure in education of individual i depends on the amount of
the intergenerational transfer which he/she received by his/her own parent.
With regard to the choice of bit+1, individual i of generation t maximizes
his/her utility with respect to bit+1. It follows that:
bit+1 = b(I
i
t+1) =
{
β
(
I it+1 −
θ¯(1−β)
β
)
if I it+1 ≥
θ¯(1−β)
β
0 if I it+1 <
θ¯(1−β)
β
(3.34)
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We see that the amount that any adult parent decides to transfer to his/her
child depends on his/her level of wealth.
Finally, given the fact that the member i of generation t received bit from
his/her parent and that he/she invested a fraction eit of b
i
t in human capital
accumulation, it follows that his/her saving is equal to:
sit =
{
bit if kt+1 ≤ k˜
bit − e
i
t if kt+1 > k˜
(3.35)
As equation (3.35) shows,
sit
Iit
is an increasing function of I it , according to the
Keynesian saving properties.
Contrary to the Unified Theory, the model developed by Galor and Moav
(2004) deals with an economy characterized by income inequality. At period
t, the rich (R) are a fraction λt of adult population and the poor (P ) are
the fraction 1− λt. Individuals are homogenous within each group and their
offspring are homogenous as well. Since any individual has one single child,
we have that fractions λt and 1 − λt are constant over time (λt = λ and
1 − λt = 1 − λ). The rich own the entire initial stock of physical capital,
whereas the poor constitute the class of workers. Human and physical capital
accumulation is determined by the optimization decisions of the two groups,
P and R. We have that
Kt+1 = λs
R
t + (1− λ)s
P
t = λ(b
R
t − e
R
t ) + (1− λ)(b
P
t − e
P
t ) (3.36)
Kt+1 = K(b
R
t , b
P
t , kt+1),
and
Ht+1 = λh(e
R
t ) + (1− λ)h(e
P
t ) (3.37)
Ht+1 = H(b
R
t , b
P
t , kt+1).
As a consequence, the labor-capital ratio at period t+ 1 is equal to:
kt+1 =
K(bRt , b
P
t , kt+1)
H(bRt , b
P
t , kt+1)
= κ(bRt , b
P
t ), (3.38)
where k0 ∈ (0; k˜). This assumption assures that in the initial stages of
development the rate of return to physical capital is higher than the one
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to human capital. Hence, the labor-capital ratio in period t + 1 is fully
determined by the level of intergenerational transfers of groups R and P at
period t.
In order to determine bRt and b
P
t , we study the evolution of transfers
within each group i = R, P . We know that bit+1 depends on I
i
t (see equation
(3.34)). On the other hand, I it+1 depends on e
i
t (see equation (3.29)), and e
i
t
is function of kt+1 (see equation (3.33)). Finally, kt+1 depends on b
R
t and b
P
t
(see equation (3.38)). It follows that
bit+1 = φ(b
i
t; kt+1) = φ(b
i
t;κ(b
R
t ; b
P
t )) = Ψ(b
R
t ; b
P
t ). (3.39)
It is possible to prove that, for bR0 > b
P
0
bRt ≥ b
P
t for all t. (3.40)
At this point, we can study the interaction between the micro- and the
macroeconomic level of the model. According to previous results, we can
identify two different regimes.
1. Regime I: physical capital is scarce, therefore the rate of return to
human capital is lower than the one to physical capital. As a conse-
quence, there is no incentive to invest in education and the process of
growth is fueled by physical capital accumulation. The poor consume
their entire income and the rich accumulate physical capital (see fig-
ure (3.1)). The poor are in a poverty trap, whereas the rich become
richer and richer. Inequality increases the wealth of individuals whose
marginal propensity to save is higher, hence inequality enhances ag-
gregate saving, capital accumulation and, consequently, the process of
development (according to the Classical approach).
2. Regime II: as the rich accumulate physical capital, the stock of physical
capital become less scarce and its return declines. The situation goes
on until the rate of return to human capital is sufficiently high so as to
induce human capital accumulation. This regime can be divided into
three stages:
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Figure 3.1: The Evolution of bit in Regime I
• stage I: the capital-labor ratio generates wage rates that justify
investment in education. Anyway, wages are still lower than the
threshold level that permits intergenerational transfers for the
poor (see equation (3.34)). They still consume their entire in-
come. On the contrary, the income of the rich is such high that
permits intergenerational transfers (see figure (3.2)) and physical
capital as well as human capital accumulation (selective human
capital accumulation),
• stage II: the capital-labor ratio generates wage rates that permit
some investment in education by all individuals (universal human
capital accumulation). Anyway, the expenditure in education by
the poor is constrained by parental wealth and it is sub optimal.
The rate of return to human capital among the poor is thus higher
than the return to education among the rich. Equality alleviates
the adverse effect of credit constraints on the investment in hu-
man capital by the poor and has therefore a positive effect on the
average level of human capital and economic growth (according
to the Capital Market Imperfection approach). Due to the grad-
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Figure 3.2: The Evolution of bit in Stage I of Regime II
ual increase in the expenditure for education, the rate of wages
increases,
• stage III: credit constraints are no longer binding due to the in-
crease in wages in stage II. The rate of return to human capital
for the poor is equal to the one for the rich. As a consequence,
inequality has no effect on economic growth (see figure (3.3)).
In conclusion, according to the just presented theory, the effect of inequal-
ity on economic growth is not always the same, but it changes according to
the different stages of the process of development. In the early stages of de-
velopment, when the physical capital is the prime engine of economic growth,
the Classical approach is confirmed: inequality channels resources towards
individuals with the highest marginal propensity to save, thus it enhances
aggregate savings, capital accumulation and, consequently, economic growth.
As the stock of physical capital increases, the rate of return to human capital
rises (due to the complementarity between capital and skills) and it incentives
investment in education. Since investment in human capital accumulation
is characterized by diminishing marginal returns, the aggregate return to
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Figure 3.3: The Evolution of bit in Stage II and III of Regime II
human capital is maximized when the marginal returns are equal between
individuals. Since equality overcomes the negative effect of credit constraints,
it fuels the process of development (according to the Capital Market Imper-
fection approach). In the later stages of development, credit constraints are
no longer binding, differences in the marginal propensity to save decline and
the effect of income distribution on economic growth becomes less significant.
The model developed by Galor and Moav investigates the effects of income
distribution on economic growth in a context of parental altruism meant as
joy of giving. However, Galor and Moav consider population exogenous and
constant over time. Our aim is to conduct the same type of analysis, but
in a framework where fertility is endogenous. In the next section, we will
introduce endogenous fertility in the just presented benchmark model.
3.4.2 Joy of Giving, Inequality and Endogenous Fer-
tility
We have just presented the model developed by Galor and Moav (2004),
where parental altruism appears as joy of giving and parents get utility from
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transferring a monetary amount to their children. In this framework, Galor
and Moav study the effect of income distribution on the economic growth.
However, they consider population exogenous and constant over time. Our
purpose is to treat population as an endogenous variable. In order to that,
we introduce endogenous fertility in the above benchmark model. On this
point, Galor and Moav themselves write:
The incorporation of endogenous fertility decisions into the ba-
sic model would enrich the understanding of the reasons for the
changing role of inequality in the process of development. If, for
instance, individuals gain utility from the quantity and the wealth
of their children, then as long as the income of poor families is in-
sufficient to provide bequests for their children, poor individuals
would choose high fertility rates that would negatively affect the
capital-labour ratio and hence offspring’s income, delaying the
timing of universal investment in human capital. However, once
wages would increase sufficiently due to capital accumulation and
the poor can afford bequeathing, there is an incentive to reduce
the number of children, increasing the share of bequest to each
child. The second phase of transition to modern growth would
be therefore accelerated. (Galor and Moav (2004), p. 1022)
Actually, this passage involves a significant change in the basic model.
Galor and Moav write about a model where individuals gain utility from the
quantity and the wealth of their children, and not from the quantity of their
children and the possibility of transferring to them a monetary amount bit+1.
In other words, the extension proposed by Galor and Moav turns the basic
model, which considers altruism as joy of giving, into a different model, where
parents care about the future wealth of their children. The wealth of children
depends on the expenditure in education and human capital accumulation,
thus it depends on the fraction of intergenerational transfers invested in edu-
cation. However, parents do not directly gain utility from these transfers. In
other words, the extension proposed by Galor and Moav may be formalized
following equation (3.3), that is
Ui = u(ci;ni;Wi+1(ei+1)),
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where et+1 is the parental investment in education. We may think about et+1
as a monetary cost or a time cost (in this case we come back to the Unified
Theory ) or both. Contrary to the extension proposed by Galor and Moav,
we are interested in continuing to think about parental altruism as joy of
giving, according to equation (3.5), that is
Ui = u(ci;ni; bi+1).
Following the benchmark model by Galor and Moav (2004) and introduc-
ing endogenous fertility, the utility function given by equation (3.27) becomes
U it = (1− β) ln c
i
t+1 + β[ln(θ¯ + n
i
t+1) + ln(θ¯ + b
i
t+1)], (3.41)
where i denotes individual i born at period t and adult at period t+ 1. nit+1
is the number of children of i. As in the benchmark model, cit+1 is the adult
consumption of i and bit+1 the monetary transfer from i to each of his/her
children. The presence of θ¯ > 0 reflects the hypothesis of the benchmark
model: if nit+1 and/or b
i
t+1 are equal to 0, the utility of individual i does not
go to −∞. For simplicity, let us assume that θ¯ = 1. It means that when
nit+1 = b
i
t+1 = 0, individual i gets 0 as regards the utility motivated by his
altruism, but he gets a positive utility from his consumption cit+1. Notice
that, following the benchmark model (see again equation (3.27)), we assume
that individual i gives the same weight to the number of children and to the
joy of giving them a monetary transfer. We could have used the following
utility function
U it = (1− β) ln c
i
t+1 + β[γ ln(θ¯ + n
i
t+1) + (1− γ) ln(θ¯ + b
i
t+1)], (3.42)
where γ is the weight given to nit+1 and (1 − γ) is the one given to b
i
t+1.
However, we prefer to use equation (3.41), since equation (3.42) makes the
analytical treatment of the model more complex, without changing its qual-
itative results.
Supposing that each child involves only the monetary cost bit+1 (like in
the benchmark model), the budget constraint for individual i is now given
by:
I it+1 ≥ c
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1n
i
t+1.
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With regard to the macroeconomic framework of the model, our modified
model keeps the same characteristics of the benchmark model, except for the
fact that the level of physical and human capital are now determined by the
average level of physical and human capital among population. Population is
still constituted by two groups of individuals: the poor (P ) and the rich (I).
The level of wealth of the poor is equal to IP , whereas the level of wealth of
the rich is denoted with IR (where II > IP ). Expecting that, in general, the
poor and the rich are characterized by different fertility rates (nPt+1 and n
R
t+1),
different saving rates (sPt and s
R
t ) and by different expenditures in education
(ePt and e
R
t ), we have that the aggregate physical and human capital at period
t+ 1 are given by:
Kt+1 = K
R
t+1 +K
P
t+1, (3.43)
and
Ht+1 = H
R
t+1 +H
P
t+1, (3.44)
where Kit+1 with i = P , R is the stock of physical capital accumulated by
the rich and the poor, respectively, and H it+1 with i = P , R is the stock of
human capital accumulated by the rich and the poor, respectively. We have
that
Kt+1 = λtn
R
t s
R
t +(1−λt)n
P
t s
P
t = λtn
R
t (b
R
t −e
R
t )+(1−λt)n
P
t (b
P
t −e
P
t ), (3.45)
and
Ht+1 = λtn
R
t h(e
R
t ) + (1− λt)n
P
t h(e
P
t ). (3.46)
In the above equations, λt and 1− λt are the fraction of R and of P among
population (that measures 1) at period t, respectively. Unlike the benchmark
model, where λt and 1−λt are constant over time (due to the fact that fertility
is exogenous and constant), in our modified model the fraction of the rich and
the fraction of the poor among population changes over time, according to the
fertility rates nRt and n
P
t . As will see soon, the fertility rates within the group
i = P , R at period t + 1 depend on the fertility rates and intergenerational
transfers within the group at period t, hence λt and 1− λt are endogenously
determined. For simplicity, we consider the size of the two groups at period
t, λt and 1− λt, as given. n
R
t and n
P
t denote the number of children per rich
adult and per poor adult born at period t from λt rich individuals and 1−λt
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poor individuals. Finally, sit and e
i
t (with i = P , R) denote the rate of saving
and the expenditure in education of these individuals at period t.
In other words, if we compare our modified model with the benchmark
model, we notice that:
• in the utility function, we now find the number of children nit+1, too;
• aggregate physical and human capital, and consequently the level of
output, are now determined by the average level of physical and human
capital among population. The fraction of the rich and of the poor
among population is not longer constant over time.
First of all, we focus on the micro framework of the model. When we
solve the modified model that considers fertility as an endogenous variable,
the solution for eit is still given by equation (3.33), like in the benchmark
model. In the same way, sit is still given by equation (3.35). The solutions
for eit and s
i
t are not affected by the introduction of endogenous fertility, since
any individual decides how much to invest in his/her own education and how
much to save, contrary to the case where parents decide how much to invest
in the education of their children.
On the contrary, something changes when we look for the solution for bit+1
and nit+1. In the benchmark model, any individual has only one child and
nit+1 is not a decisional variable. When we introduce endogenous fertility,
individual i determines bit+1 and n
i
t+1 in such a way as to maximize his/her
utility. Then
(nit+1; b
i
t+1) = argmax
{
U it
}
for i = P,R.
Since individuals give the same weight to nit+1 and b
i
t+1, we have that n
i
t+1 =
bit+1. In particular, we get
nit+1 = b
i
t+1 =
√
(1− β)2 + 4βI it+1 − (1− β)
2
> 0 for i = P,R. (3.47)
Unlike the benchmark model, we get that bit+1 (and n
i
t+1) is always positive
for any I it+1 > 0. We can notice that n
i
t+1 and b
i
t+1 are increasing functions
in I it , hence
nRt+1 = b
R
t+1 > n
P
t+1 = b
P
t+1 for all t. (3.48)
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Like in the benchmark model, intergenerational transfers within group R
are always higher than intergenerational transfers within group P .
In addition to that, we get a positive fertility differential between R and
P (nRt+1 − n
P
t+1 > 0): the rich have always more children than the poor.
This result comes from the hypotheses of our model concerning individual
preferences and the budget constraint. In particular, we have assumed that
the weight given to nit+1 is the same given to b
i
t+1. In addition, the weight
given to nit+1 and b
i
t+1 is equal for all the individuals, exogenous and constant
over time. Preferences are maximized taking into consideration a budget
constraint where children involves only a monetary cost equal to bit+1. Since
raising children does not take any fraction of the parents’ time, but only a
monetary cost, it is more costly for parents who have low incomes (that is,
P ). If we introduce a time cost for each child, raising children becomes more
costly for parents who have high wages, that is R. In this case, the fertility
differential nRt+1 − n
P
t+1 decreases and it may be negative (that is, the poor
have more children than the rich), like in Kremer and Chen (2002) and in de
la Croix and Doepke (2004) (we will later discuss about the model developed
by Kremer and Chen (2002) and de la Croix and Doepke (2004)). Even
more realistically, we could formalize preferences and raising children cost
that generate a non-monotonic relation between income and fertility. In this
case, the relation between nRt+1 − n
P
t+1 and the income gap I
R
t+1 − I
P
t+1 would
not be monotonic as well. Even if a positive fertility differential between
R and P is not realistic, we prefer to consider this case in order to diverge
from the benchmark model as little as possible. We will later discuss about
the different effects of positive, null and negative fertility differentials on the
evolution of the economy.
Given the solutions for eit, s
i
t, n
i
t+1 and b
i
t+1, we can now consider the
macroeconomic framework of the model. As seen before, aggregate physical
and human capital are given by equation (3.45) and equation (3.46). We
have to notice that, in equation (3.46) nit denotes the number of individuals
born at period t, therefore it is a decisional variable of individuals born at
period t− 1 and adult at period t, that is
nit =
√
(1− β)2 + 4βI it − (1− β)
2
> 0 for i = P,R.
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From equation (3.45) and equation (3.46) we can see that
Kt+1 = K(b
R
t ; b
P
t ;n
R
t ;n
P
t ; kt+1;λt), (3.49)
Ht+1 = H(b
R
t ; b
P
t ;n
R
t ;n
P
t ; kt+1;λt), (3.50)
hence
kt+1 ≡
Kt+1
Ht+1
= κ(bRt ; b
P
t ;n
R
t ;n
P
t ;λt). (3.51)
Unlike the benchmark model, we have that aggregate human and physical
capital depend, not only on bRt and b
P
t , but also on the fertility rates of both
R and P .
The same is true for the evolution of intergenerational transfers and fer-
tility rates within each group. More precisely, from equation (3.47) we get
that nit+1 and b
i
t+1 depend on I
i
t+1. Like in the benchmark model, we have
that
I it+1 = wt+1h(e
i
t) + s
i
tRt+1 = wt+1h(e
i
t) + (b
i
t − e
i
t)Rt+1,
hence
nit+1 = b
i
t+1 =
√
(1− β)2 + 4 (wt+1h(eit) + (b
i
t − e
i
t)Rt+1) β − (1− β)
2
.
On the other hand, from equation (3.32) and equation (3.33) we know that
eit =
{
e(kt+1) if b
i
t > e(kt+1)
bit if b
i
t < e(kt+1)
Consequently
nit+1 = b
i
t+1 =


√
(1−β)2+4(wt+1h(bit))β−(1−β)
2
if bit < e(kt+1)√
(1−β)2+4(wt+1h(e(kt+1))+(bit−e(kt+1))Rt+1)β−(1−β)
2
if bit > e(kt+1)
In conclusion, we have that
nit+1 = b
i
t+1 = φ(b
i
t; kt+1) = φ(b
i
t;κ(b
R
t ; b
P
t ;n
R
t ;n
P
t )) = φ(b
R
t ; b
P
t ;n
R
t ;n
P
t ) ,
(3.52)
for i = R, P .
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Finally, we can focus on the process of development and how it is affected
by income distribution. In Galor and Moav (2004), qualitative effects of
inequality on the economic growth change during the different stages of the
process of development. In the following paragraphs we are going to stress
the differences between the model developed by Galor and Moav and our
model where we introduced endogenous fertility.
Like in the benchmark model, we can pick out two different regimes.
1. Regime I: physical capital is scarce, the rate of return to human capital
is low, and there is no incentive to invest in education. Both the group
P and R acquire only basic skill (ei = 0). However, the effect of inequal-
ity on the process of development is quite different from the benchmark
model. In Galor and Moav (2004), there is a positive threshold level
of income that permits intergenerational transfers. In regime I, IPt+1
does not reach that level and bPt+1 = 0. As a consequence, in Galor and
Moav inequality channels resources towards individuals that accumu-
lates physical capital and enhances economic growth. In our modified
model, bit+1 > 0 (and s
i
t+1 > 0) for all I
i
t+1 > 0 and for i = P , R. It
means that also in the early stages of development, we have positive
intergenerational transfers and positive rates of saving among dynas-
ties of group P . In Galor and Moav we have a selective accumulation
of physical capital (by R), whereas in our modified model we have a
universal accumulation of physical capital (both by R and P ), even if
the poor save and accumulate less physical capital in comparison with
the rich. In addition, in our modified model we have also to consider
that nRt+1 > n
P
t+1. In Galor and Moav the stock of physical capital in-
creases when resources are channeled towards the rich, since the poor
do not accumulate physical capital at all. On the contrary, in our mod-
ify model Kt+1 is affected also by a positive K
P
t+1 (the stock of physical
capital accumulated by the poor). Since nRt > n
P
t and s
R
t > s
P
t , from
equation (3.45) we have that Kt+1 increases when the initial fraction
λt of rich individuals is higher. We know that n
R
t > n
P
t , hence the
rich have an evolutionary advantage and the economy automatically
converges to a state where the most of population is formed by rich
individuals. With regard to the effect of the income gap IRt −I
P
t on the
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evolution of the economy, we have that nit and s
i
t+1 positively depend
on I it (with i = R, P ), hence equation (3.45) tells us that physical cap-
ital accumulation is an increasing function both in IRt+1 and I
P
t . Like
in the case of parental altruism as investment in education, we have
that inequality has a positive effect on the process of development only
if ∂Kt+1
∂IRt
> ∂Kt+1
∂IRt
. The result depends on the marginal propensity to
save and to conceive of the rich
(
∂sRt
∂IRt
;
∂nRt
∂IRt
)
and of the poor
(
∂sPt
∂IPt
;
∂nPt
∂IPt
)
and on the initial ratio λt
1−λt
between rich and poor individuals. On the
contrary, in Galor and Moav, since KPt+1 = 0, we have that an increase
in IRt − I
P
t always promotes physical capital accumulation.
2. Regime II: as the rich and the poor accumulate physical capital, the
stock of physical capital become less scarce and its return declines.
Physical capital is replaced by human capital as prime engine of eco-
nomic growth. Therefore, the gap sRt − s
P
t has no longer a significant
role. The rate of return to human capital becomes sufficiently high so
as to induce human capital accumulation.
• Stage I and stage II: the capital-labor ratio generates wage rates
that justify investment in education. In Galor and Moav (2004),
wages are still lower than the threshold level that permits intergen-
erational transfers for the poor. On the contrary, in our modified
model the income of the rich as well as the income of the poor
permit intergenerational transfers and physical capital as well as
human capital accumulation. We do not have a selective human
capital accumulation, but a universal human capital accumula-
tion, since both P and R start to invest in education. In Galor
and Moav (2004) only in stage II the economy reaches a universal
human capital accumulation. In our model stage I and stage II
occurs at the same time. However, until the credit constraints are
binding, the expenditure in education of the poor is still lower than
the expenditure in education of the rich. As a consequence, human
capital accumulation is an increasing function in the quote of rich
individuals among population (given nRt > n
P
t and h(e
R
t ) > h(e
P
t )
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from equation (3.46) we see that ∂Ht+1
∂λt
> 0). As we previously
explained, the rich have an evolutionary advantage and the econ-
omy converges to a state where most of the population consists
in rich individuals. With regard to the effect of the income gap
IRt − I
P
t on human capital accumulation, from equation (3.46) we
have that Ht+1 positively depends both on I
R
t and I
P
t (since n
i
t
and eit are increasing functions in I
i
t , with i = R, P ). An increase
IRt − I
P
t has a positive effect on the process of development only if
∂Ht+1
∂IRt
> ∂Ht+1
∂IPt
. Also in this case, the result depend on the marginal
propensity to spend in education of the rich and of the poor and
on the ratio λt
1−λt
.
• Stage III: credit constraints are no longer binding due to the in-
crease in wages in Stage II. It means that bRt > b
P
t > et. As a
consequence, we have that eRt = e
P
t = et. The evolution of the
economy is no longer depending on the distribution of intergener-
ational transfers, like in the benchmark model. The rich continue
to have more children than the poor, but both the groups acquire
the same level of human capital and the output per capita is not
affected by income distribution.
Even if in the modified model we get a universal accumulation of physical
as well as human capital, it is still true that sRt > s
P
t and, until the credit
constraints are binding, eRt > e
P
t . Furthermore, contrary to the benchmark
model, we have a fertility differential and individuals that accumulate more
physical and human capital have more children with respect to the individuals
whose propensity to accumulate physical and human capital is lower (nRt >
nPt ). In other models, we find a fertility differential with opposite sign and
rich individuals have fewer children than the poor. We now want to stress
some important issues concerning the the role of the sign of the fertility
differential between different income classes. For simplicity, we prefer to
carry out that considering the process of accumulation of human capital,
failing to consider physical capital. Anyway, the analysis for physical capital
would be identical to the one concerning human capital.
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Like in the benchmark model, when income is redistributed more equally
among the two groups, equality alleviates the negative effect of credit con-
straints on human capital accumulation and it promotes a higher investment
in education for all population. However, until the credit constraints are
binding, the expenditure in education of the poor is still lower than the ex-
penditure in education of the rich. In addition, unlike the benchmark model,
in our modified model we also have a fertility differential between the rich
and the poor and we have to take it into consideration. Given the fact that
the income inequality generates a positive educational differential between
the rich and the poor (that is, the rich are more educated than the poor), we
want to analyze how income inequality affects the economic growth through
the channel of the fertility differential.
First of all, let us consider the simplest case, which is the one where
fertility is exogenous and constant across families with different income (like
in the benchmark model). In this case we have no fertility differentials. Since
the production of human capital is concave in education and education is a
positive function of income, average human capital is lower if the distribution
of wealth is less equal. Therefore, inequality has a negative effect on human
capital accumulation and economic growth (see again the benchmark model).
Endogenous fertility affects this mechanism and its effect differs according
to the sign of fertility differentials between P and R.
As seen before, our model generates a positive fertility differential between
the rich and the poor (that is, the rich have more children than the poor). As
explained above, it is due to the fact that children involve only a monetary
cost and they not require any fraction of the parent’s time. Since fertility is
higher for people that accumulates more human capital, the negative effect
of inequality on human capital accumulation explained above (in the case of
exogenous and constant fertility) is counterbalanced. The net effect is not
known, at priori. If income is distributed more equally, it increases the level
of human capital of the poor, but it reduces the share of the individuals that
have the means to invest more in education. The net effect on the average
level of human capital and on the output per capita depends on the size of
fertility and educational differentials and how they are affected by the wage
gap between P and R.
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Consider now the case of a negative fertility differential between the rich
and the poor (that is, the rich have fewer children than the poor), like in
Kremer and Chen (2002) and de la Croix and Doepke (2004). Like in our
analysis, also in de la Croix and Doepke (2004) R invest in education more
than P , even if that educational differential is explained through a mechanism
which is different from the one described in our model3. Unlike our model,
in de la Croix and Doepke we find a negative fertility differential between
R and P . It is due to the fact that raising children takes a fixed amount of
the parents’ time. Consequently, having children is more costly for the rich
and they decide to have fewer children. If fertility is higher for people that
accumulates less human capital, the negative effect of inequality on human
capital accumulation described in the case of exogenous and constant fertility
is amplified. In other words, when we have a negative fertility differential
between the rich and the poor, the first negative effect of inequality on human
capital accumulation is amplified and the net effect is negative for sure. On
the contrary, if we have a positive fertility differential between the rich and
the poor, like in our model, the first negative effect of inequality on human
capital accumulation is counterbalanced and the net effect is not known, at
priori.
Finally, we should consider the more realistic case where the relation
between income and fertility is non-monotonic. The problem is that in this
case the analysis would be complicated by the fact that the relation between
the size and the sign of fertility differentials and the income gap IRt+1 − I
P
t+1
would be not monotonic as well.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have studied the effects of income inequality on economic
growth in a context where individuals are altruistic towards their children.
3In our model, each individual decides how much to invest in his/her own education.
On the contrary, in the model developed by de la Croix and Doepke, parents decide how
much to invest in the education of their children. Since in that model the cost of education
is fixed and does not depend on the parents’ wage, the rich invest in education more than
the poor.
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We have considered two different types of altruistic behavior: the case where
parents care about the quantity of children and their future possibility of
expenditure and the case where parents care about the quantity of children
and directly get utility from the possibility of transferring to them a positive
monetary amount. In the first case parents are moved to invest in the ed-
ucation of their children, whereas in the second case any individual decides
how much to invest in his/her own education.
In order to complete our analysis, we have used two benchmark models
where parental altruism is presented as investment in the education of chil-
dren (the Unified Theory by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor (2005)) and
as joy of giving (the model developed by Galor and Moav (2004)). However,
we had to modify both the benchmark model, since the Unified Theory does
not take into consideration income distribution and Galor and Moav (2004)
do not consider fertility as an endogenous variable.
Introducing income distribution in the Unified Theory, we have formalized
a model that generates a fertility differential between income classes (rich
and poor), but no educational differential among individuals. Following the
results of the Unified Theory, our modified model generates a positive fertility
differential between R and P . It means that rich individuals have always
more children than poor individuals.
Introducing endogenous fertility in the second benchmark model, we spec-
ified a model that generates a fertility differential as well as an educational
differential. Once again, the rich have more children than the poor. Con-
cerning the educational differential, rich individuals acquire more skills than
poor individuals.
In both the cases (parental altruism as investment in education and as joy
of giving) we have concluded that the effects of income inequality on economic
growth change in the different stages of the process of development. In stages
where both the groups (P and R) accumulate physical and human capital,
we do not know at priori the net effect of inequality on the level of output pro
capita. It is due to the existence of a positive fertility differential between
the rich and the poor (nRt > n
P
t for all t). On the contrary, in models that
generate a negative fertility differential between R and P (nRt < n
P
t for all t)
inequality has always a positive effect on physical capital accumulation and
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a negative effect on human capital accumulation.
Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Appendix to Section 2.4
Individual 1 is interested in solving
(n; s) = argmax {U} (A.1)
(n; s) = argmax {ln(W − (f + b)n− x− s) + φ ln(xn+ sRs)} ,
with n ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0. The Lagrangian function is given by:
L = U + λ1n+ λ2s.
The first order conditions are given by:
∂U
∂n
≤ 0;
∂U
∂s
≤ 0 (A.2)
n ≥ 0; s ≥ 0 (A.3)
n
∂U
∂n
= 0; s
∂U
∂s
= 0. (A.4)
From equation (A.4) we get two solutions for n
n1 = 0 (A.5)
n2 =
φx (W − x− s)− (f + b)sRs
(f + b)x(1 + φ)
,
and two solutions for s
s1 = 0, (A.6)
s2 =
φRs (W − (f + b)n− x)− xn
Rs(1 + φ)
.
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As a consequence, we have four possible solutions:
n = 0; s = 0 (A.7)
n =
φx (W − x− s)− (f + b)sRs
(f + b)x(1 + φ)
; s =
φRs (W − (f + b)n− x)− xn
Rs(1 + φ)
n = 0; s =
φ (W − x)
(1 + φ)
n =
φ (W − x)
(f + b)(1 + φ)
; s = 0.
The first and the second solutions never set the conditions (A.2) and (A.3).
We third solutions satisfy these conditions only if Rs ≥
x
f+b
≡ Rf , whereas
we can accept the fourth solution only if Rs ≤
x
f+b
≡ Rf .
A.2 Appendix to Section 2.5.1
Among social transfers, we can also consider a state benefit c to the parents
for each child. In this case, the net cost of raising each child is equal to:
k = f − c. (A.8)
We suppose that k is positive, that is f > c1. Furthermore, for simplicity
we do not take into consideration how c is financed. In this case, the utility
function of individual 1 is
U¯1 = ln (w − (k + b)n− x− s) + φ ln ((x+ τW )n+ sRs) , (A.9)
where k + b > 0. The return on family is given by:
R¯f =
(x+ τW )
k + b
. (A.10)
Choosing the optimal level of saving and the optimal number of children,
individual 1 will still find a corner solution.
if Rs > Rf ⇒ n¯ = 0; s¯ =
φ (w − x)
(1 + φ)
=
φw
1 + φ
, (A.11)
If Rs < Rf ⇒ n¯ =
φ (w − x)
(k + b)(1 + φ)
; s¯ = 0.
1If the state subsidy c is higher than the fixed cost f , parents will decide to have the
maximum physiological number of children.
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The only difference with the case without the family subsidy c is that we
have k = f − c instead of f . Since f + b− c < f + b, when we introduce the
subsidy c, the return on family is, ceteris paribus, higher than the return on
family in the case without the subsidy. It means that the threshold level of
Rs starting from which individuals are induced to save is higher compared
to the case where c = 0.
Supposing that Rs < R¯f , we find that the optimal number of children
and the constitution A¯ which maximize the utility of individual 1 are given
by:
b¯a = 0, (A.12)
x¯a = W
φ− 2τφ− τ
(1 + 2φ)
,
n¯a =
φW
k(1 + 2φ)
.
Individual 2 can keep A¯ or introduce the constitution O¯ = (b¯o; x¯o) such that
b¯o =
(1 + φ)k
φ(1 + φ+ φ2)
(A.13)
x¯o = W
(1 + φ)φ2 − τ (1 + 3φ+ 3φ2 + 2φ3)
(1 + φ+ φ2) (1 + 2φ)
,
having a number of children equal to:
n¯2 = W (1− τ)
φ2(1 + φ+ φ2)
(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)(1 + φ)k
. (A.14)
If individual 2 keep A¯, he gets a pay off equal to:
a¯ = ln
(
W
1 + 2φ
)
+ φ ln
(
W 2φ2
k(1 + 2φ)2
)
, (A.15)
whereas, if he introduces O¯, he gets
h¯ = ln
(
W
1− τ
1 + φ
)
+ φ ln
(
W 2(1− τ)φ4
(1 + 2φ)(1 + 2φ+ φ2 + φ3)k
)
. (A.16)
Notice that the only difference from the previous case is that we have k = f−c
instead that f . The difference between the two payoffs is still given by
equation (2.42), so a¯ > h¯. It means that A¯ is still negotiation-proof, thus
individual 1 decide to introduce that constitution.
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A.3 Appendix to Section 2.5.2
Individuals’ choices are constrained by a subsistence consumption. In partic-
ular, it is assumed that individuals have to secure for themselves a subsistence
level of consumption z during adulthood and a subsistence level of consump-
tion v in the old age. Supposing that the return on family is higher than
the return on saving, individual 1 has to solve the following maximization
problem:
(b˜a; x˜a) = argmax
{
U˜1
}
(A.17)
(b˜a; x˜a) = argmax {ln(W − (f + b)n˜− x− s˜) + φ ln (xn˜+ s˜Rs)} ,
where
s˜ = 0, (A.18)
n˜ =
v(f + b) + xφ(W − x− z)
(f + b)x(1 + φ)
,
and subject to
(c˜a) = W − (f + b)n˜− x− s˜ ≥ z (A.19)
(c˜o) = xn˜+ s˜Rs ≥ v.
The solution is given by:
b˜a = 0, (A.20)
x˜a =
φ(W − z) +H
2(1 + 2φ)
,
n˜a =
φ(W − z) +H
2f(1 + 2φ)
,
where
H =
√
φ2(W − z)2 + 4fv(1 + 2φ).
In addition, we have to assume that
(W − z)2 − 4fv ≥ 0. (A.21)
If this condition is set, we obtain two local maximum, which guarantee only
the consumption of subsistence, and the solution (b˜a; x˜a; n˜a), which is the
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only global maximum. It guarantees an above subsistence consumption. If
the condition (W − z)2 − 4fv ≥ 0 is not set, the first and the second solu-
tions are negative and (b˜a; x˜a; n˜a) does not guarantee the subsistence levels
of consumption. Hence, we have to assume that (W − z)2 − 4fv ≥ 0.
If individual 2 keeps A˜, he/she gets a pay-off equal to:
a˜ = ln ((c˜a)a) + φ ln ((c˜o)a) (A.22)
a˜ = ln
(
W − (f + b˜a)n˜a − x˜a
)
+ φ ln (x˜an˜a) ,
where
(c˜a)a =
W (1 + φ) + φz −H
(1 + 2φ)
> z (A.23)
(c˜o)a =
(W − z)2φ2 +H(W − z)φ+ 2fv(1 + 2φ)
2f(1 + 2φ)2
> v.
Individual 2 can change A˜ with O˜ such that
(b˜o; x˜o) = argmax
{
U˜3
}
(A.24)
(b˜o; x˜o) = argmax
{
ln(f + b) + φ ln (W − (f + b)n˜3 − x) + φ
2 ln(xn˜3)
}
,
subject to
(c˜c)o = f + b ≥ f (A.25)
(c˜a)o = W − (f + b)n˜3 − x ≥ z
(c˜o)o = xn˜3 ≥ v.
We get:
b˜o(n˜3) =
n˜3(W − fn˜3 − z)− v
n˜23(1 + φ+ φ
2)
, (A.26)
x˜o(n˜3) =
φ2n˜3(W − fn˜3 − z) + v(1 + φ)
n˜3(1 + φ+ φ2)
.
In his/her turn, individual 3, once adult, will determine n˜3 such that
(n˜3) = argmax
{
U˜3
}
(A.27)
(n˜3) = argmax
{
ln
(
W − (f + b˜o)n˜3 − x˜
o
)
+ φ ln(x˜on˜3)
}
,
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subject to
(c˜a)o = W − (f + b˜
o)n˜3 − x˜
o ≥ z (A.28)
(c˜o)o = x˜
on˜3 ≥ v.
We obtain
n˜3 = n˜
a =
φ(W − z) +H
2f(1 + 2φ)
. (A.29)
Hence:
b˜o = (1 + φ)
(W − z)(H − φ(W − z))− 4fv
2v(1 + φ+ φ2)
, (A.30)
x˜o =
H(1 + 3φ+ φ2)− φ(W − z) (1 + φ− φ2)
2(1 + 2φ)(1 + φ+ φ2)
.
If individual 2 decides to introduce O˜, his/her optimal number of children
will be
n˜2 = argmax
{
U˜2
}
= argmax
{
ln
(
W − (f + b˜o)n˜2 − 0
)
+ φ ln (x˜on˜2)
}
,
(A.31)
subject to
W − (f + b˜o)n˜2 − 0 ≥ z (A.32)
x˜on˜2 ≥ v.
We can compute n˜2 and the pay-off h˜ as functions of x˜
o and b˜o:
n˜2 =
xoφ(W − z) + v(f + bo)
xo(f + bo)(1 + φ)
, (A.33)
h˜ = ln
(
W − (f + b˜o)n˜2 − 0
)
+ φ ln(x˜on˜2),
that is
h˜ = ln
(
x˜o(W + φz)− v(f + b˜o)
x˜o(1 + φ)
)
+ φ ln
(
x˜oφ(W − z) + v(f + b˜o)
(f + b˜o)(1 + φ)
)
.
(A.34)
Substituting the values of (b˜o; x˜o), we get the pay-off h˜ as function of the
parameters involved in the model, like a˜.
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